Turkey and the South Caucasus

Bulent Aras is associate professor in the department of international relations, Fatih University, Istanbul.

Fourteen years have passed since the three South Caucasus republics—Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan—gained their independence. But a legitimate and stable regional system has yet to emerge. There are a number of internal and regional problems that may lead to serious difficulties for these states. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, local and external powers sometimes competed for influence in the South Caucasus. Turkish policy in the area has been shaped by both material and ideological factors. Although I will take both into consideration in this article, more space will be devoted to the latter.

The nationalist foreign-policy line in Turkey perceived the emergence of the new republics in the former Soviet south as an opportunity, greatly exaggerating the expected benefits and also Ankara’s own capabilities. The policy statements of different domestic actors, who later joined ranks in what is known as the nationalist–republican bloc, point to what was seen as the emergence of a new “safe zone” of Turkish identity in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Addressing the Turkish parliament in December 1991, Erdal İnönü, leader of the former leftist Social Democrat People’s Party, asserted that the “profound changes” in Russia would have “very important consequences” for both Turkey and the newly independent Turkic states of the former Soviet Union, i.e., Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. “Despite all the uncertainties,” İnönü said,

these new developments are bringing new opportunities and visions to our foreign policy. These changes are also ushering in a new period in which Turkey’s role and political weight will be increased dramatically in the region and in the world.¹

The veteran rightist politician and then–prime minister, Süleyman Demirel, argued that the dissolution of the Soviet Union paved the way for the formation of a gigantic Turkish world stretching from the Balkans to the Great Wall of China. Erol Manisali, a staunch Kemalist–nationalist intellectual, proposed “the formation of a community of Turkic republics based on military, economic, political and cultural grounds”. The new Turkic republics widened the room for manoeuvre of Turkish foreign policy and relieved partially the difficulties of conducting foreign policy in a period of severe Turkish identity crisis both at home and abroad.

Official and Non-State Initiatives

TIKA (the Turkish Co-operation and Development Agency), established in 1992, is the most important body in Turkey that furthers economic relations with the newly independent states of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Its purpose can be compared to that of the US Agency for International Development. Having such a successful international development organisation represents an unprecedented achievement for Turkey. Its projects and programmes are all needs-based and initiated upon the request of the developing states.

Some of TIKA’s ongoing programmes include educational scholarships and student exchanges in co-operation with the Turkish ministry of education. Currently, about ten thousand students from the Caucasus and Central Asia attend various Turkish educational institutions, at the Turkish government’s expense. TIKA has arranged for the exchange of specialists in various fields, and teachers of all levels are being trained in Turkey. Turkey has recently opened eighteen high schools and two universities in the Caucasus under the direct control of its education ministry.

The Turkish foreign ministry also formed the Turkish Cultures and Arts Joint Administration (TÜRKSOY) to serve as an umbrella organisation for cultural officials from the Turkic states and representatives from Turkish-populated areas of the Russian Federation. Ankara has also promoted the use of the Turkish language in Azerbaijan and has beamed Turkish-language radio and television programmes via satellite to the region through its Avrasya (Eurasia) channel since April 1992.

Another organisation, the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (TDRA), and its Foundation of Religious Affairs (TDV), aim not only to promote Turkey’s position in the new republics but also to prevent the penetration and dissemination of Iranian and Wahhabi types of Islamic understanding. The type of Islamic understanding promoted by TDRA is apolitical and secularist, confining religion to the private sphere. These organisations seek to raise the level of Islamic knowledge, support the education of Islamic preachers, and increase aid for Muslim–Turkic peoples to restore and build mosques. TDV has opened three religious high schools and five divinity faculties in various countries of the region.

Turkish economic activity in the Caucasus and wider region exists on two levels: state agencies, especially TIKA, provide technical and financial assistance, and Turkish businessmen invest. By the end of the 1990s, 2,500 Turkish companies were operating in numerous projects in the Central Asian and Caucasian republics, their investments amounting to $8.4 billion and involving $4 billion in construction services. Trade volume climbed from a meagre $145 million in 1992 to over $5.6 billion in 1999. However, Turkey’s trade relations with the Caucasian republics leave room for improvement. For example, export statistics for the first four months of 2001 show that Azerbaijan had just a 0.7 per cent share of Turkey’s total exports and Georgia just 0.4 per cent.

