Armenia’s Political Transition in Historical Perspective

Robert O. Krikorian is a research associate at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies of George Washington University.

In April 1991, on a bright spring day, construction cranes swayed into position in Lenin Square in the centre of Yerevan, capital of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. They hovered over the statue of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, leader of the Bolshevik Party, maker of the October Revolution, and founder of the Soviet state. Lenin was ceremoniously removed and his “corpse” carried around the square three times, in accordance with Armenian burial customs. Then the figure that had once towered over every aspect of Armenian life was deposited in the Museum of History, a more than symbolic indication that the Soviet era of Armenian history was coming to an end.

Until shortly before the collapse of the USSR at the end of 1991, Lenin’s memory was considered sacred in Soviet Armenia and in the rest of the Soviet Union, but much had changed in just a few short years. Beginning slowly in late 1987, and then gaining momentum in February 1988, peaceful gatherings of thousands and then hundreds of thousands of Soviet Armenian citizens occurred in Yerevan’s Opera Square and in front of the massive manuscript repository, the Matenadaran, in protest about a range of political, social and economic issues. Foremost among their complaints were environmental degradation in the republic, and the treatment of the Armenian majority of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, located in the neighbouring Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan.

By spring 1991, barely three years after the start of the democratic movement in Armenia, one of the last overt symbols of Soviet power was being dismantled and removed from public sight. Not even the name of the country was the same: through an act of the democratically elected and non-communist-controlled Armenian Supreme Soviet, the pre-Soviet title of the Republic of Armenia was readopted. This newly renamed entity was still technically within the Soviet Union, but in many ways and in the minds of many citizens of Armenia, the republic was already largely outside the sphere of the central government in Moscow.

Independent statehood was arguably a risky option for Armenia, whose people had suffered so much in the past because of geopolitics. Nevertheless, on 21 September 1991, a national referendum on independence took place. The results of this referendum, which occurred while the country was still officially part of the USSR, demonstrated that the people of Armenia believed their future could be safeguarded only through independence. Two days later, on 23 September 1991, after a resounding “yes” vote, the Republic of Armenia declared its independence.

The Legacy of the Past

Located in Transcaucasia, at the geographical and cultural crossroads of Eurasia, landlocked Armenia borders Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkey, and Georgia. It was the smallest of the Soviet republics (approximately 29,800 square kilometres), and currently has a population of over three million. Throughout history, Armenia’s position as a frontier region has resulted in invasion and shifting borders, and competing influences have left their mark on Armenian culture and society. The most enduring historical legacies include Armenia’s Christianisation, beginning in the early fourth century, and the creation of a unique Armenian alphabet a century later, both of which helped Armenians develop a distinct national identity. In the modern period, the legacy of the 1915 Armenian genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire can still be strongly felt.

A Territorial Prize

History and geostrategic position condition Armenia’s domestic and foreign policies. For example, over the course of centuries a discernible pattern has emerged according to which Armenia can achieve independence or autonomy only when the country’s neighbours are weak, or their power is roughly balanced. Armenia’s location at the intersection of the Russian, Turkish, and Iranian frontiers has long made it a battlefield for competing interests. The country has been fought over, either to provide a buffer against neighbouring powers or as a means of achieving greater strategic goals.

Given its geographic location, Armenia has rarely been united as a single political entity. When surrounding powers were in equilibrium, either in strength or in weakness, Armenia flourished, but when this equilibrium was disturbed, and one side or another grew too strong, the stronger power filled the vacuum and turned Armenia into a battlefield. The mountainous terrain, which often protected Armenia from invaders, also acted as a barrier to the full integration and development of any unified Armenian state. The isolation of communities and the difficulty of communications led to the development of independent traditions, and the society which grew out of this environment fostered several states and regions that were often at odds with one another.

