A Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations?

Dr Georgios Kostakos has been an associate of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and of the University of Athens. He has served on UN missions to South Africa, Haiti, Mexico, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

When emergencies occur on a scale that raises global concern, it is often acknowledged that the United Nations should be given the capacity to deal with military and humanitarian crises promptly and effectively. Accumulated experience shows that much precious time may elapse from the moment an emergency is identified until a decision to establish a peacekeeping or humanitarian mission is taken and the mission becomes operational. The consequences are often disastrous.

Several studies and official reports have suggested ways of improving the United Nations’ ability to respond to crises, which is, after all, a central part of the world body’s raison d’être. Depending on the type of emergency, a substantive UN presence may be required at short notice to carry out a wide range of tasks, such as: conducting fact-finding missions; taking preventive action to avert an external or internal attack on a state; protecting an area particularly threatened by outside forces or internal opposing factions; monitoring sanctions; providing humanitarian assistance to populations affected by war or natural disaster; monitoring human rights and observing elections; disarming opponents and decommissioning troops; and verifying treaties and agreements.

The credibility of the United Nations is questioned every time decisions mandating action in a specific crisis are not matched by timely and appropriate deployment of personnel and equipment. Existing machinery has often proved inadequate to cope. This became particularly obvious in the years immediately after the Cold War. Initial enthusiasm and the subsequent dramatic increase in demands for UN intervention soon turned into bitterness and disillusionment as the United Nations foundered in places such as Somalia, Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

A combination of practical necessities and political calculations by important global or regional actors has meant that the post–Cold War “New World Order” has increasingly relied on ad hoc arrangements. Since the mid-1990s, this has resulted in the United Nations’ controversial practice of “sub-contracting” out problems to regional organisations or ad hoc multinational bodies, as occurred in Rwanda, Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo.

The United Nations was created and is sustained by governments as a useful tool in global interstate relations. At the same time, the United Nations expressly aspires to be something more than the mere sum of its parts, i.e., of its member states and their individual interests. It needs, therefore, to develop some imaginative means appropriate to the unique level it occupies and on which it purportedly acts on behalf of humanity, especially in cases of conflict and severe emergencies.

The above observations can be interpreted in several ways, leading to different prescriptions for action. One is a return to the provisions in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which foresees member states earmarking contingents for UN enforcement action on the basis of agreements concluded with the Security Council. Cold War rivalries never allowed that to happen, but perhaps the idea should be revived given our new, significantly altered global circumstances. Another possibility is that the United Nations continue on the path of peacekeeping. Despite the latter’s weaknesses, it is the preferred option of those wary of the United Nations acquiring power and predominance over its sovereign member states.

Stand-by Arrangements

The situation today follows the improvisations introduced during the Cold War period. Just as traditional peacekeeping falls between Chapters VI and VII of the charter, without being explicitly foreseen by either, so do the current stand-by arrangements for contingent contributions that are actively pursued by the UN secretariat. Up to now, almost ninety states have agreed to participate in the system of stand-by arrangements, providing an aggregate initial offer of about 150,000 troops, police and civilian personnel ready for UN peace operations at relatively short notice (in most cases thirty days or more).¹ About a third of the participating states have committed themselves more formally by signing with the United Nations a Memorandum of Understanding. This covers not only the number of personnel to be made available, but also their expertise, equipment and response time.

Of course, the final word on deploying a national contingent when a request is made by the United Nations always rests with the government concerned, which decides on a case-by-case basis, thus limiting the scope, reliability and predictability of the stand-by arrangements. Moreover, even if the requisite personnel were theoretically available on the basis of submitted national offers, adequate expertise and specialised equipment are important elements not easily found. For example, as the secretary-general noted in his report on the subject in January, member states had pledged a total of approximately 2,200 civilian police at a time when the required police deployment for ongoing UN missions was around 9,000. The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo is facing exactly this type of staffing problem.

Nevertheless, the stand-by arrangements system provides for at least some predictability and reliability that otherwise would not exist at all. Moreover, the United Nations’ current rapid deployment capability includes elements such as a Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters and a logistics base in Brindisi, Italy, with start-up kits for new operations. The intention is to develop this capability even further, so as to include—from the advance planning stage—more concrete and specialised contributions of military, police and civilian personnel, equipment, means of transportation, and uniform budgeting and administrative procedures. A training unit and a “lessons learned” unit within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) complement the whole effort. They try to harmonise the multitude of backgrounds, languages and operating procedures of contributed personnel and to minimise future problems by learning from past mistakes.

