Is There a European Identity?

Gerard Delanty is professor of sociology at the University of Liverpool. His publications include Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (Macmillan, 1995), Citizenship in a Global Age (Open University Press, 2000) and Community (Routledge, 2003).

 

Given the preoccupation with identity in recent times, it was inevitable that the question of Europe would be posed in terms of that concept. The resulting notion of a European identity has led to a confused debate, not because Europe cannot have an identity or because the bearers of such an identity, Europeans, do not exist, but because the very idea of identity in this debate has rarely been clarified. Do we mean a collective identity, a variety of interlinking collective identities, an aggregation of personal identities, a broadly defined cultural category, or an official EU cultural or political identity? Whether Europe is unable to compete with national societies because national identities are more real or powerful than collective ones depends on what kind of collective identity we mean when we refer to large-scale social groups or societal complexes having an identity.

 

European identity is a question of collective identity and as such, theoretically, is no different from the question of national identity. Thus, rather than begin with the vexed question of whether a European identity is replacing national identities, a more fruitful approach is to address the idea of collective identity in the context of major social and political transformation. As suggested by Malmborg and Stråth, the idea of a European identity is a discourse in which competing claims are worked out, and this idea has been part of many national traditions.¹ Rather than relate the identity of Europe to a set of values, goals, territory, people—what in general may constitute the content of Europe—it may be more fruitful to see it in terms of a cultural form, the chief characteristic of which is a dialogic rationality. In this respect there are clear parallels with notions of discursive democracy and what may be called a cosmopolitan European identity.

Some Conceptual Issues

Identity is a contested and much abused term. Drawing from sociological theories, I would like to begin by noting four aspects of identity that need to be considered in any discussion of the concept:

 

First, identity arises only in relation to social action. Neither individual persons nor social movements nor whole societies begin with a fully formed or articulated identity. Identities are created in action and express not an underlying consciousness or essence, but the self-understanding and self-recognition of the social actor. Since this changes in the course of time, the identity of the actor will also change.

 

Second, identities have a narrative dimension: they can be seen as the stories people tell about themselves in order to give continuity to their existence. Such narratives are the basis of memory and express the performative and public aspect of identity.

 

Third, identity concerns a relation of self and other by which the identity of the self is constituted in symbolic markers. In this sense, identity is based on difference and thus exists in a relational context. What is important to note in this context is that identity presupposes a subject, that is, a social actor who can be an individual or a group.

 

Fourth, a point that needs to be made in any discussion of collective identity concerns what are generally referred to as multiple identities. Collective identities can be overlapping (as in hyphenated identities), mixed (or hybrid), or co-existing. Ethnic, regional, political and national identities relate to each other in different ways. On the level of personal identities this is particularly the case as individuals rarely have only one identity, but many, and these exist in varying degrees of tension with each other.

 

These four aspects stress the constructed nature of identity, which must not be seen as something that either transcends or is prior to social reality. Identity is not an idea or a cultural given, but a mode of self-understanding that is expressed by people in ongoing narratives; moreover, the boundaries between identities are fluid, negotiable and contested. All identities are constructions, regardless of whatever kind they are.

 

A second set of distinctions must also be made. Identities can be either collective or personal. It is important not to conflate these—the identities of individuals and the identities of social groups—as they entail quite different structures and developmental logics. A collective identity, it needs to be noted, is not simply the aggregation of individual identities, but the self-understanding of a particular group (for instance, a religious or ethnic group or a social movement or political party). A collective identity will not necessarily result from personal identities and can exist without a direct relation to them. For a collective identity to exist, a social group—which can evince either cultural or political identities or indeed both—with a collective project must exist. Collective identities articulate a group identity. Without these distinctions, the concept of a collective identity is a meaningless construct. Many introspective national debates on identity, for example in Germany and Ireland, remain on the superficial level of “Who are we, what is our identity?”, and fail to take into account the wider social and historical context in which these claims are made. It appears that this is also the case with the question of European identity.