For many centuries, Armenia was riven by war as Arabs, Mongols, Turks and Persians swept over the land and occupied it for long periods. By the time of the Ottoman Turkish invasion and occupation of Armenia in the fifteenth century, the people and lands of Armenia were exhausted. Armenia became a war zone once again as Ottoman Turks and Safavid Persians fought each other, resulting in the partition of Armenia between the two great regional powers, with the bulk of western Armenia going to the Ottomans and the remaining parts of eastern Armenia passing into the Persian sphere of influence. This was the situation until the arrival of the Russians on the scene in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to challenge both Ottoman and Persian hegemony in Armenia and the entire Caucasus. The Russian presence drastically altered the geopolitical balance of forces in the region. What is now present-day Armenia was incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1828. Armenians who found themselves on the Russian side of the newly created border took advantage of educational, commercial and employment opportunities. Many Armenians travelled to Russia and from there went on to Europe where they came into contact with the intellectual trends then current, including nationalism.

The Ottoman Genocide

The continuing decline of the Ottoman Empire and the success of the independence movements of the Balkan peoples, achieved with European support, inspired many Armenians and aroused great suspicion in the Sultan and the Ottoman authorities. Previously known as the “loyal nation”, the Armenians now came to be viewed with increasing unease and hostility by the Ottoman government. Tensions exploded in 1894–6, as hundreds of thousands of Armenians were massacred under the orders of Sultan Abdul Hamid. In 1908, a group of idealistic Ottoman officers, who called themselves the Young Turks, instigated a revolution that severely diminished the power of the Sultan and raised hopes of an improved lot among the subject nationalities of the empire. Armenian suspicions grew, however, as the extreme wing of the Young Turks, the Committee of Union and Progress, took over leadership of the organisation and began a policy of increased Turkification of the empire’s non-Turkish peoples. The destruction of the Ottoman Armenians, Greeks and Assyrians would result from these policies.

In spring 1915, orders went out to the senior officials of all the Ottoman provinces to prepare for the deportation of the Armenian population. The ostensible reason given was that the Armenians were caught in a war zone and, for their own protection, needed to be evacuated. Their destination was to be northern Syria, a largely lifeless desert. “Deportation” was merely a euphemism for the total eradication of the Armenian population from their ancestral homeland. Armenian men had already been drafted into the Ottoman army, which left the Armenian community without adequate protection. On the night of 24 April 1915, several hundred leading members of the Armenian community were rounded up in Constantinople and sent into exile and to eventual death. The victims included members of the Ottoman parliament, writers, editors, artists, political activists and members of the clergy.

Thus deprived of their leadership, the remaining Armenians were caught off guard by the deportation orders. The deportees usually had just a few hours to prepare for the long trek and were able to take little of their belongings with them. In the end it did not matter, because very few of them reached their destination. En route, the convoys of Armenian deportees were attacked by groups of Kurdish bandits, marched endlessly until they died of exhaustion, or murdered outright by Turkish gendarmes and soldiers. Although the exact Armenian death toll during the genocide may never be determined, it has been estimated that 1.5 million Armenians were killed between 1915 and 1923.

A Short-lived Independence

By the end of 1916, Russian troops were able to occupy most of Turkish Armenia, but the revolution of 1917 jeopardised these gains. War-weary Russian troops were already abandoning the front, thus exposing Russian Armenians to the fate of their Turkish Armenian compatriots, when the Bolsheviks signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, consigning most of Armenia to the Turks.

In April 1918, the Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Georgians separated from Russia and formed the Transcaucasian Federation in order to negotiate a more equitable treaty with the Ottoman Empire. However, the three peoples had sharply differing interests and the federation proved unsustainable. In late May 1918, first the Georgians and then the Azerbaijanis and Armenians declared independence.

The challenges facing the Republic of Armenia were daunting. With hundreds of thousands of refugees, rampant disease and hostile neighbours on all sides, it seemed to have little prospect of survival without massive outside intervention. The Armenians hoped that the Allied powers would remain true to their pledges and guarantee the viability of the republic. All the major powers had denounced the massacres and other excesses of the Ottomans and had promised never to subject the Armenian people to the tyranny of the Turks again. This high-sounding rhetoric came up against some harsh realities on the ground. Western Armenia, which should have constituted the core of any future state, was a wasteland, with almost no Armenian inhabitants. The Republic of Armenia was not considered viable, either from a security standpoint or from an economic one, without having significant portions of western Armenia attached to it. Armenia was also at odds with the newly created independent republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan over territorial issues.

