Peacekeeping for a New Era: Why Theory Matters

A. B. Fetherston is a lecturer in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, UK. She recently completed a two-year Social Science Research Council–MacArthur Foundation Fellowship focusing on peacebuilding in Croatia, during which she lived and worked in Croatia for a year. Her publications include Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping (Macmillan, 1994).

The last decade has seen an unprecedented expansion of peacekeeping activity in response to the explosion of violent conflict in the post–Cold War world. Yet the state of our understanding of peacekeeping is unequal to the problems thrown up by such conflict. Much of the blame for this deficiency lies in the lack of a theoretical foundation on which to base workable, practical policies.
This paper attempts a reconsideration of the theory and practice of peacekeeping and suggests some new ways forward. It begins by reviewing the rather limited development of peacekeeping theory to date, paying special attention to attempts to set peacekeeping within a framework of conflict resolution. This is followed by a consideration of the shortcomings of conflict resolution itself as a space in which to situate peacekeeping, and by a look at recent, potentially more fruitful, theoretical developments regarding the concept of “peacebuilding”. There is a brief exploration of peacebuilding’s potential to offer new theoretical directions for peacekeeping which could be employed to deepen our understanding of the values guiding interventions, the appropriate aims of such operations and new ways of understanding success. All this could lead to peacekeeping being strengthened in practice. Finally, I offer an example from Croatia of the unfulfilled potential of peacekeeping as peacebuilding. As we enter the twenty-first century the time seems apt to consider such a major reworking of theories and practices of peacekeeping. The continuing failure of current practice demands a more comprehensive, nuanced understanding.

Theories of Peacekeeping

Most writing on the subject of peacekeeping has been done by diplomats and military people with experience in the field. This has tended to limit the accumulation of knowledge to case histories, often interesting in themselves, but with little general value beyond a tentative list of “do’s and don’ts” in peacekeeping operations. As recently as 1998 Paul Diehl, Daniel Druckman and James Wall, wrote:

 

Changes in peacekeeping operations have not been matched by alterations in the way that scholars analyse them. The standard study of peacekeeping remains one of a single case study, in which description is the primary goal ... An approach based on the uniqueness of peacekeeping missions does not assist us in building a theory of peacekeeping, nor does it provide much guidance in making policy.¹

 

In essence, we are still largely in the dark in terms of improving the analysis, effectiveness and success of peacekeeping. This can be attributed directly to the lack of theoretical development. Attempts over the last decade to correct this deficiency have focused primarily on presenting peacekeeping in terms of either conflict management or conflict resolution. The former is a relatively narrow undertaking which seeks to contain conflict rather than eradicate it. Conflict resolution, on the other hand, is rather more ambitious in that it aims actually to resolve violent conflict and put into place mechanisms to prevent it from recurring. Both concepts, as we shall see, are flawed.

 

In my 1994 contribution to these debates,² 1 argued that the complex practices of peacekeeping and the demands made of them were undermined by insufficient theoretical analyses that would allow researchers, policy analysts and practitioners to address the highly troublesome issues of effectiveness and success, especially in the long term. The main thrust of my argument was that United Nations’ peacekeeping when it functions as an impartial “third party” based on consent is a type of conflict resolution and could make use of the theoretical developments in that field. Set within such a framework, peacekeeping becomes an intervention deployed only after a conflict has become violent and protracted. Its functions, therefore, must be at least twofold. First, it acts as a means of separation, providing a breathing space in which both sides can step back from confrontation. Second, and crucially, peacekeeping functions as conflict resolution, working through improving communication, building trust and encouraging social, political and economic regeneration.

 

Peacekeeping, as understood within a conflict resolution framework, was, I argued at the time, vastly under-utilised, with predictably unimpressive results. There are numerous examples of peacekeeping failures, from Angola to Cambodia. Even since the rise of multidimensional missions and more concerted involvement, particularly during elections, peacekeeping has not, for the most part, helped to establish long-term, sustainable peace. It has not created space for conflict resolution. Further, and more damning, in some cases peacekeeping missions have actually had a negative impact on the conflicts they were set up to address.

