Editor's Note

The end of the Cold War engendered hopes of a definitive end likewise to that confrontation’s most terrifying possibility: a global thermonuclear holocaust. A further hope was that the escalating nuclear arms races of the Cold War might be halted and replaced by a process of gradual disarmament that eventually resulted in a world free of nuclear weapons. And indeed, the two principal antagonists of the Cold War, the United States and Russia, established friendly relations and eventually made substantial cuts to their nuclear arsenals. But if the likelihood of nuclear Armageddon receded somewhat, the shadow of the bomb never entirely disappeared and today is growing larger and darker. Universal nuclear abolition remains an aspiration only, and a quasi-utopian one at that. The United States and Russia still retain enough nuclear warheads, on hair-trigger alert, to inflict “mutually assured destruction” on each other several times over. Neither they nor any other of the acknowledged nuclear states show the slightest intention of acting on their obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to divest themselves of their nuclear weapons. The number of declared nuclear-weapon states has grown, and the suspicion that others seek to join the club has been the cause or pretext of actual and threatened war. Compounding the danger of proliferation to states is an even more fearsome contingency—proliferation to terrorist groups, a nightmare prospect given horrifying plausibility by the attacks of 11 September 2001. The nature of the various nuclear perils facing our world, and ways they might be addressed, are considered in the pages that follow.

David Krieger, president of the abolitionist advocacy organisation, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, details thirteen commitments that would revive nuclear disarmament and prevent the diversion of civil nuclear materials to weapons programmes. He concludes that proliferation cannot be prevented while nuclear-weapon states adhere to the double standard of retaining their own arsenals while insisting on nuclear renunciation from others. Above all, he argues, the onus is on the world’s strongest nuclear power, the United States, to show leadership by fulfilling its nuclear-disarmament obligations.

Such leadership is unlikely to come from the administration of George W. Bush, argues Natalie J. Goldring of Georgetown University. In a detailed examination of President Bush’s policies, she notes that he has approved the development of new nuclear weapons, primarily “mini-nukes” and “bunker busters”; moved towards the resumption of nuclear testing; and drafted contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear states. Other countries, she argues, will be tempted to do as the United States does, not as it says, with possibly fatal consequences for efforts to control nuclear proliferation.

C. Dale Walton of Missouri State University counsels against assuming that Cold War policies will remain effective against the challenges presented by the “Second Nuclear Age” we now inhabit—one in which deterrence is increasingly unreliable. Proliferation is inevitable, he believes, and a variety of measures—including ballistic-missile defences and a willingness to tolerate nuclear acquisition by “responsible” states—is necessary to cope with it.

The strongest theoretical alternative to the NPT as an anti-proliferation tool is a nuclear weapons convention—a global treaty banning the development, testing, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons. Yet many states and activists otherwise supportive of universal abolition are unwilling to back such a convention. Their reluctance, explains Tanya Ogilvie-White of the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, lies in suspicions that certain countries—primarily India—have exploited the idea as a cover behind which to develop their own nuclear arsenals.

The two articles that follow shift our debate from proliferation among states to the other great proliferation danger—nuclear acquisition by terrorists. Charles D. Ferguson of the US Council on Foreign Relations, and Joel O. Lubenau, a senior adviser to the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies, discuss the nature and likelihood of various forms of nuclear and radiological terrorism, and what can be done to prevent them. Alistair Millar, Vice-President of the US-based Fourth Freedom Forum, reflects on measures to avert what has been called the “nexus” between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Highly critical of the Bush administration’s policy of unilateral pre-emption, he outlines an alternative strategy for co-operative global security against terrorism and WMD proliferation.

Our discussion now moves from general principles and problems of non-proliferation to consideration of the nuclear policies of specific states. We begin with two articles that look at the country that is today most under pressure on nuclear matters, Iran. Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, formerly Iran’s senior nuclear negotiator in talks with the European Union, traces the path by which the current tense stalemate between the Islamic Republic and the West was arrived at. He answers some of the most commonly laid charges against Iran, and suggests ways in which the crisis might be resolved. Cyrus Safdari, an independent analyst and researcher, highlights the worrying parallels between the case made for war against Iraq in the build-up to the US-led invasion of 2003 and the accusations now being made against Iran. He asks whether the multiple logical fallacies and dishonesties of the rhetorical campaign against Iran will similarly be prelude to a military strike.

Wade L. Huntley of the University of British Columbia, Canada, considers that other “hard case” of the non-proliferation literature, North Korea. Surveying the recent evolution of efforts to ensure a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, he concludes that the answer lies in regional security co-operation that addresses tensions beyond those generated by North Korea’s nuclear aspirations.

Israel is the “wild card” among nuclear-weapon states, standing outside the NPT regime and refusing to acknowledge (or deny) the possession which few others doubt. Israeli peace activist Akiva Orr relates how Israel came to acquire the bomb. Israel’s “open secret”, he contends, is a destabilising factor that threatens regional and global security. The solution is a concerted effort to make the entire Middle East a nuclear-free zone.

The two other non-NPT weapon states, India and Pakistan, are discussed by Raju G. C. Thomas of Marquette University, Wisconsin. He examines the impulses of national pride, resentment of “nuclear apartheid”, and mutual fear that led the two countries to acquire the bomb. President Bush’s recent lifting of US nuclear-inspired sanctions against India will eventually require similar US recognition of Pakistan’s nuclear capability, he argues, and could spark wider global proliferation.

We round up our discussion of individual countries by looking at one of the five NPT declared nuclear-weapon states, Britain, which soon must decide whether to replace its Trident missile system. Reviewing the history of the British bomb, Kate Hudson of London South Bank University argues that the United States in effect has a veto over Trident’s use, that the missile does not meet the security challenges now facing Britain, and that it would be hugely expensive to replace. Britain instead should choose the path of nuclear renunciation.

If any individual merits the title of the world’s most dangerous proliferator, that person is Abdul Qadeer Khan of Pakistan, who for years peddled nuclear materials, technology and know-how around the globe. In our final article, Christopher Clary of the US Naval Postgraduate School describes the activities of Khan’s smuggling network, assesses the damage it did, and draws some lessons for non-proliferation policy.

Paul Theodoulou
Winter/Spring 2006