Although the Republic of Armenia was able to survive the first terrible year of independence, leaving some room for optimism as regards its expansion and ultimate viability, circumstances and the vacillation of the Great Powers combined to extinguish the small struggling state. Weakened by conflicts with Azerbaijan and Georgia, frustrated by the lack of movement on the issue of western Armenia, and burdened by a huge refugee problem and an almost non-existent economy, the republic found itself in an increasingly hostile geopolitical position by 1920. Turkish nationalists under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk) were engaged in a struggle to expel Western imperialist forces and create a Turkish republic, while the Bolsheviks were consolidating power in Russia. Both alike viewed the independent Republic of Armenia as an undesirable entity. The destruction of the first independent Armenian state in over five hundred years occurred at the end of 1920. Turkish forces attacked and occupied important parts of the republic, while the Bolsheviks, claiming to be the liberators of the Armenians from the Turkish yoke, moved in from the north and east. Over the next several decades, Soviet Armenia underwent massive social, political and economic transformations, including the collectivisation of agriculture, industrialisation, and Stalin’s Great Terror.

The Post-Soviet Era

As decades passed, Armenians came to accept Soviet rule, however grudgingly. This acquiescence would change dramatically, though, when Mikhail Gorbachev became General-Secretary of the Communist Party in 1985. Recognising that the Soviet system was in crisis, he embarked on a programme of renovating Soviet society and the economy through glasnost and perestroika. Within a short period of time, Armenian concerns became dominated by the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnically Armenian enclave situated within the borders of the neighbouring Soviet republic of Azerbaijan. In February 1988, the local legislature of Nagorno-Karabakh voted to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia, a move condemned by Moscow and Baku. A pogrom against Armenians in the Azerbaijani industrial city of Sumgait then took place. For several days in late February, Azerbaijani mobs hunted down and killed Armenians. This led to escalating violence in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, and to the flight of hundreds of thousands of refugees, with ethnic Armenians fleeing Azerbaijan, and ethnic Azeris fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.

The shock of Sumgait reverberated throughout Armenia. There were massive protest demonstrations in Yerevan. These spontaneous demonstrations soon became co-ordinated and led by the “Karabakh Committee”, a grouping of intellectuals who articulated the Armenian people’s dissatisfaction with the existing situation. The Karabakh Committee transformed itself into the Armenian National Movement (ANM) in 1989 and became a real political force in the country, challenging the hegemony of the Communist Party. In elections for the Armenian Supreme Soviet in the summer of 1990, the ANM succeeded in dominating the legislature and in having one of its leading activists, Levon Ter-Petrossian, elected to the chairmanship.

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh was briefly overshadowed on 7 December 2024 when a massive earthquake struck northern Armenia, killing between 25,000 and 50,000 people and leaving 500,000 homeless. Gorbachev, who was in the United States at the time, rushed back home and allowed foreign humanitarian assistance into the affected areas of Armenia. This was the first time since the Second World War that such large amounts of Western aid were permitted inside the Soviet Union, and was a major turning point in the Cold War.

By the end of 1990, democratic reforms had progressed in Armenia, including in the spheres of agriculture, politics and the economy. The Armenian Supreme Soviet decided not to participate in Gorbachev’s March 1991 referendum on the future of the Soviet Union and instead scheduled a referendum on Armenia’s political future for September 1991, in accordance with the Soviet constitution. In August 1991 a coup against Gorbachev failed, and on 21 September Armenia went ahead with its referendum. The result was an overwhelming vote for independence, which was declared two days later. In October 1991, Levon Ter-Petrossian was elected the first president of an independent Armenia. His administration confronted numerous problems left over from the many decades of Soviet rule, including communist-era governmental structures and ministries. Armenia’s infrastructure had been seriously damaged by the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan and the latter’s embargo of most imports and energy supplies. Now that independence had come to the region, a new dynamic was at work, one that necessitated relations between sovereign states.