 

Two assertions underlay my claims about the expansion of peacekeeping and its relation to conflict resolution. First, I suggested that any expansion in practice should be accompanied by much more systematic theoretical thinking so that, at the very least, we could develop appropriate short- and long-term goals, improve the analysis of mission effectiveness and establish benchmarks for good practice. Methodologically, conflict resolution would generate both quantitative and qualitative data which could then be used to develop workable policies. Second, I pointed out the problems of using poorly prepared military peacekeepers who do not have the necessary conflict resolution and peacebuilding skills. In this context, developing a theoretical framework for peacekeeping using conflict resolution seemed to offer a positive way forward.

Statistical Analysis

In their study, Diehl, Druckman and Wall provide a quantitative analysis of peacekeeping missions using statistical techniques. Their efforts are situated within the framework of conflict management. Yet their version of conflict management essentially encompasses a conflict resolution approach because they emphasise non-coercive activity which focuses on rebuilding channels of communication and trust between warring groups and finding integrative or “win–win” solutions to problems. Other methods of conflict management can include violent and coercive means. More specifically, key conflict management methods can be seen as what are generally considered to be the “normal” diplomatic efforts and activities of international relations, where the underlying assumption is that power decides in a “win–lose” world. The theoretical context offered by Diehl, et al., is therefore uncomfortably situated in the arenas of both conflict management (as coercive activity) and conflict resolution (as non-coercive activity).

 

Beyond these considerations, Diehl, et al., are careful to distinguish their work from more standard single case-study accounts of peacekeeping. They argue that their approach is “superior” because it allows analysts to focus on a wider array of functions performed by particular missions and enables success to be both estimated within individual missions and compared between missions. Essentially they aim, through statistical analysis, to find significant patterns of effectiveness and ineffectiveness across missions. Giving as an example the case of UNPROFOR, the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they show that different and often contradictory roles needed to be employed simultaneously to deal effectively with the complexity of the situation on the ground. They argue that their analysis provides policymakers in particular with some understanding of why missions have not been good at achieving their goals. Such an understanding of “success”—the fulfilment of goals set by mission designers—is quite limited. But Diehl, et al., at the end of their analysis suggest going further. In fact, they suggest exactly what my Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping concluded four years earlier: that “by placing peacekeeping in a conflict resolution framework, we expand our conceptualisation of missions from instruments of conflict control to approaches that contribute to more enduring resolutions of conflicts”.³

 

Yet ultimately, the analysis of Diehl, et al., does not go far enough and runs into the same dead end as Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping did before it. Neither study adequately reflects the complexity and diversity, or the cultures of violence, of the social spaces within which peacekeeping operations take place. Indeed the trend toward increasingly complex statistical analyses tends to leave people or “the social” out altogether. After all, how can the reductive process required by statistical analysis encompass such huge categories of social meaning? Even the increased complexity of peacekeeping missions, which could be seen as an ad hoc attempt to include “the social”, cannot begin to do so until theorising takes on board the full implications of the war zone. In this sense, any intervention—even if it is deemed successful—will continue to be constrained by the limited goals formulated within the frameworks of conflict management or conflict resolution. And although conflict resolution—by going beyond conflict control and a mere return to the status quo—seemed to offer a wider agenda and was therefore employed as a corrective to the more serious limitations of conflict management, it too has run into problems of theory and practice. It is to the shortcomings of conflict resolution as a theoretical framework for peacekeeping that we will now turn.

Limitations of Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution has been a critical force in the theories and practices of conflict management. However, even conflict resolution, and therefore most of the theorising about peacekeeping, relies too heavily on the presumed virtues of its theory, unquestioningly taking on its value/culture/discourse-laden assumptions without examining their consequences. The result has been an inability to facilitate the sustainable transformation of societies at war to societies at peace. This failure is partly due to disagreement over what constitutes such transformation. From the perspective of conflict management, transformation means controlling violent conflict and a return to the status quo prior to the outbreak of hostilities, or at most bringing into the fold of democratic neoliberalism a state which has been more or less anarchic. From a conflict resolution point of view, however, the idea is to end violent conflict and prevent its recurrence.

 

The limitation of conflict resolution theory and practice is that they are tied to a particular cultural viewpoint—a Western “rationalist” view of the world which is not necessarily applicable to other cultures or perspectives. Both views of transformation lack a critical approach which can acknowledge their limitations and change and adapt theory and practice accordingly. The goal is to open space for transformation which significantly restructures institutions and social meanings, or which, to put it another way, has the potential to shift societies from a culture of violence to a culture of peace. This, of course, is a long-term project which must encompass, and perhaps be drawn primarily from, the specific localities in which the violence is produced and reproduced.