 

However, what is important is to distinguish between collective identities as such and wider societal or civilisational identities. These are frequently confused, so that what in fact are cultural categories are attributed the status of fully articulated collective identities. The notions of an Irish identity, a Chinese identity, Jewish identity, black identity, etc., are cultural categories which can be the basis of different collective identities, but are not themselves identities in the same sense as more concrete collective identities. In the case of these diasporic identities, the term covers a broad cultural spectrum of diverse groups or possibly a whole society. Irish identity, for instance, includes Irish Americans, those of Irish descent, citizens of the Republic of Ireland, the Northern Irish, and the Anglo-Irish. Similarly, British identity is a societal or civilisational identity or a broader cultural category which includes the Scottish, the Welsh, the Northern Irish, the Anglo-Irish, the English, and a wider variety of ethnic groups. The term may even be understood as including the national identity of the Republic of Ireland. Most national identities are broad cultural categories or societal identities which include within them more concrete collective identities.

 

In modern societies, collective identities that encompass the entire society generally have to take the form of categorical identities in order to be able to include the diverse membership of the society; they are what the sociologist Emile Durkheim called “collective representations”, that is, the ideas that symbolise the identity of a society. These collective representations refer to very broadly defined cultural models and could also be called “imaginaries”. For present purposes we can distinguish between personal identities, collective identities and societal identities.

 

On the basis of these conceptual considerations, several points concerning national and European identity can be made. Virtually every kind identity—personal, collective and societal—exists today in a state of flux and contingency. The cultural logic of modernity has led to a situation in which all identities are forced to define self-understanding in non-essentialistic terms. This is true of most religious and ethnic identities, as it is of national and other political and cultural identities, for none of these can assume the existence of secure foundations.

 

As a result of globalisation, multiculturalism, global civil society and cosmopolitan political and cultural currents, societies are becoming more and more pluralised and interpenetrating, and less and less discrete wholes anchored in unique cultures and territorial nation-states. The result of these major shifts in culture and politics is that national identities are changing; they are becoming more decentred, liquid and reflexive in their awareness of their limits, and through societal cross-fertilisation more and more mixed. The European space has grown to the extent that it is no longer possible to say what is national and what is European. In Europe today, there is no national identity that exists on the level of a simple collective identity, i.e., an identity that is underpinned by a particular social group. All national identities are becoming more like societal identities, that is, broadly defined cultural categories. In post-liberal European societies, the nation has become a contested category of belonging for diverse social groups. The self-understanding of culturally mixed European societies is inescapably elucidated in post-national forms of consciousness.

 

National identity has ceased to fulfil the function of social integration; the nation no longer fits into the sphere of the state, providing the latter with an identity and cultural legitimation.² Globalisation has unleashed numerous processes of differentiation, as well as of de-differentiation, and these cannot easily be resisted by recourse to nation-building or to nationalism. The loss of capacity to create enduring forms of social integration is due not just to the changing role of the nation-state, but also to the fact that culture in general has lost its integrative function. Collective identities cannot simply anchor themselves in secure cultural reference points.

 

Viewed in this perspective, there is no tension between national identity and European identity. National identities are not closed to cosmopolitan influences or based entirely on non-negotiable cultural assumptions. The relativising of cultural values in late modernity has led to a greater self-scrutiny in national identity, which is no longer codified exclusively by political elites or reflective of the cultural form of the nation-state. There are few national identities that do not contain critical, reflexive and cosmopolitan forms of self-understanding. The idea of a morally superior European identity that somehow transcends national identity must be rejected. To varying degrees, all national identities in Europe contain elements of a European identity, which is not an identity that exists beyond or outside national identities. For example, the major expressions of German national identity today contain a strong sense of a European Germany; national identity and European identity do not exist in a relation of tension, but of complementarity. This is also the case with regard to Finnish, French, Irish, Greek and Italian identity, as well as others. In these cases, the nation has already contained within it a post-national moment. In this context, one may cite the well-known thesis of Alan Milward that the project of European integration was a project of the nation-state.³

 

In sum, the question of national identity and European identity is largely a matter of how we define identity in the first instance. The suggestion made here is to see identity as a process or a developmental logic rather than as a fixed and unchangeable state. Both European identity and national identity are embroiled in each other and reflect some of the major shifts in culture and identity that have occurred in recent times. The most significant of these shifts is the move from substantive to liquid identities.