Although the Republic of Armenia was proclaimed with high expectations, the reality of life as an independent country at war and surrounded by neighbours either hostile or in chaos was enough to make the government of Armenia reassess its priorities. National survival became the overriding concern of the new government. Governing would be a great responsibility for any group of leaders, but in the case of Armenia, history and the psychological pressure of knowing that the price of failure would be catastrophic for the entire nation increased the burden. Bearing in mind the historical legacy of the Armenian genocide, it was not surprising that the survival of the nation had to take precedence over other issues. The Armenian leadership determined that stability was the highest priority for the country and that no forces, either internal or external, would be allowed to threaten the integrity of the state. The government justified the need for stability on the grounds that all resources had to be harnessed for the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and that internal discord could have disastrous consequences not only for Armenia but for Karabakh as well. The experience of other republics, such as Georgia, which was being torn apart by civil and ethnic strife, was a stark reminder of the dangers in the post-Soviet era.

In the first years of Armenian independence, with little prospect of improved living conditions or economic growth, the government was under increasing pressure to show some tangible results. Internal dissensions and external tensions only compounded the problems facing the fledgling state. In late 1994, the government declared the Armenian Revolutionary Federation an illegal organisation, arrested many of its leaders and banned it from operating inside Armenia, thus preventing it from participating in the July 1995 parliamentary elections and constitutional referendum. The elections and referendum were held in an atmosphere of suspicion and confusion, which only served further to alienate the government from the people.

This alienation deepened during the autumn of 1996, when flawed presidential elections resulted in the highly controversial re-election of Ter-Petrossian. Demonstrations were violently dispersed by the authorities. In an attempt to increase his legitimacy, Ter-Petrossian appointed Robert Kocharian, the well-respected and popular leader of Nagorno-Karabakh, as Armenia’s prime minister in March 1997. This tactic backfired, however, when Kocharian allied with several other powerful Armenian political figures to force Ter-Petrossian’s resignation as president in February 1998. New presidential elections were scheduled for March, in which Kocharian defeated Armenia’s former Communist Party boss, Karen Demirchian, in a hotly contested run-off. This election, like several of its predecessors, was considered flawed by both international and local observers, although the results were not challenged.

With the election over, it was hoped that a period of stability would ensue and that the process of state-building would gather momentum. When Demirchian became speaker of parliament, and the former minister of defence Vazgen Sargsian was appointed prime minister, many people believed the duo would be able to bring a sense of normalcy to governmental operations. This hope was shattered, however, in October 1999, when a group of gunmen burst into parliament and assassinated several leading officials, including Demirchian and Sargsian. This event, which was televised nationally, seriously affected the development of democracy in Armenia, yet the country did not collapse. The government continued to function and new leaders were appointed to take the place of their slain colleagues. Armenia was in shock and went into mourning as it tried to come to grips with the horrifying images of its national leaders being killed.

The 1999 assassinations were only the latest and most serious blow to the country, which continued to suffer from a weak economy and massive unemployment, as well as large-scale emigration and a resulting brain drain. By 2003, there were indications that Armenia was beginning to overcome some of these problems, but the disputed 2003 presidential elections caused a further setback for its internal stability and international reputation. In a closely watched contest, President Kocharian won re-election in a heated second round of voting in March by defeating Stepan Demirchian, son of Karen Demirchian, the slain speaker of parliament. The opposition claimed that the elections were fraudulent and noted that several international observer groups found irregularities in the voting process. It is still unclear, however, whether the irregularities were enough to affect the outcome of the election.