Of course, as things in international politics go, the above arrangements can only work for as long as there is the political will by member states to make them work. Even then, practical problems, not least obstructive national bureaucracies, can lead to considerable delays. What if, however, there is a broadly acknowledged urgent need for deployment, where even a few days could make the difference between life and death for thousands of people? The severe floods in Mozambique and neighbouring countries in February and March this year are a recent example. In this case the importance of prompt action to save numerous lives soon became obvious. Although the response of the international community was heartening, it was far from adequate.

A more idealistic approach to tackling emergency situations and averting Rwanda-type genocides is to endow the United Nations with a permanent force of its own, consisting of volunteers directly recruited and trained by the world body. Such proposals have been put forward by people of the stature of Sir Brian Urquhart, a former under-secretary-general who retired in 1986 after forty years of UN service.

A Permanent UN Force

The United Nations is primarily an intergovernmental body, an instrument created by, and placed in the service of, the world’s states. The establishment of a permanent force directly accountable to the organisation rather than to its individual members would be a major point of departure, at least in psychological terms. The United Nations is already the target of conspiracy theories, especially in the United States, where some claim it is poised to take over the world and run it “big brother” style. Such accusations, however outlandish they may seem, would certainly be redoubled if the United Nations acquired a permanent force of its own.

Indeed, there is resistance even to the current protocol whereby national contingents assigned to UN operations receive orders from the secretary-general. The United States has more than once made clear that its troops only obey orders coming from the president and the US command structure. In a less vocal but essentially similar fashion, most UN peacekeeping contingents report to and receive instructions from, first and foremost, their national centres. Thus, they only loosely become “UN troops” for the period of a mandated peace operation. This can easily be seen on the ground and is the result of both political and practical considerations. Troops from different countries, speaking different languages, with diverse backgrounds, equipment, training and working methods, cannot become part of a smoothly functioning whole just by donning the blue helmet or beret. The secretary-general may nominally be the commander-in-chief of such multinational forces, and the secretariat through the DPKO may provide a minimal common thread that supports the effort and tries to unify it, but that is all one can reasonably expect.

To endow the United Nations with a private force would solve some of these problems but by no means all. It would probably also give rise to new ones. For instance, such a force would need finance and training, as well as equipment and facilities allowing it to operate in an efficient and effective way. A whole logistical mechanism far surpassing the existing capacities of the DPKO would have to be set up on an unprecedented global level. Regional models could be followed, such as NATO, the Western European Union and the European Union’s prospective rapid reaction force. However, even these are either mostly intergovernmental and unified mainly at the headquarters level, or are still in the making with unclear futures.

Were the United Nations to be given a rapid reaction capability of its own, its use would still require the approval of the world body’s collective organs, especially the Security Council; deployment could not go ahead in the face of a council blocked by disagreements. Moreover, to set about actually achieving its goals, the United Nations would need the firm commitment of most member states. Even if all went well in terms of authorisation, the current tendency to “scapegoat” the United Nations could markedly intensify if individual states were not somehow involved in, and held at least partly responsible for, the actual running of UN peace operations. Letting the United Nations clear up all the mess without risking one’s own troops would also encourage irresponsible attitudes and unrealistic mandates by state governments.

All the above should be taken into consideration before embarking on any experiment with a permanent UN force. Another factor is that because the United Nations aspires to strengthen global peace and explicitly encourages disarmament it cannot just create another army of its own with major fire power. Apart from being inconsistent with some of the United Nations’ basic principles, such a force would also be perceived as a direct challenge to the sovereignty of member states. Thus, any new initiative can only be based on pacification techniques and the United Nations’ moral authority, rather than the threat or use of massive force.

In the remainder of this article, I forward proposals that try to make allowance for many of the fears, limitations and cautions voiced above. Drawing on other work in this field, I moot the creation of a permanent body which would be multipurpose in scope and not confined to military tasks. This body would also be multidisciplinary in character, i.e., composed of men and women with a broad variety of backgrounds, professional expertise and skills. It would enable the United Nations to react swiftly to emergencies by providing an initial presence in problem areas soon after a decision to intervene was taken, without alienating its member states or raising fears of global domination.

Creating a ‘Peace Guard’

A “UN Peace Guard” (UNPG) could be staffed with young men and women from all over the world, recruited directly by the United Nations on the basis of merit from various professional fields and with due respect to broad geographical representation. The recruits would have at least a first post-secondary-education degree, be aged between twenty and thirty years old, and be in good physical condition. In order to tackle the whole range of its anticipated duties, the UNPG would have to be able to call on many individual and collective talents. Recruits would be drawn from professional categories including political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, social workers, economists, lawyers, medical doctors, paramedics, computer and communications experts, pilots, engineers and technicians.