Imagining European Identity

The notion of a European identity can mean several things. As the previous remarks suggest, we can speak of European identity on the level of personal identities. In this case, it is a matter of individuals identifying with European culture or politics. People increasingly describe themselves as European. However sociologically interesting this may be, the proliferation of Europeanised personal identities does not produce a European collective identity as such. To be sure, consciousness of being European characterises the identities of many individuals, and the growing Europeanisation of social relations has increased the extent of personal European identities. But this does not necessarily amount to the existence of a European collective identity (although it could result simply in more cosmopolitan identities among Europeans). As argued earlier, a collective identity derives not from numerous personal identities, but from a distinctive social group or institutional framework that articulates a collective identity. For such an identity to exist there must be a means of expressing an explicit collective self-understanding.

 

There are not many examples of a collective European identity, despite the efforts of numerous Europeanists to create one. The Declaration on European Identity of 1973, signed in Copenhagen by the nine member states of the then European Community, attempted to articulate a European identity based on a “common European civilisation”, a “common heritage” and “converging” attitudes and ways of life. The declaration strongly emphasised the notion of “Identity” (with a capital “I”) as an official identity—“The European Identity”—to define the political structure of the European Community in its relations with the external world. The declaration states:

 

The Nine member countries … have decided that the time has come to draw up a document on the European Identity. This will enable them to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs.

 

In this and other attempts to create an official collective identity for the European Union, identity serves a legitimating function. European collective identity in this sense has clearly become more pronounced in recent times with the proliferation of symbols of Europeaness, an emerging EU cultural policy, the euro currency, and scientific and educational policies aimed at enhancing a consciousness of Europe. Despite the absence of a shared language, these developments are not fundamentally unlike earlier attempts by national elites to create national identities, but are probably more fluid. Whether an enlarged European Union will be able to articulate a collective identity comparable to a national identity is questionable.

 

Taking the third sense of identity previously discussed—societal—European identity can be viewed in a different light. In addition to the empirical fact of an increase in the number of personal European identities and the obvious attempt of Brussels to construct a European collective identity, we can also speak of a wider European cultural identity which is distinct from EU policy and politics. In this case, European identity refers not to a capitalised Identity, but identities in the plural—such as national, regional, political, etc.—that are defined by an orientation to a broad cultural conception of Europe. Here, European identity is a generalised mode of self-understanding through which groups, whole societies, movements, and so forth, define their relation to others.

 

As argued earlier, collective identities also take the form of broad cultural categories that are not group-specific but cultural imaginaries. Such categories are reference points for specific identities to take shape. In this sense, European identity refers to specific modes of self-understanding that have arisen from the increased interpenetration of European societies and from a certain liquidification of national identities. In this broader sense, a European subject as such does not exist in the way distinct groups of people exist. But this does not mean that it cannot exist. As a cultural imaginary, European identity is a process of self-recognition and exists as a constellation of diverse elements.

 

This European identity corresponds to a dialogic view of culture. According to Jürgen Habermas, the identity of a “post-national” society can be based only on cultural forms of commonality that accept certain basic principles—e.g., procedural rules for conflict resolution, communicative solutions, and the limited patriotism of an identification with the constitution (a “constitutional patriotism”)—rather than on territory, cultural heritage or the state.⁴ He argues that no society can simply opt out of the critical and reflexive forces at work in modern culture. On this view, unity is merely the limited universalism of modern values such as criticism and reflexivity.

 

The characteristic feature of Habermas’s argument is that these values go beyond the typical liberal values of respect for others, tolerance of difference, and so on, by giving a greater role to critical self-confrontation. Thus, rather than simply looking for a common or underlying cultural identity, the emphasis is on a transformative type of self-understanding. The idea of European identity that this suggests is one that expresses cosmopolitan currents in contemporary society, such as new kinds of loyalties, memories, and dialogue. A concrete example of such a cosmopolitan embodiment of European identity that has become influential today is the notion of unity in diversity. The subject of much discussion, unity in diversity seems to capture Europe’s contemporary mode of self-understanding. It avoids an excessive concern with unity in favour of an orientation to diversity. It holds that unity can only consist of the recognition of diversity and must refer to values compatible with the fact of diversity. A European identity thus might be seen as the recognition of differences and the capacity to build upon these links.