After a series of liberalisation efforts in Turkey, small and medium-sized firms from central and eastern Anatolian towns emerged as successes. Known as the “Anatolian tigers”, these companies, in the words of Ziya Öniş, professor of international relations at Koc University in Istanbul, “managed to establish themselves as significant exporters of manufactures on the world market, while, at the same time, receiving little or no subsidy from the state for this purpose”.² Most of the Turkish businessmen investing in the economies of the region come from these Anatolian tigers, which offer a role model for the development of the newly independent states. Only a few of Turkey’s big industrialists have invested in the area, excluding construction companies.

The Turkish military has also been directly involved in developing relations with the new republics. The Russian and Armenian media frequently alleged that Turkey sent equipment and military personnel to help the Chechens and Azeris in their respective conflicts with Russia and Armenia. Ankara strenuously denied these allegations, declaring that Turkish assistance was limited to some bilateral agreements (i.e., modernisation projects) and the training in Turkey of only a small number of military officers from the new republics. Azerbaijan has never concealed its desire to become integrated into NATO’s military structure. It participates in NATO’s “Partnership for Peace” programme, a project intended to create trust between the alliance and east European and former Soviet-bloc states. Baku perceives Turkey as a unique bridge that would allow Azerbaijan to draw closer to NATO’s zone of interests.

The Turkish military worries about possible Russian encroachment in the Transcaucasus. Tensions between Ankara and Moscow peaked in May 1992 when Turkey put forces on manoeuvre when it appeared that Armenian units might attack the Azerbaijani autonomous region of Nakhichevan. Russian commander Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov declared that Turkish military intervention could result in the outbreak of a third world war. Ironically, at the same time, Turkey was becoming the first NATO country to buy military equipment from the Russian Federation.

Equally, many non-governmental organisations have become involved in building good relations between Turkey and the new republics. Turkish religious groups have also been active in the former Soviet south. The İskenderpaşa and Erenköy groups, for example, build mosques and Islamic centres as well as distribute the Qur’an and other Islamic publications. The most important religious activist has been Fethullah Gülen, a moderate Islamic scholar and thinker who appeared on the political scene at a time when the Turkish government was desperately seeking to balance more radical Islamists. His community owns and runs about one hundred schools in Turkey and uses the same curriculum as state schools, with an additional emphasis on good manners and respect for one’s elders.

Gülen’s followers have founded more than two hundred schools around the world, from Tanzania to China, but mostly in the Turkic republics. Those schools promote a philosophy based on Turkish nationalism rather than Islam. Gülen promotes Turkey’s Ottoman heritage, secularism, economic development, and democracy. His schools admit non-Muslim students, and because of their high quality (and perhaps their use of English as the primary language of instruction) they attract the children of elites and government officials.

The attempt to build pro-Turkish elites is part of a clear vision and goes far beyond the Turkish establishment’s aims and objectives in the region. The Turkish World Research Foundation—established in 1980 and led by Turan Yazgan—has also opened in the newly independent republics schools that follow the motto of İsmail Gaspıralı, an influential Tatar Turkish nationalist: “Unity in language, ideals, and business”. Gaspıralı sought to unite all Turkic peoples of the former Soviet Union under the name of Turkestan. The directors and supporters of the Turkish World Research Foundation claim that they are aware of the difficulty of achieving such a goal, and that for now they are content to promote the idea of Turkishness, one that would accommodate the differences among various ethnic groups. The foundation has become the leading group in organising cultural events, symposiums, conferences, and panels throughout the former Soviet Union.

Another important nationalist group is the foundation of Avrasya Bir, whose members include Turkey’s former minister of transport, Enis Öksüz. This group publishes academic studies and brings scientists, students, and government officials from the newly independent republics to Turkey in an effort to foster intercultural relations.