 

There are a number of arguments which can be made at this point to support the view that both conflict management and resolution are too limited theoretically to be usefully employed as a practical framework for peacekeeping. First, war has deep social and cultural effects which need to be accounted for when intervening. This is a point often made by anthropologists who study the ethnography of war zones. They argue, for example, that how wars are fought has changed significantly, so that now civilians are targets in so-called dirty wars. Here the aim is not necessarily to kill, but rather to control, by instilling fear and insecurity in everyday life, thereby undermining social institutions, meaning and ultimately resistance. Violence becomes the basis on which social interaction and meaning are established: this is what is meant by “cultures of violence”. Any intervention, including peacekeeping, must account for these insights so that, at the very least, activities are directed towards preventing the further entrenchment of violence.

 

Second, conflict resolution and peacekeeping constitute particular sets of practices which, when employed dogmatically, are inappropriate and potentially harmful. This is not to say that they should never be used, only that conflict resolution, for example, is a particular way of approaching conflict which is not applicable in all cases. Take, for instance, the rationality which is inherent in the conflict resolution approach. Disputants are asked to analyse their conflict rationally so they can objectively understand its causes and eventually find solutions which will benefit all sides. The implication here is that there exists universally applicable and objective knowledge which allows the causes and solutions of conflict to be deduced. This discounts, among other things, the fact that all knowledge emerges from within particular worldviews. As Alejandro Bendaña has said of conflict resolution, “techniques are not separable from politics. That is to say, we cannot separate the field from the political framework in which it appears”.⁴ Moreover, conflict resolution is culturally “Western”. Some commentators have argued that placing peace above other values is contrary to the practice of certain cultures which might, for example, value struggle over peace.

The Problem of Power

Third, there is the thorny issue of power. Power is evident in conflict management processes, in which, ultimately, the side that has the most power and therefore the strongest bargaining position is the side that gains the most from any settlement. But power is not so clearly present in conflict resolution, with its insistence on “neutral third parties” and “facilitative non-coercive processes”. Conflict resolution scholars, of course, are not unaware of this “problem of power”, but can only suggest that it may be important to “empower” certain groups in a conflict before resolution processes become possible. The problem of power is then “put off” or avoided in the practices of conflict resolution. Denying this kind of power does not make it disappear and participants have to reenter the social context where negative power is very apparent and problematic.

 

Both approaches, therefore, fall into the trap of understanding power only as a negative. The dilemma is often stated as an either–or proposition: for example, either to use force in particular circumstances or not to use it at all. Both stances can and have created considerable problems for peacekeeping on the ground—witness Bosnia. Part of the problem with this narrow understanding of power is that methodologies tend to focus on “power-holders”—those groups more often than not responsible for perpetrating the war. Moreover, peacekeeping can only work if power-holders are persuaded to change their ways. Neither conflict management nor conflict resolution, on the basis of current practice, can be said to provide a sustainable platform for long-term peace, even though non-coercive methods may have the benefit of greater legitimacy.

 

Although one can discern a small shift in peacekeeping policy with more consideration being given to local contexts, the emphasis tends to be on restoring local government through elections, restoring social welfare systems and generally creating “stability” or reimposing a status quo. Again, power is about control. And these efforts rarely have real transformative potential. For people living in war zones who do not have access to power-holders, peacekeeping efforts can actually be disempowering, since the potential for transforming structures and institutions which exercise this power (such as the state) seems a remote, if not impossible, prospect. An example of the hidden complexities of power is the problem of disarmament in a situation where the gun is seen as the sole access to power, and therefore to security, food, etc., that most people have. This belief is only confirmed by the presence of armed peacekeepers. This is not to argue against the use of military peacekeepers, but rather to highlight how the absence of thorough analysis can have unintended consequences when interventions take place.

 

What are the alternatives? The need for sound and thorough analysis that takes on board the points made above is paramount. Such analysis needs to be self-reflective and must look at the ways in which Western, “rational” perspectives limit understanding of intervention. At the very least, a better grasp of the social impact of war and of the operations of power in war zones is essential to developing a much more sensitive theoretical basis for interventions, especially in the long term.

Peacebuilding

If both conflict resolution and management are flawed as theoretical and therefore, practical frameworks for peacekeeping, where might we look for a more effective alternative? Peacebuilding may offer a broader, more inclusive and analytically more powerful means of rethinking interventions.

