Giving a State a Bad Name? Kyrgyzstan and the Risk of State Failure

Cai Wilkinson is lecturer in Russian and international relations in the School of Government and Society at the University of Birmingham, UK.

In the wake of 9/11, Kyrgyzstan has all too frequently found itself described as a state in danger of “failing”, with dire warnings of the consequences for international security and particularly the fight against terrorism if its slide towards failure is not prevented. Ten years on from that signal event, concern over Kyrgyzstan’s viability as a sovereign state continues. Although the most recent Failed States Index, which was compiled using data collected in the latter part of 2009, saw the small ex-Soviet republic record a score of 88.4 out of 120, giving it a slightly improved ranking of forty-fifth, the violent overthrow of the Bakiev regime in April 2010 and the outbreak of bloody conflict in the south of the country in the following months have led to renewed warnings that Kyrgyzstan is on the edge of failure—if indeed it has not already “failed”. Even nominally positive developments such as the election of a new parliament on 21 October 2010, which marked the creation of the first parliamentary democracy in Central Asia, have done little to allay fears; the new government quickly became paralysed by infighting and factionalism that prevented the appointment of a prime minister until almost two months after the elections. In short, Kyrgyzstan’s future looks far from certain or stable regardless of whether an assessment is based on events of the last year or the last decade.

However, this article does not seek to answer the question of whether Kyrgyzstan is or isn’t failing, but rather to explore the implications of being labelled a “failing” state. What are the consequences for the Kyrgyz Republic of having gained a reputation as a “candidate for state failure” domestically and internationally?

This article addresses the question in three parts. The initial section provides an overview of the events that have led to Kyrgyzstan’s being perceived as a potential failed state, with a particular focus on events since 2005. Attention then turns to how international actors such as the United States, the European Union, Russia and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have responded to these events. As will become clear, responses to instability in Kyrgyzstan have been significantly influenced by the actors’ strategic interests in Kyrgyzstan and the wider region, raising the question of whose security is actually being prioritised and what purpose warnings of potential state failure serve.

These questions are discussed in the second part of the article, which suggests that in practice, labelling a state “failed” or “failing” serves little purpose beyond identifying it as a threat to the interests and security of other states, with any assistance or intervention focused primarily on containing this threat to strategic interests rather than representing a commitment to improving the long-term stability of the state and, by extension, the wellbeing of its inhabitants. As such, the concept relies on a very specific Westphalian notion of statehood and sovereignty, resulting in a strong normative agenda.

The final section reflects on the implications of this agenda. It is argued that the continued invocation of the failed-state concept in relation to Kyrgyzstan in fact risks further undermining the country’s development by encouraging the creation of a “Potemkin state” whose sovereignty is internationally recognised, but which will continue to lack domestic legitimacy because of its inability to guarantee not only the basic safety and security of its inhabitants, but also a positive future for them both individually and collectively. This dynamic is compounded by the West’s insistence on neo-liberal democracy as the remedy for states at risk of failure. The end result is that rather than representing a considered assessment of a state’s viability and capacity to provide political goods for its citizens, the concept of state failure is primarily a normative measure of a state’s conformity to Western criteria of formal statehood—a fact that is all too evident in the case of Kyrgyzstan.

A Decade of Impending Failure

The 1990s saw Kyrgyzstan enjoy a reputation under the presidency of Askar Akaev as a positive exception to regional political norms, causing it to be dubbed an “island of democracy” and “the Switzerland of Central Asia”. However, by the turn of the century, it was becoming increasingly evident that all was not well in Kyrgyzstan. The Aksy tragedy of March 2002 in particular provided concrete grounds for increased concern about the socio-political stability of the young republic: around one thousand protestors in the southern Aksy District who had gathered in support of Azimbek Beknazarov, an opposition politician on trial for alleged corruption, found themselves under fire from the police, resulting in six deaths and many more injuries. The event was a watershed moment that marked a fundamental breakdown in state–society relations. It triggered mass protests that continued for months, eventually leading to the fall of the government, headed by future president Kurmanbek Bakiev, in May 2003.

In light of these events and the broader socio-economic problems facing Kyrgyzstan, Robert Rotberg’s classification in 2003 of Kyrgyzstan as being “on the continuum of weakness tending towards failure” is arguably unsurprising. As he explained, the ex-Soviet Central Asian republic,

with limited resources and arbitrary rule, has contended with a sharply contracted economy, poverty, and two forms of militant insurgency. Those militant rivals for power remain, respect for human rights and democratic processes has slipped, and Kyrgyzstan’s ability to emerge from inherited weakness is questionable, even given the creation of a U.S. airbase and the arrival of free-spending Americans.¹

The Tulip Revolution

Yet, despite the bleakness of Rotberg’s assessment, it was not until 2005 that Kyrgyzstan truly became the focus of international attention and, almost as rapidly, concern. Initially, this was due to the prospect of the republic’s returning to a “democratic path of development” as opposition politicians led growing protests against the Akaev regime’s blatant rigging of forthcoming parliamentary elections. These protests eventually culminated, largely unexpectedly, in the storming of the presidential compound in the capital Bishkek and