Iran under Khatami: Deadlock or Change?

Mark J. Gasiorowski is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Louisiana State University. Some of the research for this paper was conducted under a grant from the United States Institute of Peace. An earlier version appeared as “The Power Struggle in Iran”, Middle East Policy 7, no. 4, October 2000.

The election of Mohammad Khatami as president of Iran in May 1997 produced considerable optimism that the Islamic Republic was entering a period of far-reaching reform. Khatami’s landslide victory re-energised the reformist movement that had emerged in the mid-1990s, making him its leading figure. The reformers quickly took the initiative, pressing for a wide range of changes aimed at bringing democracy to Iran and loosening the stern socio-cultural restrictions established after the 1978–9 Islamic Revolution. A profound transformation appeared to be under way that would result in the establishment of a democratic Islamic regime capable of preserving Iran’s Islamic identity yet permitting the freedom and openness that much of Iran’s restless population clearly favoured.

Khatami’s election temporarily threw his conservative opponents off balance, enabling the reformers to achieve considerable gains during his first year in office. However, the conservatives soon regrouped and began to counterattack, blocking further reform and creating an increasingly tense climate of confrontation. After the reformers won another decisive electoral victory in the February 2000 parliamentary elections, the conservatives made a concerted effort to roll back most of the reforms that had occurred since Khatami’s election and establish firm control over the state apparatus. This effort has largely been successful. By the time of Iran’s June 2001 presidential elections, the reformist movement had lost most of its momentum and the prospects for wide-ranging reform appeared slim.

This article examines the dynamics of Iranian politics during Khatami’s first term in office. It begins with an analysis of the reformist and conservative factions. It then examines how the power struggle between these two factions has played out since May 1997. The article concludes with a discussion of the prospects for reform in Iran in the coming years.

Reformers and Conservatives

The reformist faction is a loose coalition of centrists and Islamic leftists who emerged in the mid-1990s and formed a de facto alliance during the 1997 presidential elections.

The centrist group of the reformist movement initially consisted of protégés and close relatives of Khatami’s predecessor, Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who began to liberalise the Islamic regime when he was president from 1989 to 1997. In early 1996 several leading centrists created an organisation called the Servants of Construction to contest the parliamentary elections held that year. The organisation’s main goals were to revitalise Iran’s sluggish economy with neo-liberal structural adjustment measures and continue Rafsanjani’s gradualist liberalisation efforts. The Servants of Construction backed Khatami’s dark-horse presidential bid in 1997, and several of its leaders held top positions in Khatami’s first government.

The Islamic leftists had enjoyed considerable power in the 1980s and were responsible for much of the radicalism in Iran during that period. However, after being routed in the 1992 parliamentary elections, they gradually abandoned most of their radical positions and embraced democracy as their primary goal. The oldest Islamic leftist organisations are the Militant Clerics’ Association, the Mujahideen of the Islamic Revolution Organisation, the pro-labour Workers’ House, and the pro-student Office for Consolidating Unity. After Khatami’s 1997 election, a group of young Islamic leftists established the Islamic Iran Participation Front, which quickly became the most prominent reformist organisation. These organisations, together with the Servants of Construction, then formed a coalition called the Second of Khordad (May 23—the date of Khatami’s 1997 electoral victory) to contest the February 2000 parliamentary elections and advance the reformers’ cause.

Khatami served as minister of culture and Islamic guidance from 1982 until 1992, developing a reputation as a moderate, intellectually oriented Islamic leftist. In 1997 he campaigned on a platform calling for greater freedom and tolerance, the rule of law, the expansion of civil society, economic development that would protect the poor, and moderation in foreign policy. These themes were extremely popular and Khatami won 69 per cent of the vote, with an astonishing 91 per cent turnout rate. Khatami’s landslide victory galvanised the centrists and Islamic leftists, leading them to form a loose coalition whose main focus was to promote democracy within the framework of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the Islamic legal authority)—the basic organising principle of the Islamic regime—which they interpret very broadly. Although important differences exist within the reformist coalition over economic policy and how aggressively reform should be pursued, Khatami’s tremendous popularity has enabled him to keep the coalition fairly united around the moderate, non-confrontational approach he favours.