In the aftermath of its defeat in the presidential elections, the Armenian opposition decided to form a new electoral bloc ahead of the May 2003 parliamentary elections. This newly formed bloc, Ardarutyun (Justice), comprised several of the leading opposition parties, including the People’s Party, led by Stepan Demirchian, the National Unity Party, headed by Artashes Geghamian, and the Republic Party, whose leadership included former prime minister Aram Sargsian. Despite this outward show of solidarity, the Justice Bloc was hampered by both a lack of co-ordination and a failure to present a coherent alternative to the ruling authorities. The results of the parliamentary elections, too, proved disappointing from the opposition’s point of view, as a majority of seats went to pro-government candidates. Pro‑government parties remained in the ascendancy, including Orinats Yerkir (the Rule of Law Party), headed by the young speaker of parliament, Artur Baghdasarian, the Republican Party, headed by Prime Minister Andranik Margarian, and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. The opposition claimed that the elections were not free and fair, a criticism echoed by several international monitoring organisations. But, as with the 2003 presidential elections, it is difficult if not impossible to determine whether the level of alleged fraud altered the outcome of the election. Whatever the case, there was a widespread feeling among Armenian citizens that they had no real influence on the political process.

By the end of 2003, then, it looked as though the government and opposition were headed for stalemate. However, as so often in Armenian history, external events caused a ripple effect in the country. The popular revolt in Georgia, known as the “Rose Revolution”, which led to the resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze, inspired many in the Armenian opposition. The immediate catalyst for the Rose Revolution was Shevardnadze’s blatant tampering with the Georgian electoral process. Armenian oppositionists felt that they, too, would be able to take advantage of the momentum created in neighbouring Georgia and succeed in ousting the Armenian president. Failing to take into account the very different political, economic and social circumstances in Armenia, and misled by the relative ease with which the Georgian president was removed and by the positive foreign reaction to his ouster, the Armenian opposition organised mass demonstrations in April 2004 against Robert Kocharian. Without a coherent platform, however, the opposition was unable to secure the resignation of Kocharian, who responded to the demonstrations by dispersing them forcibly. Attempts by various groups to mediate between the authorities and the opposition failed, as political discourse in Armenia became increasingly polarised. One manifestation of this polarisation is the boycott of parliamentary sessions by opposition deputies, who refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the current government.

These recent developments have damaged Armenia’s international prestige. Since the opposition’s failure to unseat Kocharian in spring 2004 the situation has been tense, as both opposition and government determine their best course of action. The issues that need to be addressed by all political forces in the country are wide ranging. They include reversing emigration and the brain drain; devising a comprehensive strategy to tackle corruption and develop the economy; reducing the high level of unemployment; and engaging the Armenian diaspora in the rebuilding of Armenia. Resolving these and myriad other problems, however, is hampered by the fact that politics in Armenia remains largely personality-based, with powerful interest groups jockeying for economic and political advantage. A sense of overriding national interest has yet to be developed, as short-term personal and economic goals take precedence over long-term development strategy.

Nagorno-Karabakh

The legacy of the past is also evident in the current challenges facing Armenian foreign policy. The most pressing national security issue for Armenia remains the stalemated conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the subsequent cold war that has developed with Azerbaijan. The roots of the conflict can be traced back to the early Soviet period, when Stalin, as chairman of the Commissariat of Nationalities, reversed a 1921 decision of the Bolsheviks’ Caucasian Bureau to place Nagorno-Karabakh under Soviet Armenian jurisdiction. Armenians have inhabited Karabakh since antiquity. This historically Armenian territory maintained a quasi-independent status under the leadership of local Armenian rulers for centuries. The overwhelming majority of the population was ethnically Armenian. Stalin ignored all these realities. Partly with an eye towards better relations with Kemalist Turkey, and partly in accord with his conscious decision to sow discord among nationalities, he applied the tactic of divide and rule and established the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region within Azerbaijan in 1923. Thus, the Armenians and Azerbaijanis would remain divided and rely that much more on the central government in Moscow.

Protest against this situation was generally muted during the harsh years of Stalin’s rule, while the circumstances of the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh continued to deteriorate. In 1987, soon after the accession of Gorbachev, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh agitated for a revision of the borders, claiming economic, legal and cultural discrimination by the Azeri authorities in Baku. After the anti-Armenian pogrom in Sumgait in February 1988, tensions gave rise to the formation of armed militias and the beginning of a guerrilla war. The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 transformed the dispute from an internal affair of the USSR into an international conflict which threatened to involve outside powers. The low-intensity warfare of 1988–91 gave way in 1992 to full-scale armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, with Armenia assisting the latter. There was widespread destruction and Armenian forces occupied several Azerbaijani territories outside Nagorno-Karabakh. Between thirty-five thousand and fifty thousand people have been killed and over a million displaced by the conflict.

