Muslims of Europe: An Italian Perspective

Roberto Toscano is Italy’s ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

 

 

The “Muslim question” haunts Europe. It is a mixture of real problems and politically inspired dramatisation, true concern for European democratic traditions and the racist rejection of difference, genuine conceptual disarray and the deliberate blurring of distinctions. The task of addressing it in a manner compatible with those traditions of freedom and pluralism we purport to defend is one of the most momentous of our time. It is certainly a practical task—a combination of institutional flexibility and political savvy—and yet analysis and reflection are also extremely important. We must first clarify our ideas if we are to act in a sane, rational and effective way.

 

This modest contribution to the discussion of European Islam will try to spell out some general features of the issue, but also to see whether the peculiarities of the Italian experience suggest some approaches capable, if not of “solving” the problem (we should learn rather how to live with it in a humane and civilised way), then at least of reducing its potential for disruption, confrontation and violence. 

Avoiding Hubris 

It is by now evident that the presence of Muslims in Western societies represents a considerable challenge to those liberal and democratic values today deemed synonymous with the West: pluralism, tolerance, acceptance of difference. The “today” is important, and deserves a brief comment: indeed, one should never forget that the above description of what constitutes “the West” is the product of a long process that is still far from being unchallenged by different Western trends and ideologies and far from being irreversible. This should give us pause and make us more modest and averse to formulating claims of superiority, as well as more patient when judging other cultures and traditions.

 

In other words, we (meaning “original”, non-Muslim Europeans) will be unable even to start addressing the issue without some rather self-critical premisses. The first is that our civilisational achievements in terms of democracy, pluralism and individual freedom were not innate, nor the only possible mode of being European, but are rather the product of a painful, slow, contested and often bloody process. And when speaking of “us” and “them” (“them” being not only Muslims, but non-Westerners in general), we should stop comparing our best with their worst: we tend to compare Immanuel Kant with Emperor Bokassa, but are very careful never to compare Hitler with Gandhi. Even worse is comparing our theoretical best (Christ’s original message) with their historical worst (murderous Islamic fundamentalism)—our ideas with their practice.

 

Another important self-critical exercise is to admit that Europeans have had—and to a certain extent still have—the tendency to feel superior to Americans, accusing them of racism, whereas whenever we have been confronted with the challenge of diversity at home, let alone in our colonial history, our behaviour has rarely been in harmony with our lofty egalitarian and humanistic principles. Too often we have failed, and are still failing that test.

 

Recently, we have been witnessing another disturbing phenomenon. Facing what is perceived as the menace of militant political Islam, some Europeans—many of them non-believers—are proposing a return to militant political Christianity. Far from being a spiritual revival, this trend actually apes the worst of the Other, aiming at a reversal of the long and painful Western process of secularisation and tolerance. It is a call to arms against Muslims (arbitrarily defined as inevitably and integrally Islamist) that is addressed to a community of sectarian “Christianists”, rather than of Christians. 

Questions of Diversity 

But let us begin by clearly defining the object of our discussion. Traditionally, it is a discussion that has been conducted under the heading “Muslims in Europe”. This is definitely not a neutral option, insofar as it implies that Muslims are an alien presence. A better heading would be “Europe’s Muslims”, implying that we should all share. Given the demographic and religious trends, it would be not only theoretically weak, but practically misleading, to say that Europe is equivalent to Christianity, or even to post-Christian secularism and atheism. The fact is that when we say “Muslims in Europe”, we imply that the Muslim presence can be defined in terms of immigrant communities, or that Muslims are “guests” of Europe. If the former is true of much of Europe (and it is especially true of Italy, where Muslims are mostly recent immigrants), we should aim at moving beyond this description since reality is also moving towards a situation in which it will be more correct to speak of “European Muslims”, just as we speak of “American Catholics” and “American Jews”, groups which are also “different” if compared to the dominant Protestant culture of the United States, and which are also the relatively recent products of immigration.

 

Since I mentioned the United States, I will say that in comparison to it, Europe is a relatively recent newcomer to the test of diversity—and my country, with a long history of cultural and religious homogeneity, is the most recent of all. And yet I maintain that Europe is well equipped to cope with that test.

 

In the first place, the European liberal tradition is one which, to employ Isaiah Berlin’s terms, has never been satisfied with mere “negative liberty” (freedom from), but has always sought the rules, institutions and social ethic which could allow for “positive liberty” (freedom to).