The UNPG’s initial target size could be five thousand personnel, expanding later if the first experimental period went well. Recruits could be distributed more or less equally among four UNPG installations or “facilities” located in the Americas, Europe, Asia and Africa. The American facility could be conveniently located near UN headquarters in New York and could also serve as the centre of operations (COP) for all field activities. This would justify a figure of fourteen hundred staff in this primary facility, as opposed to twelve hundred for each of the other three. An additional permanent staff of about one hundred senior officers, core trainers—excluding ad hoc contracted ones—administrators, logistics officers and support staff would also be employed in each facility, except in the COP, where special arrangements would be made. Each facility would have enough space for an airport, extensive training grounds of varied terrain, command and accommodation quarters and warehouses. They would be fully equipped and self-sufficient in terms of communications, power supply and transportation.

Operational Procedures

The basic unit of the UNPG would be a self-contained team of two hundred persons (the UNPG would thus initially consist of twenty-five basic units). Each basic unit would incorporate a wide range of special skills so that it could handle most contingencies. Units would be readily deployable to any part of the globe. Some would be better prepared for certain regions. They would include persons speaking the main language(s) of a region but not, as a rule, coming from that region. English could be the working language of all units internally, although multilingualism should be encouraged morally and practically.

The idea is that in an emergency one or more basic units would be deployed, the number depending on the size of the area to be covered and on the breadth and complexity of the mandate at hand. This UNPG presence would be able to perform most basic tasks—peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring, electoral observation and even short-term rehabilitation—until a fully-fledged UN multinational force was put together. Operations of limited duration—say of up to six months—and demanding limited personnel could be handled from beginning to end by the UNPG. If all basic units from all facilities were used, a maximum of twenty-five small-scale contingencies or a lesser number of larger contingencies could be handled at the same time. Of course, this would stretch capabilities to breaking point. Normally several basic units would serve as reserves to replace other basic units on long missions, or would come in as reinforcements where difficulties on the ground demanded it.

Overall political control of UNPG activities would rest with the competent political intergovernmental organs, chiefly the Security Council and/or the General Assembly, and would be exercised through the mandates and periodic appraisals issued by them. At the same time, as with the various UN forces up to now, the UN secretary-general would be the UNPG’s supreme commander. His orders would be relayed through the under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations, whose present department (the DPKO) would practically merge with the new formation. Close co-operation would be established with the Department of Political Affairs, which would provide briefings and guidance on sensitive political issues. Other UN departments, programmes and specialised agencies (e.g., the Office of the Emergency Relief Co-ordinator, the UN High Commission for Refugees, the UN High Commission for Human Rights, etc.), as well as non-governmental organisations, should be brought in as appropriate.

For operational matters, a clear line of command would be established from the under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations, his/her advisers and the senior officers at the DPKO/COP, down to the facility commanders and basic unit commanders. Details should be dealt with at the lowest level possible, according to clear, predefined rules and procedures. Command of a basic unit would periodically rotate among its members, while for a specific field mission it could be assigned to individuals from the most relevant professional category according to the mandate to be carried out.

Training

UNPG recruits would receive continuous training in such areas as foreign languages (linguistic aptitude would be a prerequisite for recruitment); self-defence tactics, including, but not confined to, the use of light weapons; political geography, anthropology and intercultural communication; conflict resolution skills; logistics; communications and electronics; and first aid. All recruits would receive the same basic training but there would also be specialised training for each professional/functional category. Training would usually be carried out within the basic unit, although basic units of the same facility would regularly attend joint training and would perform joint exercises. Exchange visits and joint exercises would also take place among the facilities at regular intervals.

Service with the UNPG would last for three years, with the possibility of extension to a maximum of five years. Each year a percentage of the staff, between a third and a fifth, would be replaced (special provisions would be made for the initial transitional years). UNPG members would receive free accommodation, food, clothing, recreation facilities and other amenities during their period of service. They would also be entitled to a reasonable monthly salary. However, even though recruits would often be expected to operate on a twenty-four-hour, seven-days-a-week basis, no overtime or hardship allowances would be paid. At the end of their service they would receive a handsome relocation allowance, enabling them to be smoothly reintegrated into their respective societies and professions. In fact, UNPG “veterans” would be a valuable source of skills for the public and/or private sector of their respective countries.