 

Peacebuilding has a long history which will not be explored here. The point of departure for our purposes is the best analysis available now. This is the work of John Paul Lederach. His framework of reconciliation and his elicitive approach provide an important advance in thinking about intervention.⁵ Drawing on his casework in different parts of the world he has formulated an elicitive methodology based on the idea that techniques of peacebuilding should be developed from, and thereby embedded in, the localities in which they are employed.

 

Lederach is careful to distinguish this framework from conflict management. He suggests the need for a shift away from focusing on issues towards rebuilding relationships. The long-term goal of this work is the sustainable transformation of societies. Here Lederach argues that protracted violent conflict requires action beyond the traditional international relations methodology of conflict management. His alternative is based on an analysis of conflict as a social system which is “peopled”, and thus focuses on the relationships within that system. From this perspective, reconciliation is understood as work on relationships because

 

the immediacy of hatred and prejudice, of racism and xenophobia, as primary factors and motivators of the conflict means that its transformation must be rooted in social-psychological and spiritual dimensions that traditionally have been seen as either irrelevant or outside the competency of international diplomacy.⁶

 

It is from this general view that Lederach’s integrated framework of peacebuilding is developed. This framework is based on, first, an analysis of the types of actors at different leadership levels which matches them to particular methodologies of conflict management, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. So, for example, at the top level of leadership, conflict management or diplomatic methods are most applicable, but at the middle level of leadership, where there is more flexibility, conflict resolution methods can be employed. The distinctiveness of this analysis is its representation of leadership levels (top, middle and bottom) as a pyramid whose base represents the largest constituency, the grass roots. This inclusion of the “rank and file”, coupled with an argument for a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding, is significantly different from other analyses. It represents an important departure and development in the idea of peacebuilding, with obvious, immediate and important implications for peacekeeping practice. However, Lederach’s approach also emphasises the key role played by middle-level leadership, which acts as a link between the top leadership and the grass roots in facilitating a sustainable peacebuilding process.

 

The second aspect of Lederach’s integrated model is a systemic analysis. He uses the concept of a “nested” paradigm which allows local problems to be analysed within the context of system and subsystem causes. In other words, the local problem is nested (visually encircled) within the subsystem, which in turn is nested within the system.

 

The subsystem level is important here because it enables a peacebuilding strategy to be developed for a local or specific situation while taking into account the systemic problems which are also present. Here Lederach makes an important connection to the levels of actors (top, middle and grass-roots) in his pyramid, equating the middle level with a subsystem level and arguing that it could provide “the strategic link to the other levels”.⁷

 

The other axis of this systemic analysis is a time dimension for peacebuilding. This, too, comprises a nested paradigm: crisis intervention, preparation and training, design of social change, and finally, the envisioning of a desired future.⁸ Lederach sees each of these phases as part of an integrated peacebuilding process. He points out that although we have had some experience and success in crisis intervention, further peacebuilding, where it is employed is often poorly planned and only carried out in the short term. He argues that we need to think generationally. While crisis intervention might take three months or a year, integrated peacebuilding involves a much longer commitment, with twenty-plus years being necessary to promote lasting social change.

 

Lederach does not suggest what level of external commitment might be required over this period but it is clear that the bulk of the energy and resources must come from within, and be facilitated from without.

Long-Term Transformation

Transformation, in this integrated framework, relies on the application of two tools: first, a descriptive understanding or sound analysis, vital for fully grasping the transformative impact of conflict on the various systems; second the conversion of this analysis into specific practices or prescriptions for intervention whose purpose is to create more peaceful societies. Lederach argues that these descriptive and prescriptive approaches, combined are the means by which we can shift from focusing on immediate issues and crises to long-term changes in relationships and social structures.

 

The development of the concept of peacebuilding in Lederach’s model is especially relevant for peacekeeping in that it provides some useful redirection, not least towards the overall transformation of social structures and institutions. More specifically, it promotes coherent and sustained engagement with grass-roots activity and change from the bottom upwards. Such an approach could address many of the current theoretical and methodological shortcomings outlined above. It suggests the importance of going beyond the resolution of crises to transforming not only relationships, but also social space, structures and institutions over the long term. Peacekeeping, as currently practised is not engaged in such a project. This is not to suggest that peacekeeping missions should have sole responsibility for Lederach’s kind of peacebuilding, but rather that they should be one part of an overall strategy of intervention that facilitates changes going beyond those conceived by either conflict management or resolution.