 

Only participation, i.e., positive liberty, can help us solve the dilemma of how to preserve difference while ensuring common citizenship. The limits of the apparently humanistic goal of assimilation have been thoroughly exposed. In short, assimilation is only a theoretical recognition of the common humanity of every individual, but it conceals a devastating premiss: the definition of that common humanity remains firmly in the hands of the dominant, “host”, community. In assimilationist ideology, the abstract citizen bears the clear marks of a specific culture setting the standards and the conditions for assimilation. Besides—and this is especially true of individuals identifying themselves with Islam—some people just do not want to be assimilated, if that means adopting the culture, religion, spiritual orientation, lifestyle, and family patterns of the dominant group.

 

Today, however, criticising assimilationism is too easy a task. It is more difficult, but just as necessary, to expose the underside of another, equally humanistic (in theory) ideology, that of differentialism, more commonly known as “multiculturalism”. The recognition of different communities, each self-regulated, socially and in part politically autarkic, seems the most respectful, non-hegemonic way of addressing diversity. And yet there are at least three powerful objections to this approach. The first is that the slogan of “separate but equal” hides an illusion, if not worse: separation tends to determine hierarchy, autonomy often conceals marginalisation and exclusion—non-empathy, non-recognition, neglect, even contempt. The ghetto or the Indian reservation is always looming behind the best intentions of multiculturalists.

 

Actual experience indicates that cold tolerance and distant respect, at best, tend to be the prevalent psychological and political modes of multiculturalism. As a Dutch intellectual, Paul Scheffer, has remarked of multiculturalism as practised in the liberal and tolerant Netherlands, the country had “let its immigrants rot in their own privacy”.1

 

The second objection to multiculturalism refers to the constant danger that difference may become conflict. Whenever one identity—of the many that make up the reality of each individual—is singled out as the sole relevant one and idolatrously elevated into an all-encompassing paradigm, then the Other is often turned into the enemy, all the more so if social and economic disparities are described in terms of discrimination and exploitation, and our own group’s reality is described in terms of victimisation—i.e., if disadvantage is presented as an unjust denial of rights and benefits perpetrated by some other group.

 

In the third place, multiculturalism is centred on the recognition of rights for groups as such, thereby raising the danger (unacceptable for those who adhere to liberalism) that nonconforming individuals might be repressed within their own communities. Europe cannot accept that people living on its territory are “delivered” to community leaders who are unaccountable to the law and often aspire to a patriarchal, authoritarian and sometimes even violent power over their community. 

A Plural Reality 

The European answer to this dilemma is neither assimilationist nor multiculturalist, especially since individual countries and European Union institutions alike have developed a system of differentiated, multi-level participation that escapes both extremes. Europe can only be defined pluralistically: a plurality of identities of each citizen (from family to religion to local community to nation-state to the European Union). Europe, in other words, means rejecting both a monolithic and a fragmented view of politics and human society. As an Italian philosopher, Massimo Cacciari (today the mayor of Venice), has observed, Europe is neither a bloc-like landmass nor an island: it is, culturally and politically, an archipelago combining individuality and commonality. Muslims, with their culture and their religion, can be—and in many ways already are—a legitimate part of that archipelago.

 

Yet, in spite of these favourable premisses, problems abound, so that in the minds of too many people Europe and Islam are seen as irreconcilable poles of an insoluble contrast, if not an outright clash. Too many people, when addressing the question, seem to go back fatalistically to Kipling’s famous dictum that “East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet”. They forget that Christianity, if its origins are considered, is definitely not Western, but rather a Jewish heresy onto which Greek philosophy and Roman law were grafted. They also forget that, because of globalisation, we are beyond the mere meeting of cultures and religions; we are irreversibly intertwined, coexisting on the same territories.

 

The problem underlying the difficulty of accepting a reality we already inhabit is fear. What is significant is that there is fear on both sides of the relationship. It is felt both by non-Muslim and Muslim Europeans. The former fear that diversity will entail a loss of identity, and are haunted by reactionary nostalgia for a golden, homogeneous (and imaginary) past. Muslims, on the other hand (many of them recent immigrants from less developed areas of the world and from societies strongly defined by traditional norms) have difficulty coping with modernity, let alone post-modernity, and also fear a loss of identity.

 

Resistance to the very reality in which both groups, Muslims and non-Muslims, are already living is grounded in the unrealistic hope that it is possible to “opt out” of history, to freeze one’s way of life and of interpreting respective religious messages. Both groups forget that change is not optional, that at most it can be steered or managed. It must not be accepted passively. Our identities must be preserved through change, not against change. To quote a distinction that the Romans grasped very clearly, we can—on an individual or collective basis—remain ipse, that is, with the same identity, but not idem, meaning unchanged through time and history. 