The conservative faction is an amorphous coalition whose main focus now is to stop the reformers’ efforts to promote political and socio-cultural liberalisation, which threatens their control over key state agencies and what they regard as the main achievements of the revolution. The conservatives are united in their support for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who as Leader of the Revolution enjoys ultimate authority over the state apparatus and generally opposes the reformers’ efforts to bring about change. They have a number of prominent political organisations, including the Militant Clerics’ Society and the Islamic Coalition Organisation, though their personalistic style renders these organisations much less important than those of the reformers.

The conservative faction has three disparate wings. One consists of hardliners who favour the use of violence and other confrontational means against the reformers to stop liberalisation. The hardliners include members of vigilante “pressure groups” such as Ansar-e Hizbollah (Supporters of the Party of God) and many top officials in the judiciary apparatus and security forces. The second wing consists of pragmatic conservatives who personally oppose liberalisation but recognise that some reform is necessary. These pragmatists are fairly similar to the reformist centrists and could easily work with them, though neither group is very large or powerful. The third wing consists of traditionalists who oppose liberalisation and do not believe compromise is necessary, but also generally oppose violence. The traditionalists include much of the clerical establishment and many shopkeepers and members of the urban lower class. Important differences exist among these three wings of the conservative faction, especially over the hardliners’ use of violence. However, Khamenei’s leadership and their opposition to the reformers have kept them fairly united.

The reformers and conservatives have very different sources of power. The reformers’ power lies mainly in their huge popular support, which enabled them to win 70–75 per cent of the vote in the May 1997 presidential elections, the February 1999 municipal council elections, and the February 2000 parliamentary elections. The reformers’ popularity would enable them to organise large public demonstrations or even a massive popular uprising, if they choose to do so. The reformers have a variety of effective political organisations and newspapers with which to mobilise their supporters and challenge their opponents. They also control the presidency, the parliament, most of the municipal councils, and the powerful Ministries of the Interior, Intelligence, and Culture and Islamic Guidance.

The conservatives’ main source of power lies in their control over key branches of the state apparatus. Ayatollah Khamenei, as Supreme Leader, has authority over the armed forces, the Revolutionary Guards, the police and the judiciary. Most top officers and judiciary officials are conservatives, though many junior officers and enlisted men apparently support the reformers. Together with the pressure groups, these capabilities give the conservatives a near monopoly on coercive force. Conservatives also control the radio and television media; the Council of Guardians, which screens candidates for all elected offices and can veto parliamentary legislation; and the Assembly of Experts, which appoints and oversees the Supreme Leader. In addition, conservatives dominate the Expediency Council, which mediates disputes between the parliament and the Council of Guardians, and they control many powerful religious institutions and parastatal business foundations.

The balance of power between the reformers and conservatives is fairly even, with the reformers’ overwhelming popularity roughly matched by the conservatives’ coercive and institutional strength. Consequently, while the prospects of the two factions have waxed and waned, neither has achieved victory and the power struggle between them is now deadlocked. It is not clear when and under what circumstances this deadlock will be broken.

Khatami’s Honeymoon Period

Khatami’s May 1997 election shocked the conservatives and gave the reformers a honeymoon period in which to begin carrying out reforms. Khatami soon assembled a cabinet of like-minded reformers and gained approval for them in parliament, even though it was dominated by conservatives. Khatami and his colleagues then began to implement their programme. Their initial focus was on promoting political liberalisation, which they consider a prerequisite for socio-cultural and economic reform. Culture Minister Ataollah Mohajerani eased restrictions on the press, allowing several outspoken newspapers to open. Khatami and others made a series of bold speeches calling for greater openness and the expansion of civil society. In November 1997 Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri called for a sharp reduction in the Supreme Leader’s powers, infuriating conservatives. Khatami also began an initiative to improve Iran’s relations with the West, advocating “civilisational dialogue” and boldly calling for scholarly exchanges and other non-diplomatic contacts with the United States. These actions transformed the political climate, raising popular expectations and leading ordinary Iranians to challenge restrictions on freedom of expression.