Nationalist groups such as the above emphasise Turkishness and consider the dissemination of Islamic ideas, in particular the idea of the umma (the global community of Muslims), to be detrimental to Turkey’s interests, serving Saudi and Iranian interests instead. Although the activities of the nationalist groups have not received official endorsement, prominent Turkish politicians, including Turgut Özal, Süleyman Demirel, and Tansu Çiller, have attended and addressed their meetings.

Diaspora Politics

Diasporas matter in Turkey’s Caucasian policy. Muslim peoples from the Caucasus have made their home in Turkey—Georgians, the Laz, and Azeris. Most of the Caucasian diaspora came to Anatolia as a result of tsarist Russian victories over the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans attempted to help the Caucasian Muslims each time Russia tried to extend its hegemony over the Caucasus. Russia deported well over a million people to the Ottoman Empire between 1800 and 1875. The empire’s liberal immigration policies for people of Turkish blood led to another massive immigration to Ottoman lands in the aftermath of 1877‑8 Russo-Turkish War.

The collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 led to foreign intervention in the South Caucasus from several directions. Ultimately, despite their rhetoric about self-determination, the Bolsheviks were not eager to relinquish Russia’s hold on the Caucasus and systematically gained control of each South Caucasian country by the end of 1921. Enver Pasha, Ottoman war minister and champion of pan-Turkic expansion, had unsuccessfully attempted to unite under Turkey’s leadership the Turkic-speaking Muslim peoples of the Caucasus and wider region (he was killed in 1922 while fighting the Bolsheviks in Central Asia). The founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk, followed a different path. His prime aim was to build a strong Turkish republic. To that end, he sought to avoid provoking the Soviet Union in the Caucasus. He gained what are now Turkey’s north-eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan in return for establishing a firm eastern frontier with Soviet Russia.

In 1923, of Turkey’s total population of thirteen million, almost two million were of Caucasian origin. The new republic’s emphasis on nationalism and mainly Turkishness led to the assimilation of the Caucasian diaspora, and indeed up until the 1990s the peoples of Caucasian origin did not acknowledge their identity explicitly. Some prominent Caucasian political exiles, mainly centred in academia, attempted to pursue a diaspora politics. However, they were not allowed to pursue anti-Soviet activities. After the Second World War, the situation changed and the Soviet Union emerged as a main security threat to Turkey. Ankara’s bid to enter Western security institutions was mainly due to Stalin’s territorial demands on Turkey. This tense atmosphere cooled relations between Ankara and Moscow, and there was only very limited contact between Anatolian Turks and their blood brothers in the Caucasus. The Caucasus was militarised in this period and sealed off by a Soviet iron curtain.

The collapse of the Soviet Union coincided with the global rise of identity politics, which had a direct impact on Turkey’s Caucasian communities. These peoples and nationalist Turks became the primary groups interested in developing relations with the Caucasian republics. Azeri, Laz, Georgian and Abkhaz ethnic groups in Turkey established foundations and non-governmental organisations that undertook activities ranging from easing travel to and from their ancestral homelands to collecting money to send their cousins abroad.

It is worth noting that the Caucasian diaspora enjoyed good relations with the Turkish state and even found places in the upper ranks of the military (Turkey’s former chief of staff, Dogan Gures, is of Chechen origin), the police force, and the national intelligence agency. Caucasians also continued to keep their places in Turkey’s universities and other intellectual circles. The main reason for these close relations was their willingness to assimilate and to join the republican project of creating a homogenous Turkish nation. Diaspora communities never emphasised their distinct linguistic or ethnic particularities. For example, all peoples of Caucasian origin used to be known by the umbrella name of “Cerkez”. Only in the 1990s did they begin to emphasise their distinctions from one another.

The Caucasian diaspora influences Turkish foreign policy towards the Caucasus in a number of ways. First, as mentioned above, domestic actors have established foundations and non-governmental organisations to pursue closer relations with the Caucasian states and have lobbied to achieve this goal. Ethnic Azeris, Abkhazians and Georgians have been the most active in this regard. The political environment in Turkey following the Soviet collapse was hospitable to this end since party politics were shaped by increasingly nationalist and Islamist currents that favoured more active Turkish involvement in the newly emerging Turkic states.