Seeing Clearly 

Moving beyond fear is therefore a task which must be performed by all actors, all individuals concerned, all groups. It will not be achieved by denying or minimising problems. But definitely some preliminary work to get certain facts straight before confronting the various political, ethical and spiritual issues that constitute Europe’s difficult Muslim/non-Muslim relationship would be in order.

 

The most urgent task of all is overcoming the simplifications and distortions that characterise the image of Islam and Islamic culture that is unfortunately predominant in the West. Islam is seen:

 

● as a monolithic bloc, ignoring the wide range of religious orientations within the faith, not just the well-known distinction between Sunnis and Shi’ites, but also the traditions of Sufism, of the Alawites or Ismailis, and the profile of African Islam;

 

● as a religion of extremists, taking at face value the preposterous claim of the most violent groups and individuals (inevitably the most visible) to represent the whole of the Muslim world;

 

● as uniquely culpable for a range of clearly barbaric phenomena, such as genital mutilation (a regional, pre-Islamic custom practised also by Christians), terrorism (definitely not unknown in Christian milieus: both ETA and the IRA arose within a deeply Catholic culture), and especially suicidal terrorism (as if the Tamil Tigers were Muslim). Islam is held responsible, in anti-Muslim polemics, for patriarchal traditions that can also be found within Christendom. The stoning to death in April 2007, within northern Iraq’s non-Muslim Yazidi community, of a young girl “guilty” of wanting to marry a Muslim, should make us pause before attributing to a particular religion a monopoly on the horrors of patriarchal backwardness;

 

● as a religion preaching holy war, forgetting the holy wars of Christianity (the Crusades, with their indiscriminate massacres of Muslims and Jews) and that jihad is not only, or even chiefly, a bellicose precept, but one of self-improvement and spiritual struggle;

 

● as the main ideology of hostility towards the West, forgetting the distinction between a religion and its ideological uses.

 

However, Muslims too will have to undertake a conceptually symmetrical task of clarification, deconstruction and abandonment of myths and distortions. It is indeed true that the West, especially after 11 September, has been indulging in what could be called “sinister Orientalism”, regarding Islam as representing only terrorism, intolerance, backwardness, and oppression. But Muslims also have much work to do in dismantling the pernicious distortions of their “Occidentalism”, which sets up a negative mirror-image of an imaginary West consisting exclusively of imperialists, racists, materialists, and soulless hedonists. As is always the case, disarmament, in order to be effective, will have to be bilateral, and will entail eschewing caricature and simplification when addressing complex phenomena such as cultural traditions and religious heritage.

 

Much intellectual reciprocity is entailed here, but it would be unfair to turn that into an overall symmetry. The chief onus for this necessary dialogue lies with those who have the greater power, those who inhabit the dominating heights of European society and culture. They will have to carry the main burden: increasing their present pitiful knowledge of Islam, ceasing to be patronising towards Muslims, and abandoning attempts to impose “Western values” on them. The only non-negotiable values are those of democracy and pluralism. The only thing we should not tolerate is intolerance, be it politically or religiously motivated. 

Values and Duties 

What is it legitimate to demand of our fellow Europeans who are Muslim, and of the Muslims who live among us without being citizens? In 2005, British prime minister Tony Blair, referring to Muslims in the United Kingdom, said that they had “the duty to share and support the values that sustain the British way of life”. One should take exception to this statement, and say instead that all European citizens have the duty to obey the law, not to share values. Values, indeed, are a matter of individual choice and subjective appraisement. Europe is the creation of values, but those values have been turned into laws and institutions. At the end of the Second World War, the (many) citizens of Germany and Italy who had been followers of Hitler and Mussolini definitely did not share what we now consider “European values”, yet they were not called on to renounce their individual beliefs. Rather, their sole duty was to obey the new democratic constitutions of the two countries and the law.

 

Even Muslims who do not share “European values” have the right of citizenship in Europe as long as they respect the law. We may certainly express doubts about the authenticity of the allegiance to democracy of a thinker such as Tariq Ramadan, a modern integriste. Yet when he says that European Muslims must obey the laws but not necessarily share the values of the dominant, non-Muslim, culture, it is difficult to challenge him and at the same time avoid falling into a less-than-pluralistic ideological trap.

 

What should be done is not to create self-contained, autonomous Muslim communities, but rather supply space, a democratic and pluralistic space where not only will Muslims be able to live their own spiritual traditions, but where Islam—freed for the first time in history from the constraints of non-democratic political systems—will be able to grow, debate, develop its full spiritual and intellectual range, interact with other traditions, and define itself vis-à-vis the challenges of the contemporary world.