 

Massimo Cacciari describes Europe as an archipelago of spaces connected by various links; it is a network of differences, a mosaic of overlapping and connecting diversities; it does not have an overarching unity, but connections.⁵ In a similar spirit, Rémi Brague has argued that the uniquely European is to be found in the nature of the transmission of culture rather than in any specific cultural content. Europe is based on a particular cultural form that transforms that which it takes over, but it does not have a culture of its own. The essence of Europe is its capacity to transform culture. This is a reading of European culture as already decentred, “eccentric” and containing alterity within it. For Brague, Europe cannot be defined by geography, by politics, or by a disembodied Platonic idea. It is not a place or a particular political order, but a mode of cultural communication.⁶ This capacity for self-transformation suggests that Europe does not belong to the Europeans, who do not as such exist: “Europe is a culture,” he argues, and cannot be inherited but only created.

 

In sum, European identity exists on different levels (personal identities, collective identities, and wider cultural models) which need to be carefully differentiated. It is possible to conceive of European identity as a cosmopolitan identity embodied in the cultural models of a societal or civilisational identity rather than as a supranational identity or an official EU identity that is in tension with national identities. As a cosmopolitan societal identity, European identity is a form of post-national self-understanding that expresses itself within, as much as beyond, national identities. The argument is that post-national and cosmopolitan currents are evident within national identities and are given cultural form by European identity.

Europe’s Defining Values?

One could quite well ask, “Why European identity?” What is distinctive about Europe that marks its cultural identity? Until recently the idea of a European identity was more or less the equivalent of Western identity, with Europe signalling Western values, universal civilisational values. Until the end of the Cold War, Europe was part of an American-led West in which it renounced its own discredited identity in favour of a universalistic Western value system. Following the collapse of communism, the unification of Germany, the growing significance of the European Union, the declining significance of the Second World War for contemporary political culture, and the emergence of a European public sphere, a European identity has emerged. As argued in the previous section, this is not necessarily an identity that is in tension with national identities since the latter are themselves undergoing significant shifts in their natures. Still, the question remains: “What is distinctive about Europe as opposed to Asia or America or other global identities?”

 

Many philosophers and writers—for example, Edmund Husserl, Daniel de Rougement, Jan Patoka, T. S. Eliot, Paul Valéry, Karl Jaspers—took the view that Europe was based on the universalism of science, and they appealed to an overarching spiritual idea that purportedly manifested itself in the diversity of Europe. This vision of Europe has been influential and has shaped such documents as the “Charta of European Identity”, which sees Europe as based on the values of “tolerance, humanity and fraternity”.⁷ The current president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, has given voice to this view of Europe as the foundation of democracy.⁸ Other positive accounts of European identity refer to cultural values that transcend the divisions of European history, as for example in Passerini’s study on European love, or Jan Patoka’s vision of Europe as based on the philosophical tradition.⁹ However, such essentially cultural accounts of European identity have not gone unchallenged. We may consider a few alternative conceptions.

 

The first response might be a dismissive one, with the argument that European identity is a means of expressing adversity. Throughout history, Europe has often been equated with Christianity and defined in relation to Islam. Europe has been held to signify the values of civilisation and high culture in opposition to Asia and the rest of the world. European history is full of examples of different nation-states proclaiming themselves to be the protectors of Europe. In these dynastic and national struggles, the appeal to Europe has been a strategy of conquest and expansion, for to be the champion of Europe is to distinguish oneself from those less worthy of such a title.

 

To see that the idea of Europe has been a rhetorical device to serve whatever political interests happen to be opportune, one need only consider how in the late 1960s and early 1970s the Right, on the whole and with some obvious exceptions, embraced the ideal of European unity, whereas from the late 1980s onwards this became a largely Left political project. It is difficult not to draw the conclusion that, for good or bad, the idea of Europe is open to multiple codifications and can be invented in numerous ways.

 

However, one point can be made: European identity is not exclusively constructed on the basis of a collective “We” who define themselves against an alien “Other”, for the simple reason that, as a result of three decades of cultural diffusion and mixing, there is no clearly definable “We”. In most European countries the opposition to the Iraq War showed very clearly that the values that define Europe are not Islamophobic. Although xenophobia is a major problem in European societies, it has not become the dominant social imaginary.

 

While it is certainly true that Europe has been closely associated with Christianity, which gave Europe some of its enduring characteristics, this is not the defining feature of European identity today. Europe is one of the few parts of the world where religion has ceased to be a politically significant factor. In this it is unlike the United States.