The conservatives soon began to counterattack. Pressure groups physically assaulted reformist leaders, reformist rallies and newspaper offices. The security forces made no real effort to stop these attacks and they have continued ever since. Conservatives bitterly denounced Montazeri and placed him under house arrest. Hardliners in the judiciary filed corruption charges against the outspoken reformist mayor of Tehran, Gholam Hossein Karbaschi, and several of his deputies. Karbaschi was then arrested in April 1998, provoking large student-led demonstrations that were attacked by the police. Karbaschi was released on bail, but was later convicted and given a long prison sentence. Conservatives also began to attack Interior Minister Abdollah Nouri, and the conservative-led parliament impeached Nouri in June. In the summer of 1998 hardliners in the judiciary began to close reformist newspapers and arrest outspoken editors and writers. Parliament passed a law making it easier to prosecute the press, and a special press court was set up for this purpose. Rumours began to circulate that hardliners in the security forces were plotting a coup against Khatami.

As the conservatives’ attacks against them grew, the reformers began to seek more institutionalised methods of promoting reform. In May 1998 the Interior Ministry announced that political parties could be established. The Servants of Construction was soon licensed as a party and the Participation Front and several other reformist parties were created in the following months. Khatami then announced that he would implement a provision of the constitution allowing for popularly elected municipal councils, which the reformers favoured because they would permit local self-government and provide experience in democratic practices. The reformers tried to contest the October 1998 Assembly of Experts election, putting up a broad field of candidates. The Council of Guardians then rejected almost all of their candidates, enabling conservatives to win most of the seats. However, reformers took some 75 per cent of the seats nationwide in the February 1999 municipal council elections, demonstrating that they remained extremely popular. They also began to call for judicial reform in this period, though little was achieved.

Iran’s factional conflict took a more sinister turn in the autumn of 1998, when four dissident intellectuals were brutally murdered in what came to be known as the “serial murders”. The conservatives initially blamed foreign-backed “enemies”, but it soon became clear that hardliners in the Intelligence Ministry had carried out the murders and that they also had intended to assassinate Khatami and other reformist leaders. A group of intelligence officers was arrested and the minister of intelligence soon resigned. Allegations then began to emerge that top conservatives had ordered the murders. These allegations were given new fuel when a leading suspect died mysteriously in prison in June 1999, in what many observers believe was a cover-up to protect the architects of the murders.

Outrage over the serial murders and the outcome of the municipal council elections led many to believe that the reformers were now on the verge of victory. The conservatives soon resumed their attacks, however, assaulting several top reformers, arresting a leading reformist intellectual on spurious charges, and trying unsuccessfully to impeach Culture Minister Mohajerani. The security forces also arrested thirteen Iranian Jews and several Muslims on charges of spying for Israel, in what was widely seen as an attempt to embarrass Khatami and undermine Iran’s relations with the West. The conservative-dominated parliament began to consider a bill in June to limit sharply press freedom. In early July an initial version of this bill was approved and the venerable reformist newspaper Salaam was closed down.

The Honeymoon Ends

On 8 July, a large group of students from Tehran University staged a peaceful protest against the press bill and the closure of Salaam. That night, police and pressure groups attacked a student dormitory, killing one student and injuring and arresting many others. Khatami and most other officials denounced the attack, and students organised large protest demonstrations. These demonstrations continued for several days and spread to other cities, producing a serious political crisis. The protesters began to call for democracy and freedom of the press, and some openly criticised Khatami and Khamenei. Clashes began to occur with the police and pressure groups, apparently encouraged by provocateurs who had infiltrated the protesters’ ranks. The government then announced a ban on demonstrations. Protesters ignored the ban and were brutally attacked by police and pressure groups, producing the worst riots in Iran since the early 1980s. Revolutionary Guard commanders threatened to carry out a coup, forcing Khatami to denounce the protesters and call for order. Dozens were injured and some fourteen hundred protesters were arrested. Abandoned by Khatami and facing harsh repression, the protesters were forced to give up.

