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Editor’s Note |
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Theocracy or Democracy? The Choice Facing Khatami Eric Rouleau |
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Iran under Khatami: Deadlock or Change? Mark J. Gasiorowski |
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Civil Society and Democratisation during Khatami’s First Term Hossein Bashiriyeh |
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The Reform Movement: Background and Vulnerability Abbas Abdi |
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Opponents of Reform: Tradition in the Service of Radicalism Kamran Giti |
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Iran’s New Order: Domestic Developments and Foreign Policy Outcomes Anoushiravan Ehteshami |
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Geopolitics and Reform under Khatami Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh |
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The Future of US–Iran Relations Gary Sick |
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Iran and Europe: Trends and Prospects Ahmad Naghibzadeh |
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Iran and the Caucasus: The Triumph of Pragmatism over Ideology Svante E. Cornell |
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Iran’s Turbulent Neighbour: The Challenge of the Taliban Amin Saikal |
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Khatami’s Economic Record: Small Bandages on Deep Wounds Jahangir Amuzegar |
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The Voice of Reform: Iran’s Beleaguered Press Mohammad Soltanifar |
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Screening Iran: The Cinema as National Forum Richard Tapper |
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Book Review OPEC under the Microscope Walid Khadduri |
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Book Review Racism: A Scandinavian Case-Study John Solomos |
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Book Review Asian Values, Asian Rights Jack Donnelly |
GLOBAL DIALOGUE
Volume 3 ● Number 2–3 ● Spring/Summer 2001—Iran at the Crossroads The Voice of Reform: Iran’s Beleaguered Press
After Khatami’s victory, the struggle between the two chief opposing factions in Iranian political life that had remained more or less hidden from the public during the preceding seventeen years was finally exposed. Two very powerful factions had dominated every sector of Iranian society throughout these years, and neither was prepared to abandon the field and allow its rival to take over.
The conflict between the two factions that had begun during the first years after the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and had been kept secret by the leaders of the two rival camps became so obvious after Khatami’s election that no politician was able to deny it. The rival factions now stood revealed. They openly competed with each other, and each sought to use every lever at its disposal to consolidate and preserve its power.
The conservative (right) wing, which had lost executive power after Khatami’s victory, concentrated all its efforts on the state organisations and apparatus and used these organs to achieve its ends. The chief institutions controlled or dominated by the conservatives were the office of the Supreme Leader, the judicial system, the Revolutionary Guards, the army, the police, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) corporation and the Majlis (parliament).
Benefiting from the immense popular support for reform indicated in the vote for Khatami, the reformist camp, too, used its own means and tools to accumulate power. Its first step was to mobilise the public to ensure that this popular support was maintained. The second milestone in the reformers’ campaign was the achieving of a majority in the Majlis through victory in the February 2000 parliamentary elections. The reformers were unable, however, to overturn the monopoly on broadcasting enjoyed by the conservative-dominated IRIB. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran stipulates that the IRIB is managed by the Supreme Leader. Private radio and television stations are prohibited. Reformers made several official applications to open radio or television stations, but all such requests were expressly rejected by the state. Consequently, the reformers turned to the press to make their message heard.
The reformers, through their control of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, which oversees the press, issued licences for more newspapers to open. This manoeuvre saw the beginning of a bitter conflict in the press between the two rival factions, each mobilising its own publications to fight those of the other. The reformers did all in their power to expand the number of newspapers and magazines espousing their cause, as did the conservatives. A Rejuvenated PressThroughout its 166-year history, the Iranian press has always been seen by the government of the day as an important tool for achieving official ends. Considering that governments have consistently used publishing licences as a means of combating or controlling the press, at no time in Iran’s history have we witnessed a more free, open and popular press than in the first two years of the Khatami presidency. These two years, i.e., 1997 and 1998, were the most outstanding period for dynamic press activity in the history of Iranian journalism.
Before the Islamic Revolution, there were 275 titles in Iran, including newspapers, weeklies, bi-weeklies monthlies, bi-monthlies, quarterlies and annual publications. Within a very short period after the revolution, this figure jumped to 600, but the start in 1980 of the imposed war with Iraq caused a sharp drop in the number of publications.
However, with the advent of Khatami’s government and the new president’s keen interest in an expanded press as a lever against the conservative-dominated IRIB, the number of publications rose to 1,139 in 1998.
Between 1997 and 1998, newspaper circulation rose to an unprecedented three million, and even increased during periods of extra tension or crisis. For example, the five-day unrest in July 1999, sparked by a police attack on Tehran University students who had protested against the closure of the reformist newspaper Salaam, saw daily press circulation rise to over 4.2 million.
For many years, there was only one domestic news agency in Iran. The Pars News Agency was the official voice of the nation prior to the revolution, after which it continued to operate, and enjoy a monopoly, under a different name (IRNA—the Islamic Republic News Agency).
But after May 1997, two new private news agencies were granted licences to operate. One was the Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA), which was initiated by college students. The other was the Farsi News Agency, which failed, however, to become operative.
The state monopoly broadcaster, the IRIB, its grip on public opinion dramatically weakened by the efflorescence of the print media under Khatami, expanded from four to six the number of television channels in an attempt to recapture its lost audience.
In a surprise boost to reformers after Khatami’s re-election, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ruled that parliament could investigate how the IRIB spends its huge budget. The conservative speaker of parliament had earlier blocked the investigation, causing reformist deputies to storm out. But on 18 June 2024 Ayatollah Khamenei backed them, saying an “investigation is one of the appropriate means to ensure the healthy activity of these departments”. The IRIB is regarded as a bulwark of the conservative camp, and reformers have long sought to make it accountable to parliament. The Foreign Media in IranKhatami’s first term in office saw a dramatic rise in the number of reputable foreign news media in Iran. The statistics testify to their ever-growing presence. The representatives, correspondents and journalists resident in Tehran of international news agencies and various foreign publications and broadcasters totalled only around thirty before 1998. Their numbers increased to thirty-nine in 1998, seventy-three in 1999, seventy-five in 2000 and eighty-seven in 2001.