 

As far as European cultural history is concerned, the divisions within Christianity have been as great as the Christian–Islamic divide. The division of the Christian Church into Latin and Byzantine parts in the eleventh century, and the subsequent division of Latin Christianity with the Reformation, have undermined the unity of the Christian tradition. The historical tension between Christianity and Islam has lost its cultural capacity to define societal identity. We only have to consider the case of Turkey, which despite a major Muslim population is a secular state and one in which the Islamist governing party is looking more and more to Europe. Whatever problems Turkey may pose Europe in the event of its eventual EU membership, they are not likely to be religious.¹⁰ There is no convincing empirical evidence that Islam is a “threat” to Europe or incompatible with European values. (There is of course the separate question of militant fundamentalism, but this must be considered as part of the wider phenomenon of fundamentalism, which is not an exclusively non-Western phenomenon.)

Cosmopolitanism and Modernity

The challenge for Europe is not culture but politics. Influential European intellectuals, including such prominent figures as Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas, have argued in the wake of the controversial Iraq War in 2003 that the United States has betrayed the cherished ideas and ideals of modernity.¹¹ Their argument is that the very principles of modern democracy and cosmopolitanism that the American Revolution embodied and that were a beacon to Europe and the rest of the world for some two centuries have been abandoned in a descent into empire-building. These intellectuals see the challenge of European identity to be the preservation of these democratic and cosmopolitan values.

 

Could this be the content of a European identity? Given the difficulties of defining Europe in exclusively cultural terms or by reference to a shared history or territory, quite different criteria will have to be found. Europe conceived of as a demos rather than an ethos accords with the political reality of contemporary European societies and the growing sensitivity to issues of global civil society. Undoubtedly, some people will see in this a danger that European identity may be defined as anti-Americanism. However, despite some cultural predispositions among the European intelligentsia towards anti-Americanism, this would appear to be more of an American invention than a current reality. Given the global presence and influence of American popular culture, science and technology, anti-Americanism is limited in scope, and European critical responses to American politics are not significantly different from opposition within the United States.

 

There is a strong case for linking European identity with the cosmopolitanism of European cultural and political modernity. It is important to appreciate that this kind of identity is not merely a collective identity in the conventional sense of the term. We are not talking about the collective identity of a particular group of Europeans or an official legitimating identity for the European Union, but of an emerging cultural model. Even without the European Union this would exist.

 

The European Union itself tries to take on the mantle of cosmopolitanism in order to assume a democratic identity it otherwise lacks. For instance, human rights have become an important expression of European identity, but a close look reveals a double standard. There is one standard for judging non-member states with regard to accession or development aid, and another for judging the conduct of member states. It is important not to reduce European identity to the political culture of the European Union or other institutions. Social actors such as the European Union have to define their political projects by reference to the political and cultural legacy of European modernity. Examining this tradition, we may enquire what its defining tenets are and how the European political legacy can give form and orientation to Europe.

Social Justice

Of the wide range of political philosophies, ideals and movements that have characterised European modernity, the tradition that is most distinctively European is the aspiration for social justice. This is arguably more central to European political modernity than the republican tradition, although this must also be considered as constitutive of the European political imaginary. The belief in a social project has been more a part of European political modernity than of political modernity elsewhere on the globe. The vision of solidarity and social justice has animated many of the major social movements in modern Europe, leading to the foundation of the twentieth-century welfare state, which is arguably the European political legacy. Social Catholicism, trade unionism and socialism have left an enduring mark on Europe, bequeathing a tradition that is the basis of its identity of social care, equality and the vision of a fair society.

 

This is particularly striking when Europe is compared to the United States. Whatever Europe is becoming, two things are clear: it is not Greater France and, critically, it is not a European version of the United States. It is no longer framed in the image of the French state and republican values, and nor is it a purely market society with loose federal structures. According to Will Hutton, there are three clusters of values that define Europe: the stakeholder view of property, belief in the social contract, and commitment to a vital public realm.¹² There is, he argues, a distinctive kind of European capitalism, which is based on uniquely European values and needs to be fostered so that it does not become like American capitalism with its veneration of the stock market and corporate economic freedom, and its acceptance of social marginalisation. Europe’s values entail a more responsible kind of capitalism held in check by the institutions of civil society. A European identity based on these values will be a modest Europe, which Goran Therborn characterises as a “Scandinavian” Europe.¹³ These values are only weakly represented by the “European social model”, but they are a potentially viable basis for European identity.