 

Although Lederach’s approach has much to offer peacekeeping theory and practice, it shares, though to a much lesser extent, some of the shortcomings of earlier frameworks. The problem of avoiding the narrowness of our own perspective, the issue of power and (in Lederach’s case, perhaps) the over-reliance on local cultural norms, all present potential barriers to transformation. These might be mitigated by making use of social theory, which by definition questions these limitations. Two examples indicate where social theory might be useful in deepening and strengthening Lederach’s approach.⁹ First, there is the obvious need to develop a more nuanced understanding of power. One instance is the work of Michel Foucault, who argues that power can be positive: a kind of self-disciplining, self-imposed power to do or be in a certain way. A second instance is the work of Antonio Gramsci and his concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony. Counter-hegemony, especially, offers a potential mechanism of non-violent transformation built on consensus. These ideas can be of real analytic use to peacekeeping.

Croatia: An Example

In light of this discussion it is useful to look briefly at an example of peacekeeping in practice and then consider it from the perspective of transformative peacebuilding. UNTAES,¹⁰ a small mission, was set up in Eastern Slavonia in Croatia and ran from January 1996 through to January 1998. It provides an example of the potential in transformative peacebuilding of working with local community-based organisations. But it also shows the major shortcomings of current practices in their inability or unwillingness to take advantage of peacebuilding opportunities.¹¹

 

Violent conflict erupted in Croatia in the latter half of 1991 between Croatian Serbs, supported by the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), and Croatian government forces. Although cease-fires were signed and UN peacekeepers deployed, the war did not formally end until August 1995 when the Croatian army “reintegrated” territory held by Croatian Serb forces. The cost of the war was high. As well as thousands of deaths (many civilian) and many more missing, there was ethnic cleansing on both sides which displaced hundreds of thousands and large-scale destruction of buildings and economic infrastructure. Even now, significant problems remain in Croatia, including displaced and refugee populations, damaged property, severe restrictions on freedom of the press, limited political opposition, discrimination, harassment and human rights abuses. But the elections held in January 2000 offer hope for real change as the ruling party which perpetrated much of the violence in Croatia was voted out of power and replaced by a liberal/social democrat coalition.

 

The establishment of UNTAES heralded the beginning of the end of specific peacekeeping involvement in Croatia. Eastern Slavonia was the last area to be “reintegrated” into the Croatian state. Unlike the other UN-protected areas, it was not reintegrated by force during the summer of 1995. As such, the UN peacekeeping mission was responsible for overseeing the changes needed for a smooth transition back to Croatian sovereignty. A key aspect of this task was providing security and protection for the then largely Serb population of the UN-controlled area. Much of the major work carried out came under civil affairs. Central to UNTAES’s activities was the establishment of a Joint Implementation Committee (including representatives of both Serb and Croat communities) to work on reintegrating municipal and social services. The committee also dealt with human rights, cultural issues and education. UNTAES, in other words, had a very wide remit to be involved in specific peacebuilding work.

 

Much of what could loosely be described as peacebuilding was directed through the Joint Implementation Committee. This was necessary, but on both sides the committee representatives (and their constituencies) were often less than keen to co-operate. Lack of co‑operation was particularly evident from the Croatian government, which used a range of delaying tactics and threats throughout the handover process. UN missions frequently labour under political obstructionism of this kind.

 

A much smaller, but potentially far more fruitful effort, was the work with local nongovernmental organisations, an activity which was supposed to be organised by an UNTAES NGO co-ordinator. This post carried no specific remit beyond co-ordinating the efforts of the United Nations, UN agencies and international NGOs in the UNTAES region in order to avoid overlap and ensure the best use of resources. In the end, it was not filled for six months and then only by accident. The person who took on the job was working on developing co-operation across the Croat and Serb health sectors and was trained and experienced in this area. The potential usefulness of the NGO co-ordinator’s work was impeded by lack of resources (one person was far too few to make a real impact) and the lack of overall vision and importance given to the position.

 

Local community-based organisations did report good co-ordination with UNTAES on such issues as travel passes into the UN-administered area, use of UN vehicles for various purposes and information sharing. One local organisation co-ordinator noted that working with UNTAES had been much easier than with its predecessor UNPROFOR. It seemed to her that there had been some institutional learning about the need for greater flexibility, a quicker response and a stronger presence within the various communities.