The Caucasian groups were encouraged by the Turkish media to publicise their views and organise themselves under umbrella organisations—e.g., Kaf-Der (Caucasian Association), Kafkas Vakfı (Caucasian Foundation), Çeçen Dayanışma Grubu (Chechen Solidarity Group), Azerbaycan Dostluk Derneği (Azerbaijan Friendship Association). These associations and solidarity groups also function as influential political lobbies. There are several deputies of Caucasian origin in the Turkish parliament. Right-wing politicians in particular feel it necessary to pay attention to these groups’ demands, which ranked high on Turkey’s domestic political agenda during the Chechen war, the Abkhazian crisis, and with the entry of Russian troops into Azerbaijan. Of the foundations formed by ethnic Caucasians in the 1990s, the less problematic in the eyes of the Turkish state establishment have been those set up by South Caucasian peoples.

The Azeri community pushed for more active Turkish support for Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Although many other factors influence Turkey’s stance on the conflict, its position is very close to what the Azeri diaspora is demanding—the return of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan and the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azeri territory. Most Azeris in Turkey live near Azerbaijan’s territory of Nakhichevan, and during a series of interviews in May 2001, some openly acknowledged that ethnic Azeris had gone to Azerbaijan to fight against Armenia. Although Turkey’s Azeris are mainly from the Shia branch of Islam, they downplay this factor and bring nationalism to the fore, emphasising their integration with Turkish society and their eternal brotherhood with Turks. When it comes to Azerbaijan’s place in their loyalties, they use the motto of “one nation, two countries”.

Georgian Muslims and the Laz have been assimilated and integrated into Turkish society. It is not possible to talk about any kind of secessionist movement regarding these two groups. Ethnic Abkhazians are the main group from what is now Georgia that strongly preserves its identity and culture. During the eruption of the Georgian–Abkhaz conflict in the early 1990s, Turkey’s Abkhaz community attempted to enlist Ankara’s support for alleged Muslim victims (Abkhazians) of Christian oppressors (Georgian state forces). However, suspicion of a hidden Russian hand being behind the Abkhaz forces and concern about the geopolitical consequences of any interference on its part prevented Ankara from becoming involved. In addition, Abkhaz demands were opposed by Turkey’s ethnic Georgians, even though their numbers are limited.

The final group which should be mentioned is Turkey’s Armenian community. Although Armenians were once loyal subjects of the Ottoman state, in the last decades of the empire they were suspected of forming a fifth column in alignment with Russia and some other European powers. Suspicion and caution still characterise Ankara’s approach to Armenia and to the Armenian diaspora in Turkey. The Armenian community could potentially play a role in promoting Turkish–Armenian rapprochement, but the current deadlock in relations between the two countries and historical mistrust prevent this from occurring.

Ethnic groups living in Turkey and the South Caucasus are not simply ethnic conflicts waiting in line. Peoples do not necessarily assign themselves the expected conflictual roles, and there is no necessary connection between diaspora elites and domestic political elites that will give direction to foreign policy. However, this has not been understood by some segments of the Turkish state. Some circles in the Turkish establishment, mainly ultra-nationalist and rogue elements, attempted to use the diaspora communities in order to influence or guide developments in the newly established post-Soviet republics. Certain diaspora groups showed a willingness to go along with this to achieve their own goals. For example, in the 1995 coup attempt in Azerbaijan, some Azeri-origin Turks collaborated with rogue elements in Turkish intelligence in an ultimately unsuccessful bid to overthrow President Heydar Aliev.

Russia and the BTC Pipeline

The key issues of Turkey’s relations with Russia will be trade, investments by Turkish and Russian businessmen, tourism, purchases of natural gas, transit of the Dardanelles by Russian oil tankers, future pipeline projects that may pass through Thrace or Anatolia, the Chechen question, Russian arms sales, and the actions of Kurdish separatists on Russian soil. A major recent development is President Vladimir Putin’s statement that the Turks of northern Cyprus deserve better treatment from the international community, since the Turkish Cypriots in 2004 voted in favour of the United Nations plan designed to put an end to the division of the island.