 

Whatever the specific content of European identity, the important point is that it is not an identity rooted in a cultural form of life that might be the expression of a “European People”. This communitarian and republican vision of Europe does not offer an alternative to the instrumentalist view of Europe based on the market and efficiency. A cosmopolitan identity suggests a collective identity beyond both values and interests. As a societal identity, it is a “thin” identity and sustained by dialogic or discursive structures rather than a pre-established cultural foundation. I have earlier described this as a sense of collective identity closer to a cultural category than an identity of a specific social group. Identity in general, but specifically this sense of identity, cannot be seen as a “thing”; it is a system of relations and a capacity for communication.

Conclusion: The Shape of Europe

The argument of this paper is that European identity exists on different levels. As a result of the ongoing process of Europeanisation as well as wider processes of globalisation and the cross-fertilisation of cultures, there is an increase in the number of European personal identities within the populations of European societies; but there is less evidence for the existence of a European collective identity. Nevertheless, there are discernable signs of such a collective identity, which in general can be related to the cultural and political identity of the European Union.

 

I have argued that a more diffuse kind of European societal identity exists on the level of a cultural model in which new forms of European self-understanding and self-recognition are expressed. It is only from the perspective of this societal identity that the shape of Europe can be discerned. European identity in all these senses—personal, collective and societal—and especially the last, is not in competition with national identities; indeed, it is arguably the case that national identities are becoming more cosmopolitan, as are personal identities. Both national identity and European identity should be seen, like most collective identities today, as fluid or “thin” identities rather than as hard or “thick” identities that are rooted in pristine cultures or historical logics.

 

The implication of this view of collective identities in Europe as “thin” is that cosmopolitan forms of understanding can take root in a variety of ways. Rather than an overarching, all-embracing collective identity reminiscent of the nineteenth-century nation-state, European identity should be sought in the cosmopolitan currents of European societies in which new forms of self-understanding are emerging. Whether a European societal identity will emerge and give shape to Europe—that is, to the constellation of elements that make up Europe—remains to be seen; but it may be suggested in conclusion that a decisive factor will be the creation of a social project in which some of the defining values of European modernity can realised.

 

The critical implication of this for the European Union is that a future European post-national and constitutional order will have to reconcile itself with the fact that the identity of Europe is not easily codified in a cultural package. Identity is about giving voice, and this requires neither a clearly defined ethnos nor a demos but discursive spaces. This dialogic view of Europe seems to accord with the deliberative theory of democracy as a form of communicative power. For the European Union, therefore, the challenge is less to anchor its constitutional order in an underlying identity or overarching collective identity than to create spaces for the flow of communication.

Endnotes

1. Mikael af Malmborg and Bo Stråth, eds., The Meaning of Europe (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2002).

 

2. See Gerard Delanty and Patrick O’Mahony, Nationalism and Social Theory (London: Sage, 2002).

 

3. Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992).

 

4. Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), and The Postnational Constellation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).

 

5. Massimo Cacciari, L’Arcipelago (Milan: Adephi, 1997).

 

6. Rémi Brague, Europe, la voie romaine (Paris: Éditions Critérion, 1993).

 

7. The charta was proposed by Václav Havel in 1994, taken up by Europa-Union Deutschland and drafted in 1995. It can be found at [http://www.europa-web.de/europa/02wwswww/203chart/chart_gb.htm].

 

8. Romano Prodi, Europe as I See It (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).

 

9. Luisa Passerini, Europe in Love, Love in Europe: Imagination and Politics in Britain between the Wars (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998); Jan Patoka, Plato and Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

 

10. See Gerard Delanty, “The Making of a Postwestern Europe: A Civilizational Analysis”, Thesis Eleven 72 (2003), pp. 8–25.

 

11. See the article published in several European newspapers by Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, “Unsere Erneuerung nach dem Krieg: Die Wiedergeburt Europas” (Our renewal after the war: Europe’s rebirth), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 May 2003, pp. 33–4.

 

12. Will Hutton, The World We’re In (London: Little, Brown, 2002).

 

13. Goran Therborn, “Europe in the Twenty-First Century”, in The Question of Europe, ed. Peter Gowan and Perry Anderson (London: Verso, 1997).