The July 1999 riots left Iran tense and polarised. Many students and other reformers were very bitter, both with the security forces and Khatami. Many conservatives believed that harsher actions were necessary to prevent further disorder. The leaders of both factions feared that further confrontation might arise and tried to reduce tensions. Khatami reaffirmed his support for Khamenei and vowed to crack down on pressure groups and address the students’ concerns. Khamenei blamed the riots on foreign-backed “counter-revolutionaries” and made speeches praising Khatami and calling for unity. Most of the protesters were released in the following weeks, though some were later put on trial and given stiff sentences. Several policemen were put on trial for the dormitory attack, but most were eventually acquitted. Parliament put off consideration of the press bill. Khamenei replaced the hardline head of the judiciary with a pragmatic conservative who promised to carry out reforms.

As tensions subsided, Iranians began to focus on the crucial February 2000 parliamentary elections. The reformers assembled the Second of Khordad coalition and made extensive plans to contest the elections. Conservatives in parliament raised the voting age from fifteen to sixteen and lowered the vote threshold required for election in the first round, hoping to reduce the reformers’ vote. They also gutted Khatami’s proposed five-year development plan in an effort to discredit him. Conservatives in the judiciary arrested Abdullah Nouri, the reformers’ leading candidate, and gave him a five-year prison sentence, making him ineligible to run in the elections. Another assassination plot against Khatami was foiled and several more reformist newspapers were closed.

A key question hanging over the elections was whether Rafsanjani would seek a seat, with the goal of regaining the position of Speaker he had held from 1981 to 1989. With Nouri out of contention, Rafsanjani entered the race in early December, presenting himself as a consensus candidate who could unite the country and solve its many problems. The conservative political organisations quickly backed him, as did the Servants of Construction. The Islamic leftists believed Rafsanjani would co-opt the reform movement if he became Speaker and therefore decided not to support him. Several Islamic leftist journalists then began to attack Rafsanjani harshly by linking him to the serial murders, creating considerable tension between the centrists and Islamic leftists.

Surprisingly, the Council of Guardians vetoed only a small number of candidates. The reformers therefore won a sweeping victory, taking 71 per cent of the seats decided in the first round, with conservatives taking only 21 per cent. Within the reformist camp, almost all of the first-round seats went to Islamic leftists rather than centrists. Rafsanjani barely won a seat, which he later gave up when it became clear he would not be elected Speaker. His daughter, who had been elected overwhelmingly in the 1996 parliamentary elections but then strongly defended her father during the February 2000 campaign, was soundly defeated. Many prominent conservative incumbents were defeated as well. The second round produced similar results. The elections demonstrated that most Iranians opposed not only the conservatives but also pro-Rafsanjani centrists who were inclined to co-operate with them. It gave the reformers control over parliament but left Iran more polarised than it had been at any time since Khatami’s election.

A De Facto Coup

The conservatives reacted with quiet fury to the outcome of the parliamentary elections. The security forces soon began a crackdown on immodest behaviour, arresting hundreds. The Council of Guardians called for recounts in certain districts and nullified the election of several reformist candidates, producing angry protests in the affected districts. Said Hajjarian, a leading reformist strategist, was shot and severely wounded in March, creating great anguish in the reformist camp. Several prominent reformist journalists were arrested. In April the Expediency Council ruled that parliament could not investigate state agencies controlled by the Supreme Leader, shielding the security forces, the judicial system, the radio and television media, and other key institutions from public scrutiny. Khamenei made speeches approving the use of violence under certain circumstances and warning the press not to go too far. Coup rumours again began to circulate. In mid-April the outgoing parliament passed the press bill that had sparked the July 1999 riots. The press court then closed nineteen newspapers and several prominent reformist journalists were arrested. These events and the continuing efforts of the Council of Guardians to nullify election results sparked large demonstrations throughout the country. Fearing that their opponents were trying to create a pretext to stop the new parliament from convening, Khatami and other leading reformers appealed for calm.