This de facto state of war lasted until a ceasefire was signed in May 1994, which continues to hold more than a decade later. Numerous unsuccessful mediation attempts have taken place within the framework of the Minsk Group of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, co-chaired by Russia, the United States and France. Despite several reportedly close calls, a final resolution has remained elusive. Azerbaijan has resisted involving Nagorno-Karabakh directly in the negotiations and has insisted on an unconditional Armenian withdrawal from the occupied territories surrounding the disputed region before talks on its final status can take place. In opposition to this “phased solution”, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia have argued for a “package solution” that would solve all outstanding issues, including the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, before an Armenian withdrawal. Armenian foreign‑policy elites state that without security guarantees in place for Nagorno-Karabakh, it would be unwise to withdraw from the occupied territories. As a result of the conflict, the border with Azerbaijan remains closed and militarised, and prospects for regional co-operation appear extremely limited.

External Relations

Russia

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has cast a shadow over Armenia’s international relations in general and has placed limitations on Armenia’s ability to manoeuvre in the foreign-policy field, thus deepening its reliance on Russia as a strategic partner. Russia’s interests in the South Caucasus are of long standing, dating from the eighteenth century, when Russia was struggling with the Ottoman and Safavid empires for hegemony in the region. Russia is also home to a large Armenian community and continues to act as a magnet for Armenian labour migrants. Although Armenia is a member of the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Yerevan is trying to pursue a policy of “complementarity”, in which it balances its Russian links with cordial ties to the West, especially the United States. As the only country in the South Caucasus with friendly relations with Russia, Armenia is host to a Russian military base and patrols its Turkish border with Russian assistance. Russia’s political influence in Armenia is strengthened by its economic penetration of the country. Many of the major Armenian industries were handed over to Russian management in 2002 in a debt-for-equity swap, and Russia remains a major trading partner for Armenia.

Turkey

With Turkey, relations remain strained, in part because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Ankara has declared that until Armenia ceases to occupy Azerbaijani lands, no diplomatic relations will be established with Yerevan, and a trade embargo will remain in force. In reality, Turkey’s reluctance to establish relations with Armenia has much deeper roots. Turkey has engaged in a wide-ranging campaign of denial of the Armenian genocide and has expressed fears that acknowledging this crime against humanity would result in Armenian claims for land and reparations. Despite Armenia’s repeated assurances that recognition of the genocide is not a prerequisite for establishing relations and that it recognises Turkey’s borders, Ankara remains extremely wary. Turkish–Armenian relations, or the lack thereof, are also conditioned by the close ties between Ankara and Baku. Any hint at rapprochement between Yerevan and Ankara creates a firestorm of opposition in Azerbaijan.

Iran

While relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan are almost non-existent, diplomatic and economic ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran are fairly well developed. Despite religious and cultural affinities with Azerbaijan, Iran has cultivated good relations with Armenia, even attempting to act as a mediator over Nagorno-Karabakh. This stance can partly be explained by Iran’s fear of its own sizable Azerbaijani population and the possible separatist sentiment that might be aroused among them by an Azerbaijani victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Furthermore, occasional nationalist rhetoric emanating from Baku regarding irredentist claims to “southern Azerbaijan” (northern Iran) only serves to exacerbate tensions between Baku and Tehran and further strengthen Armenian–Iranian ties.

Georgia

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has also had an impact on relations with Armenia’s other direct neighbour, Georgia. Although on the surface correct relations prevail, there is underlying tension between the two states. Concerned about Georgia’s territorial integrity, Tbilisi tends to support Azerbaijan rather than Armenia. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline and a common anti-Russian stance align Georgia with Azerbaijan, while distancing it from Armenia. Georgia’s own unresolved territorial conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia and latent tension in its Armenian-majority southern region of Samtskhe-Javakheti also contribute to Georgia’s hesitant stance towards Yerevan.