Missed Opportunities

In practice UNTAES had many defects. It lacked the long-term vision necessary for transformative peacebuilding, but then it had not been conceived or organised within any kind of wider, longer-term peacebuilding context. The title of “NGO Co-ordinator” is indicative of the United Nations’ lack of imagination and understanding of the key issues and needs of long-term peace-building. Co-ordination is clearly only one small part of such work and should not, in any case, be confined to NGOs. It should include, even be developed for, local individuals and community-based organisations. The chief difficulty, though, was that UNTAES lacked the specific mandate and commitment to work with grass-roots organisations on building a sustainable civil society.

 

There were numerous, more specific shortcomings which are typical of any peacekeeping mission. These included continual changes in personnel, which caused a lack of continuity and an uneven application of peacebuilding efforts; the lack of any significant understanding, planning, qualified personnel or financial commitment to support the development of civil society; inadequate co-operation between UN agencies and international NGOs working in the area; and overdependence on the goodwill and competence of the personnel in charge, and a tendency to ignore, patronise and/or undermine local peacebuilding efforts. In addition, the time frame was woefully inadequate, with international interest and therefore funding being withdrawn far too prematurely. These are just a few of the problems which prevented the development of the kind of transformative peacebuilding structures set out by Lederach and discussed above.

 

The whole of the UNTAES area still faces huge problems, not least of which is ensuring the safety and security of the remaining Serb population. Although there are some very good local groups present, they are small in comparison to the size of the challenge facing them. How far can the lack of peacebuilding be blamed on the United Nations? This is, of course, very difficult to assess, and perhaps is not be the crucial question. Rather, it is more important to ask how much effort, time, money and properly trained personnel from the United Nations and its key agencies working in the area were assigned to deal specifically with the facilitation of local peacebuilding work. Certainly, a large effort was made to overcome the immediate humanitarian crisis. But after that, the cutbacks were dramatic. As Lederach’s work very powerfully argues, short-term help should be only one part of larger peacekeeping efforts. So the next question to ask is, did those early efforts of the United Nations feed into a larger, more substantive peacebuilding process, and to what extent? The answer would be “very slightly indeed”, and that where they did it was more by accident than design.

 

An analysis of peacekeeping set within a framework of transformative peacebuilding indicates a number of policy shifts. First is “the big picture”, the need for a long-term, sustained commitment to intervention, where peacekeeping is vitally important but only one, early part of an overall effort. The second is to concentrate on local activities and to facilitate community-based peacebuilding in sustainable and culturally appropriate ways.

Peacekeeping as Peacebuilding

Despite the limitations of conflict management and resolution, we should not conclude that all such work is valueless. It is simply that we must develop more critical and diverse theories and practices to cope with the complex peace and security problems of postwar societies. Shifting the focus of efforts, training and resources to local contexts is vital for improving the prospects of peacekeeping as transformative peacebuilding and for creating sustainable social justice and peace in societies torn apart by war.

 

Part of this work must be theoretical since our practices derive from the perspectives, beliefs and understandings we have of the world around us. An essential aspect of a broader theoretical view is realising the complex interrelationships between “international”, “national” and “local” levels of meaning and practice. The framework of peacebuilding, seen from the starting point offered by Lederach and refined in the context of social theory, offers an arena in which to analyse these crucial issues and the means to develop practices which can have a transformative impact. The overwhelming complexities and destructiveness of violent conflict demand that interventions be capable of coping with the realities of war zones. As we have seen, peacekeeping in its present form is totally unequipped to do so.

Endnotes

1. P. F. Diehl, D. Druckman and J. Wall, “International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 1 (1998), p. 34.

 

2. A. B. Fetherston, Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994).

 

3. Diehl, Druckman and Wall, “International Peacekeeping”, pp. 50–1.

 

4. Ibid., p. 72.

 

5. John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).

 

6. Ibid., p. 29.

 

7. Ibid., p. 58.

 

8. Ibid., p. 77.

 

9. For more extensive discussion of the application of social theory to intervention, see my “Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks”, International Peacekeeping 7, no. 1 (2000).

 

10. United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium.

 

11. The following comments are based on research carried out between September 1997 and August 1998 when I lived and worked in Croatia. I had the opportunity during this period to interview a number of the activists, UN and agency personnel working in the area.