Both Turkey and Russia favour improving their current relations and adopting a more pragmatic stance in the international arena. The two sides have signed a number of agreements which will surely facilitate the establishment of constructive relations.

The volume of bilateral trade between Turkey and Russia reached $10 billion in 2004, and the two countries aim to increase this to $25 billion by 2007. Turkey’s construction sector is active in Moscow and is increasing its market share in Russia. Russian businessmen want to take part in energy projects in Turkey. Another area of major co-operation is Russian arms sales to Turkey. Mindful of the Iraq crisis and potential instability in Iran and Syria, Ankara pays serious attention to military modernisation projects and has an interest in Russian arms supplies. Finally, Russian tourists are coming in growing numbers to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast for their vacations.

Potential points of tension in the relationship are Russia’s energy geopolitics, its policies concerning its “near abroad”, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, ethnic secessionist movements in the Caucasus, Moscow’s compliance with international agreements calling for a reduction of Russian military forces in the region, and the fallout of the Iraq War.

Moscow dislikes the BTC pipeline, which will transmit Caspian oil to the West along a route from the Azeri capital through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, bypassing Russia completely. Moscow regards this pipeline as a challenge to its status in the Caspian basin and an obstacle to its oil trade. Although the major dispute over the BTC pipeline was between Russia and a number of former Soviet states, it indirectly influenced Turkish–Russian relations. However, the Blue Stream project—a natural gas pipeline that runs from Russia to Turkey via the Black Sea—and several other Turkish–Russian oil pipeline projects have tempered Moscow’s grievance with Ankara over the BTC plan.

Russia has a regional profile and is sensitive about losing its influence in former Soviet territories. Since 1991, Turkey has emerged as a significant regional player, striving to build good relations with states in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The US military deployment in various parts of Central Asia, the pro-Western change of governments in Georgia and Ukraine, and the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are among the developments that have paved the way for the emergence of a new geopolitics in Eurasia. The European and US expansion into former Soviet territories has caused Russia to seek new alliances, as evidenced by its rapprochement with Iran, China and India.

Having received a date for EU entry negotiations, Turkey is emerging as a European actor in the region. However, Turkey’s new orientation was tested during the subsequent domestic transformations in Georgia and Ukraine. The Turkish response to Russia’s actions vis-à-vis the Ukraine and Georgia upheavals was muted; Ankara confined itself to pointing to relevant international norms and agreements as being the best way to resolve the crises. Ankara tries to avoid taking sides in any “Russia versus the West” struggles, while developing its own relations with Moscow.

One important area of contention in Turkey’s relations with Russia is Armenia. Turkish–Armenian relations are held hostage to historical enmities and to Turkey’s pro-Azerbaijan policies in the Caucasus. Currently, Russia is Armenia’s main ally, and Russian mediation between Turkey and Armenia on a number of issues can be expected. Joint Russian–Turkish attempts to solve the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict are also a possibility.

Conclusion

There are a number of lessons to be drawn from the fourteen-year history of Turkish policy towards the southern Caucasus. Today, most observers agree that Ankara was unwise to pursue initially a big brother role in the former Soviet south. Following the Soviet collapse, some Turkish policymakers adopted the patriotic/nationalist line of presenting Turkey as the protector and supporter of the Turkic peoples in the Caucasus. Turkey gradually came to realise that this stance was a source of regional instability. In the mid-1990s, Turkish policymakers recognised that the Caucasus and Central Asia could not constitute an alternative to relations with the European Union. Eventual EU membership may lead to Turkey’s emergence as a democratic and economically strong state on the borders of the southern Caucasus. Ankara’s goal should be to create a joint understanding on regional security, promoting democracy and human rights and increasing economic welfare throughout the Caucasus.

Endnotes

1. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Tutanak Dergisi (Turkish Grand National Assembly, Official Bulletin), 12 December 1991, p. 562.

2. Ziya Öniş, “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective”, Third World Quarterly 18, no. 4 (1997), p. 763.