 

If we can entrain this process, then we may be justified in thinking that Europe and Islam, far from being antithetical, will turn out to be more compatible than commonly thought. Even more significant, both would benefit from this encounter. And in the open contest for ideological and spiritual hegemony that can unfold only in conditions of freedom and respect for human rights, it will be for history to decide which values are capable of prevailing. 

The Italian Case 

When talking about “Muslims in Italy”, the rather reduced dimensions of the phenomenon are immediately evident. In a population of about fifty-seven million, Muslims number only about seven hundred thousand, i.e., around 1.2 per cent.2 Also worth stressing at the outset is that it is difficult to speak of “Muslims of Italy”, since the Muslim presence in the country (in marked contrast to that in Britain, France and Germany) is of very recent origin, and overwhelmingly a product of immigration, with relatively few second- and third-generation Muslims. Thus, it would be more correct to speak of “Muslims in Italy”. These considerations preclude the Italian case’s being regarded as emblematic of the general European situation. Yet it has several features which deserve to be underlined and which have a wider relevance.

 

If the analytical categories discussed in the first part of this paper are applied, we can see that several characteristics of the Italian pattern of Muslim presence point in a direction that excludes both the assimilationist and the differentialist options, thus opening the way for intercultural rather than multicultural integration.

 

The first thing to consider is that Muslim immigrants in Italy come from a wide range of countries: Morocco (160,000), Tunisia (45,000), Senegal (39,000), and Egypt (33,000), as well as Bangladesh, Somalia, Iran, and Pakistan. What is significant, if read together with these data, is that a majority of Muslim immigrants, when asked to define their identity, indicate country of origin first (42.8 per cent), with 17.7 per cent calling themselves “citizens of the world”, 15.9 per cent splitting their cultural allegiance between Italy and their home countries, and only 12.9 per cent indicating religion as their main ground of identity. It is also interesting to note that only 1.7 per cent of Muslim immigrants cite Italy as their identity reference, whereas 2.1 per cent of respondents have acquired Italian citizenship.

 

These data point simultaneously to the reduced appeal of total assimilation (as indicated by the fact that even some Muslims who are already Italian citizens do not define their own identity exclusively in Italian terms) and to the non-existence of a unified “Muslim community”, which would include Moroccans and Senegalese, Somalis and Iranians. It is also significant that most Muslim immigrants to Italy come from moderate and not radical Islamic countries, which means they bring with them a political culture that has fewer problems of compatibility with European democratic traditions.

 

Here it is important to note the attitude of Muslims in Italy towards religion. The fact that most define their own identity in national rather than religious terms does not mean they are not religious. Quite the contrary: 70.8 per cent are practising Muslims, 28.6 per cent define themselves as non-practising Muslims, and only 0.4 per cent say they are non-religious or atheist. It is true that mosque attendance is very low (estimated at between 5 and 10 per cent of Muslims in Italy), but a factor to be considered is the scarcity of mosques in Italy, and that many Muslims live too far away from them to attend regularly.

 

This raises another fact which explains why the prospect (desired by some, dreaded by others) of a “multicultural Italy” with a strong and unified Muslim community is rather unlikely: the territorially scattered distribution of the Muslim presence in Italy. There are no “Muslim banlieues”, nor Muslim neighbourhoods or towns. This might change with an increase in immigration from Muslim countries, but especially if territorial integration were to be blocked by discrimination on the basis of religion. Today, there are but scattered signs of such discrimination; socio-economic factors seem to weigh much more heavily than cultural–religious ones. In finding somewhere to live, a Tunisian Muslim might run into bigoted landlords no more frequently (and perhaps even less often) than might a Christian Albanian or a Christian (and Catholic) Congolese. On the other hand, while socio-economic discrimination might be more significant than cultural and religious discrimination, it is important to remark that the data on the social background of Muslims in Italy reveal what is almost a picture of “elite immigration”: 28.4 per cent have a university degree, 44.3 per cent finished high school, and only 2.7 per cent are illiterate.

 

For the time being, in any case, the reality is one of Muslim immigrants’ residing wherever work and availability of lodgings may take them. There is no doubt that territorial separation (if not separatism) is the fundamental prerequisite for the creation of self-contained, culturally autarkic, potentially radicalised communities. In the case of Italy, such separation does not seem to be the case.