The Council of Guardians continued to challenge the election results, apparently hoping to prevent key reformers from entering parliament and to increase Rafsanjani’s vote share. By early May it had nullified twelve reformist candidates and was threatening to nullify all thirty candidates elected from Tehran. Reformist students threatened to organise nationwide demonstrations in protest. On 18 May, the Council of Guardians then nullified the Tehran votes. Realising that this might create tremendous unrest, Khamenei immediately ordered it to reinstate the ballots and certify the elections. The council reluctantly agreed, though it substantially raised Rafsanjani’s vote share. Realising that he would not be elected Speaker, Rafsanjani gave up his seat.

The new parliament was convened on 27 May. Mehdi Karrubi, a moderate reformer who had been Speaker from 1989 to 1992, was again elected Speaker. Behzad Nabavi, a leading reformer, and Mohammad Reza Khatami, the president’s brother and head of the Participation Front, were elected Deputy Speakers. The new leaders of parliament declared that their first priority would be to revise the press law and that they would also seek judicial reform, electoral reform, curbs on pressure groups, an end to the state monopoly on radio and television, and economic reform. In response, Khamenei made speeches opposing changes to the press law, praising the judiciary and the Council of Guardians, and advocating economic reform. In early July, students staged demonstrations in Tehran, Tabriz and other cities to commemorate the July 1999 riots. The Tehran demonstrators were brutally attacked by pressure groups, which co-operated with the police in arresting many of the students.

Reformers in parliament then prepared legislation to ease the press law, beginning a new round of tension. In response, hardliners in the judiciary closed several more newspapers and arrested several prominent journalists. On 6 August, as debate on the press legislation was about to begin, Khamenei abruptly ordered that it be dropped from consideration. Speaker Karrubi reluctantly complied, sparking angry denunciations from reformers. Hardliners then organised raucous demonstrations against the reformist-dominated parliament, and Khamenei and other conservatives sharply denounced the press. All but one of the remaining reformist newspapers were closed down and several more reformist journalists were arrested. In late August, Revolutionary Guards and pressure groups attacked a student meeting in the city of Khorramabad, producing five days of bloody riots that left one student dead and many injured and arrested.

Khamenei’s decision to block the press legislation and the reformers’ feeble response showed that the conservatives could prevent the new parliament from carrying out meaningful reforms, rendering the reformers’ electoral triumph a hollow victory. Together with the closure of most reformist newspapers, the arrest of many reformist leaders and the ability of the Council of Guardians to veto legislation and manipulate elections, this demonstrated that the conservatives were prepared to use extreme measures to block reform and that there was little the reformers could do to stop them. With these actions, the conservatives seem to have carried out what can be called a de facto coup: they are allowing Khatami to remain in office and the parliament to remain in reformist hands, but they are using their extensive control over other branches of the state apparatus to prevent the president and parliament from effecting their reform programme. As a result, the power struggle between the two factions is now deadlocked and it is not clear when or how this deadlock will end.

Since August 2000, this general scenario has continued to hold. Khatami has not undertaken any major initiatives, apparently trying instead to work behind the scenes to persuade Khamenei and other conservatives of the need for at least limited reform. These apparent efforts have not had much effect and, indeed, Khatami has publicly admitted his powerlessness. The parliament has worked diligently to promote reform, taking steps to ban the security forces from university campuses, codify political offences, strengthen defendants’ rights, improve prison conditions, stop newspaper closures, restrain the intelligence ministry, and investigate the serial murders and Khorramabad riots. However, the Council of Guardians has blocked most of these initiatives. While the parliament remains an important platform from which the reformers can express their views, the judiciary has brought charges against a number of deputies, apparently trying to silence them.

The crackdown on the reformist press has continued, with over forty newspapers closed down and some twenty journalists arrested by May 2001. Although a few reformist newspapers have remained open, they have been forced to exercise considerable self-censorship. Culture Minister Mohajerani finally resigned in December 2000, after being hounded for several years by hardliners. A number of prominent reformers have been imprisoned on flimsy charges since August 2000 and one has been sentenced to death. In March and April 2001, the security forces arrested over sixty members of the loyal oppositionist Liberation Movement of Iran on dubious charges of trying to overthrow the Islamic regime. Although fifteen Intelligence Ministry employees were finally convicted of the serial murders and given stiff sentences, reformers charged that the trial was a cover-up designed to protect high-ranking conservatives involved in the killings. The security forces and pressure groups continue to attack reformist rallies and demonstrations almost with impunity.