The media referred to above include news agencies, television and radio stations, newspapers, magazines, weekly and monthly publications, photographic agencies, and so forth.
Some of these Tehran-based foreign news media ran into trouble, experiencing major problems in continuing their work and even outright bans on doing so. It is important to note that these restrictions were imposed by certain factions within the Iranian system of government that were absolutely not controlled or influenced by President Khatami. A few salient cases are outlined below:
1. Associated Press correspondent Afshin Valinejad was banned from continuing his journalistic activities after less than one year for allegedly publishing two stories featuring communiqués by the outlawed terrorist group, the Mujahideen Khalq Organisation (MKO). One story was related to the assassination in August 1998 of former army commander-in-chief, General Sayad-Shirazi, and the other concerned the assassination in April 1999 of the former head of the prison service, Assadollah Lajevardi. Valinejad was expelled from Iran, albeit unofficially and not through proper legal channels. The unofficial ban on AP was eventually lifted and Valinejad was allowed to return to Tehran, where he and an American currently run the AP permanent office.
2. Reuters’ Iranian representative Mehrdad Balaj was expelled for reporting the unrest that followed the student protests of July 1999.
3. The representative of Britain’s Guardian newspaper, Geneive Abdo, and her husband Jonathan Lyons, the Reuters bureau chief in Tehran, were subjected to pressure and left Iran under threat of prosecution after interviewing the jailed journalist, Akbar Ganji.
4. Serge Michele, correspondent for the Swiss daily Le Temps, received official warnings for interviewing Iranians in official disfavour.
The above instances of harassment, which occurred during the last four years, signally failed to deter international reporters and correspondents from coming to Iran. Indeed, Iran is nowadays one of the most attractive assignments for foreign journalists looking for a story. During the last couple of years, there have been more and more requests from international media outlets for permission to set up branch offices in Tehran as well as applications for work permits from foreign correspondents.
Some 264 international news correspondents and journalists visited Iran in 1993. In 2000, the number was 827, from sixty-eight different countries. CrackdownLike the foreign media, Iran’s domestic press was also subjected to official harassment and obstruction. The huge growth of publications attached to the reform camp incited the conservatives to take radical steps to curb the reformist press. Thus, in its final days, the conservative-dominated Fifth Majlis (1996–2000) hurriedly approved a law on 19 April 2024 that severely restricted press freedom. The limitations and penalties authorised by the new law gave the conservatives a much freer hand to increase their pressure on the press and interfere in its workings.
The new press law was immediately put on the agenda for review by the Sixth Majlis, in which reformers were a majority. The deputies were on the verge of changing the law and giving greater freedom to the press when on 6 August 2024 they received a letter from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which called on them to suspend the move until further notice. To date, the Majlis has not received permission to take up the issue again.
During Khatami’s first presidency, as a result of extreme pressure from the frustrated conservative camp, many publications were shut down by the Special Press Court, the Special Clerics’ Court and the Press Supervisory Board. The closures were ordered on various pretexts, including the alleged receipt of private complaints, charges of inciting the public, undermining national security, publishing falsehoods, insulting religious sources of emulation, and publishing material that conflicted with the national interest. Several publishers, editors and journalists were arrested and jailed. They included Abdollah Nouri, Khatami’s former interior minister and manager of the Khordad daily; Akbar Ganji, the afore‑mentioned embattled maverick journalist; Mashalla Shamsolvaezin, editor of the banned Jame’e, Neshat and Qods dailies; and several others.
Approximately fifty publications were shut down during President Khatami’s first term in office. Prominent among these closures were the following:
Zan, a daily managed by Faezeh Hashemi, daughter of the former president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani; Khordad, a daily managed by former interior minister Abdollah Nouri; Neshat, a daily managed by Latif Safari; Toos, a daily managed by Mohammad Sadeq Javadihesar; Jame’e, a daily managed by Hamid Reza Jalaipour; Akhbar Eqtesadi, a daily managed by Isa Saharkhiz; Mosharekat, the daily mouthpiece of the Islamic Iran Participation Front; Sobhe Emrooz, a daily managed by Saeed Hajjarian, who was shot and wounded by radical elements in March 2000 during an attempt on his life; Nowsazi, a daily managed by Hamid Treza Jalaipour; Iran Farda, a monthly managed by Ezzatollah Sahabi, who is currently in jail; Jahane Eslam, a daily edited by Ali Akbar Mohtashami and managed by Hojjatoleslam Seyed Hadi Khamenei, brother of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; Asre Azadegan, a daily managed by Ghafour Garshasbi; and Ham Mihan, a daily managed by Gholamhossein Karbaschi, former mayor of Tehran, who served several months in jail.
The battle between the reformist and conservative press in the last two full years of President Khatami’s first term (1999–2000) saw numerous radical papers closed, or compelled to moderate their tune or observe complete self-censorship. But the Press Court and the conservative camp continue to attack the press and whenever a newspaper publishes an article of which they disapprove, it must expect to be shut down and its editors and journalists to be arrested.
Notwithstanding the tense and suffocating environment in which it has to operate, this same limited press played a key role in uniting twenty-one million voters behind Khatami in the June 2001 presidential elections, sweeping him to a second term.
During this second term, the Iranian people expect Khatami and the reformist camp to break the existing stalemate and relieve the mounting pressure on the press. They want newspapers and magazines to recover their former liberties because they realise that the key to reform in Iran lies with the press. |