 

Something should be said about Muslim organisations in Italy and their relations with the state. According to the Italian Constitution, religious faiths other than the Catholic Church (whose relations with the Italian state are regulated by a Concordat) can stipulate agreements allowing for special rights and benefits, including the possibility of drawing on public funds. Such agreements have been reached with religious groups ranging from Jews to Jehovah’s Witnesses, but not with Muslims. This has nothing to do with the attitude of Italian governments, but rather with the problem of identifying an interlocutor to represent the Muslim community, given strong differences among the various branches of organised Islam in Italy. The main Muslim organisations are the “Union of Islamic Organisations and Communities in Italy” (UCOII) and the “Islamic Cultural Centre of Italy” (the Rome Mosque). The UCOII accuses the Rome Mosque of representing “state Islam”, and more precisely, Saudi orientations and approaches; the Rome Mosque brands the UCOII as radical and as basically being inspired by the Muslim Brothers. Attempts to bridge this gap have so far been unsuccessful, but it can be foreseen that sooner or later Muslims, too, like other religious groups, will have their official status according to Italian law.

 

An interesting development has been the setting up within Italy’s interior ministry, in September 2005, of a “Consulta per l’islam italiano” (Consultative Body for Italian Islam). It consists of sixteen members, eight of them Italian citizens, the other eight foreign residents, and it serves as an advisory body to the minister of the interior.

 

We have seen that the pattern of Muslim presence in Italy seems to be defined by the two following traits: religious belief as a part, but not an exclusive component, of cultural identity; and the scarce appeal of territorially homogeneous Muslim communities. Most significant, however, is the attitude of Muslims towards the alternatives of an assimilationist or a multicultural society. According to the results of the poll already cited (see footnote 2), the majority (42.6 per cent) would prefer to live “interculturally”, i.e., with full integration in Italian society while maintaining their own complex identities that include, but are not limited to, their shared religious belief, while 24.6 per cent wish for a multicultural society in which communities would maintain their own institutions, customs, identities, dress codes, etc. Only one-tenth of respondents reject even “multicultural integration”.

 

Other interesting findings of the same poll are the following:

 

● When asked to indicate what they value most about Italy, 40.5 per cent of Muslims say “freedom of speech and association”.

 

● The majority (50.6 per cent) have a positive view of Italy.

 

● 53.9 per cent of respondents say that in Italy racism is a minority phenomenon caused by Italians’ lack of familiarity with other cultures, i.e., it is the product of ignorance, not malice. 

Grounds for Hope? 

To sum up, the situation today of “Muslims in Italy” (and tomorrow of “Muslims of Italy”) seems to justify—against all the prophets of doom and of the clash of civilisations—a rather positive view of the future. Complacency should be avoided, however. On the one hand, the numerically small magnitude of the Muslim presence in Italy mitigates any of its problematic aspects. On the other, there are no guarantees that the situation will not become more problematic in the future. Much will depend on wise policies by governments and on the Italian people’s capacity to accept higher levels of cultural diversity; hitherto, Italians have been much less exposed to such diversity than other European peoples. And much will also depend on Italy’s Muslim communities themselves: on their capacity to choose the right representatives, and on their success in combining adherence to their religious faith, traditions and cultures with the demands of life in a modern, democratic and predominantly non-Muslim society.

 

It is important here to consider the strategies of organised “radical Islam” in Italy. Basically, they can be summed up as an attempt to transform a Muslim community into an “Islamic” and possibly “Islamist” one. Radical Islam, in Italy, aims at fighting not assimilation (as we have seen, not a real possibility, given the strong religious and cultural identification of Italy’s Muslims) but rather integration. It tries to foment the territorial and social self-exclusion of Muslims from a society that is denounced as impious (jahiliyah) and totally incompatible with Islam.

 

It must also be pointed out that converts play an important role in radical Islamic groups in Italy. These converts often have a history of political extremism both on the right and on the left—which, incidentally, indicates that radical Islamism can become, and to a certain extent is already becoming, the general vehicle of extremist political antagonism.

 

Finally, the whole prospect of “integration without assimilation” (the European way to a creative, liberal and peaceful intercultural society) will definitely be affected by external factors, in particular the present threat of international terrorism. The only thing that can destroy, in Italy and elsewhere in Europe, the prospect of a European civilisation that includes Muslim culture is the association of Islam and terrorism. The link is preposterous, but it will not be defeated and erased without a joint effort (both political and cultural) by Muslims and non-Muslims.

 

 

Endnotes

 

 

1. See Jane Kramer, “The Dutch Model: Multiculturalism and Muslim Immigrants”, New Yorker, 13 April 2006.

 

2. All population data on Muslims in Italy, and the subsequent opinion-poll findings about their attitudes, are drawn from Roberto Gritti and Magdi Allam, Islam, Italia (Milan: Guerrini e Associati, 2001). Today, Italy’s Muslim population is probably slightly bigger than stated by Gritti and Allam, but is still certainly not more than 2 per cent.