The reformers have responded to the conservatives’ harsh attacks with a strategy of “active calm”, calling on their supporters to continue pressing for reform yet avoid provocative actions that might give the conservatives a pretext to oust Khatami or take other decisive steps. For his part, Khatami for many months refused to say whether he would seek re-election in the June 2001 elections, finally entering the race only in early May, a few days before the deadline. He did this apparently in the hope that Khamenei feared massive unrest would occur if he did not run and therefore would make concessions of some sort to persuade him to do so. While Khatami and Khamenei may have reached such an agreement, no evidence of one has emerged.

The reformers’ decision to avoid provocative actions and Khatami’s failure to elicit visible concessions have frustrated many of the reformers’ supporters, especially among Iran’s restless youth, and created growing tension within the reformist movement. As a result, the reformist movement has begun to split, with most reformers favouring continued “active calm” but a growing number favouring a more confrontational approach towards the conservatives. In addition, a significant proportion of the reformers’ supporters have become deeply disillusioned with the movement’s failures and retreated from politics altogether. This was reflected in the turnout for the June 2001 presidential elections, which, with fourteen million abstentions, was down on that for 1997. Yet despite the lower turnout, Khatami added more than a million votes to his twenty million of 1997, winning re-election by a huge margin.

The Prospects for Reform

Regardless of that victory, though, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the reformers’ strategy of working within the system to achieve far-reaching reform—the essential focus of “active calm”—has failed. Part of this failure undoubtedly is due to tactical mistakes made by the reformist leadership, including its decision not to mobilise its supporters more actively, its passivity in the face of conservative attacks, its mismanagement of the July 1999 riots, and the harsh attacks some reformers made on Rafsanjani during the February 2000 parliamentary elections. However, the reformers’ failure is due at least as much to the tenacity and entrenched power of the conservatives, especially their control over the position of Supreme Leader, the security forces, the judiciary and the Council of Guardians. Although it is conceivable that the reformers might be able to rebound and achieve some success by working within the system during the next few years, the conservatives’ entrenched power makes this very unlikely.

Two alternative scenarios seem much more likely to occur. First, the tense factional deadlock that now prevails could lead to a popular uprising, with the reformers who favour a more confrontational approach organising mass protests aimed at defeating the conservatives and instituting radical reform. Depending on a variety of factors, such an uprising could result in a “velvet revolution” and victory for the reformers, a Tiananmen Square–style crackdown and victory for the conservatives, or simply a reversion to the current factional deadlock. It is impossible to say in advance which of these outcomes might occur. However, the risks to each faction inherent in this scenario and the desire of most Iranians to avoid a violent confrontation suggest that leaders on both sides will probably try to avoid provoking a popular uprising and would move quickly to ease tensions if one were to emerge. Consequently, if a popular uprising does occur, a reversion to the status quo ante may be the most likely outcome.

Second, the current factional deadlock may simply persist for a long period of time. This is especially likely to occur if the conservatives can defuse popular pressures for reform not only by continuing with their de facto coup but also by carrying out economic reform and perhaps limited socio-cultural reform. Powerful interest groups in the conservative camp are likely to block the necessary economic reforms, and most conservatives staunchly oppose any further socio-cultural reform, so this would be difficult. However, if pragmatists somehow become dominant in the conservative camp, and especially if they can build a working alliance with centrists and perhaps some moderate Islamic leftists, the conservatives may be able to do enough to contain popular unrest. This seems unlikely, but it cannot be ruled out. Continued high oil prices also would help contain unrest.

Consequently, in the absence of mass protests leading to a “velvet revolution” of some sort, the prospects for extensive reform in Iran now do not look good. The most likely scenarios involve a continuation of the current factional deadlock, perhaps with limited economic or even socio-cultural reform. The reformers’ goal of establishing a democratic Islamic regime seems, at best, a distant prospect.