A 1995 Ford Foundation and Yale University study on UN reform indicated that the annual cost of a ten thousand–strong UN Rapid Reaction Force would be $500 million, with an additional one-time start-up cost of another $500 million.² Proportionally, for a UNPG of five thousand people the cost should be about half that, although expenditure in acquiring and maintaining premises and equipment may be inelastic to a large extent. Much depends also on whether member states would offer the initial equipment and facility grounds and premises free of charge, and on whether they would undertake to service and/or renew the equipment. A detailed study has to be made of the financial aspects of several possible alternative arrangements.

Additional Uses

Even if the cost of going ahead with such a plan proves manageable, political reservations may be harder to deal with. Sovereignty-jealous governments and some national military establishments would oppose the idea of the United Nations—an entity with a supranational potential—having a permanent force at its disposal. However, the modest size and equipment of the UNPG, its deeply entrenched “un-military” character and scope, should placate worried national officials. Furthermore, the United Nations would continue to rely for large-scale or long-term missions (and, of course, for any enforcement action) on the forces made available to it by its member states.

It must be stressed that an initiative on the lines proposed here would be intended to supplement and not replace the ongoing arrangements between the secretariat and member states for stand-by national forces which are located in their national territories but can be turned over to the United Nations at short notice. In fact, the creation of the UNPG would help streamline the establishment and functioning of major UN multinational forces in several ways:

1. The officers of national contingents earmarked for UN service could be offered joint training courses at UNPG facilities.

2. National contingents could be turned over to the United Nations for an agreed mission through the nearest UNPG facility, which would co-ordinate transportation and provide compatible communications equipment.

3. UNPG units could prepare the ground for a smoother and better-organised deployment of national contingents. UNPG advance deployment would help stabilise the situation and the units could then provide the necessary cohesion, training and co-ordination if they remained for a period after the multinational UN forces arrived.

Although it is conceivable that the UNPG units on each continent could also serve on missions mandated by that continent’s regional organisation(s), careful consideration should be given to the political and institutional repercussions of such a step. In any case, the United Nations should run its facilities as a unified system and retain the final word on any co-operation arrangements.

Interim Measures

The above may look good on paper, but it is easy to foresee adverse reactions and dismissals from many quarters. If a full-scale innovative solution of this kind proves impossible to implement in the near future, an interim arrangement might offer the United Nations a more co-ordinated, efficient and effective rapid reaction capability without arousing too many passions. Elements of such an arrangement would include:

1. An expansion of the stand-by arrangements system, as already envisioned by the secretariat, to include as many member states and as many troops, police, civilians and kinds of expertise as possible.

2. The creation and specialised training of units dedicated to international service by countries participating in the stand-by arrangements, on the basis of uniform guidelines produced after broad consultations.³

3. The institution of brief but intensive training sessions at a “UN military staff college” for officers in charge of a country’s stand-by units. Building on relevant UN, national and multinational precedents, training would cover the principles and practices of multilateralism, including instruction on UN administration and logistics. In short, the national officers of future UN contingents would learn to speak a common language, metaphorically and literally. This would certainly facilitate interaction and co-ordination for future missions.

4. Regular joint exercises by the UN-assigned military units of various countries from various regions, complementing the officers’ training.

An interim arrangement like the above may or may not lead to a permanent UN force of the type under discussion. In any case, such an arrangement, elements of which are already in place, is positive and important in itself, and need not be abandoned if a permanent force is established. Officer training and joint exercises of national contingents for peacekeeping purposes will always be needed, as even a permanent UN force would have to be supplemented by national forces for large and protracted operations.

The primary aim of this article was to focus attention on a factor crucial to the success of international peace and humanitarian operations in the twenty-first century, namely, a reliable rapid reaction capability for the United Nations. The details can be worked out by committees and specialised bodies if and when UN members ever reach a consensus to proceed. However, what must not be avoided is discussion of difficult but vital issues like this, which call for practical steps based on inspiration, imagination, leadership and courage.

Endnotes

1. See report of the UN secretary-general, “Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations”, UN Doc. A/54/670, 6 January 2000.

2. The United Nations in Its Second Half-Century (New York: Ford Foundation and Yale University, 1995).

3. Note here an interesting initiative to establish a Multinational UN Stand-by Forces High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) by a group of states which are regular troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. See Anna Fosdick, “Conflict Management Learning? Policy Reflections and Institutional Reforms”, Global Governance 5, no. 4 (Oct.–Dec. 1999), p. 441.