The United States and Europe

Of the major outside powers, the United States and the European Union play significant roles in the affairs of all three South Caucasus countries. The United States has a long history of involvement with the Armenians, especially during the period of the Armenian genocide, when massive amounts of humanitarian aid helped keep the surviving population from starvation. A large and active Armenian diaspora community in America has ensured that US interest in Armenia remains relatively high.

In more recent years, American attention was first focused on Soviet Armenia during the 1988 earthquake; the United States was extensively involved in relief and reconstruction projects. Since Armenian independence in 1991, the United States has also worked to find a negotiated settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as one of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group.

In addition to humanitarian assistance, the United States has provided large amounts of economic aid to Armenia and most recently has declared it one of only sixteen countries eligible for increased aid under the Millennium Challenge Account programme. Despite this US engagement with Armenia, US–Armenian relations should be viewed within the larger context of US foreign policy, including US–Russian relations, US–Turkish relations, and US‑Iranian non-relations. Similarly, the European Union’s inclusion of the South Caucasus states in its New Neighbourhood Policy should be viewed within a larger context as well, including EU economic interests and the impending accession of Turkey, which will create a direct border between the European Union and the South Caucasus republics.

Israel and the Arab World

Armenia’s foreign relations with Israel and the countries of the Arab Middle East have been conditioned in part by the Israel–Palestine conflict, and in part by the strategic alliance between Turkey and Israel. Armenian foreign-policy makers have been divided between, on the one hand, their sympathy for the state of Israel, created in the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust, and the Jewish people, whose historical suffering strikes a responsive chord in the Armenian psyche, and on the other hand, their wariness of the close political and military ties between Israel and Turkey. Israel’s pro-Turkish stance on the issue of the Armenian genocide has also created tensions between Yerevan and Tel Aviv, as has Israel’s support of Turkish interests in the United States. The final status of the ancient Armenian quarter of Jerusalem appears to have aroused only marginal interest in the Armenian foreign ministry to date. Armenia and Israel have only limited political and economic ties, with neither state having an accredited ambassador resident in the other’s country.

Armenia’s relations with the Arab world are diverse, ranging from political and cultural ties with Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, countries with significant Armenian diaspora communities, to economic ties with the Persian Gulf states, especially the United Arab Emirates. Armenia’s ties with Lebanon are particularly cordial. Many Arab students study in Armenian institutions of higher learning, especially the medical and engineering schools. Armenia has also sent a small contingent of non-combatant military personnel to Iraq, despite numerous warnings that such a deployment might jeopardise the situation of Iraq’s Armenian community. Armenian ties with countries such as Lebanon and Syria are viewed with some suspicion in Israel, given the unresolved nature of the Israel–Palestine conflict, thus creating special challenges for Armenian diplomacy in the region.

A Hostile Environment

Throughout this general survey, a running theme has been the geographic isolation of Armenia. This isolation, while affecting the social and economic development of the country over the centuries, has also had a profound impact on the security perceptions of the Armenian people and its leadership. At its simplest and most basic, all one need do in order to understand the effect of geography on Armenia is to look at the map. It is a nation which is land-locked, lacking in strategic depth, possessing few natural resources, and whose external communications are reliant upon the goodwill of its neighbours.

Moving beyond this basic observation one sees that Armenia is a nation whose traditional enemy, Turkey, with the second-largest army in NATO, lies across a border presenting no real natural barrier. The Republic of Armenia remains blockaded on two sides by Azerbaijan and Turkey, yet it is important to acknowledge that Armenia is part of a regional system. This system is unique because of its peculiar economic and political development, and also because it involves competition among three large powers: Russia, Turkey and Iran. To ignore this regional dynamic is to lose sight of how the small Caucasian states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are in many ways forced into limited policy choices; if any one of them pursues an independent policy, that will have a disproportionate effect upon the other two. Thus, Armenia faces some of the same dilemmas at the dawn of the twenty-first century as it has done for several hundred years. Circumstances change, but geography does not, and Armenia is constrained in its policy options by the limitations of its geographical and strategic position.