Averting Forced Migration

Susan F. Martin is director of the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University.

Millions of international migrants have been forced to leave their home countries and seek refuge in other nations. Many leave because of persecution, human rights violations, repression or conflict. They depart on their own initiative to escape these life-threatening situations, although in a growing number of cases they are driven from their homes by governments and insurgent groups intent on depopulating an area or changing its ethnic, religious or other composition. Some migrants are forced to move by environmental degradation and natural and human-made disasters that render their homes uninhabitable. Still others are forced out of their home countries by extreme poverty.

 

Those who migrate because of conflict and repression have a special status in international law. A refugee is defined by the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as “a person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”.

 

Refugee status has been applied more broadly, however, to include persons who are outside their country of origin because of armed conflict, generalised violence, foreign aggression or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order, and who, therefore, require international protection.

 

By contrast, those forced to move because of extreme poverty, environmental degradation and natural disasters have no special protection under international law. Although they, too, may no longer be able to remain within their home countries, they are generally treated as if they were voluntary migrants, moving to another country for better economic opportunities or to join family members.

 

Although just stated in simple terms, the distinction between voluntary and forced migrants can be difficult to draw. Voluntary migrants may feel compelled to leave because of pressing problems at home; forced migrants may choose a particular refuge because of family and community ties or economic opportunities. Moreover, one form of migration often leads to another. Forced migrants who settle in a new country may then bring family members to join them. Voluntary migrants may find that situations change in their home countries, preventing their repatriation and making them into forced migrants.

 

It is the complicated relationship between voluntary and forced migration that challenges receiving states when they try to avert forced migration. Many governments have established sometimes elaborate and costly asylum adjudication procedures to make determinations as to who will be admitted and who returned to their home countries. In some cases, where other immigration avenues are restrictive, these procedures are the only or principal means through which migrants are able to gain admission, regardless of their reasons for emigrating or the circumstances they would face on return. Fearing uncontrolled migration, states have imposed such mechanisms as visa requirements and carrier sanctions to limit access to their territory. Too often, however, these mechanisms fail to make distinctions between refugees and other migrants and limit the protection afforded to persons who, failing to obtain asylum elsewhere, will find themselves endangered. Sometimes these mechanisms are also self-defeating, as would-be migrants, including bona fide refugees, turn to increasingly more sophisticated smuggling and trafficking operations that are able to circumvent the immigration controls. A vicious cycle then develops, with governments imposing new restrictions while smugglers find new ways to get around them.

 

In recent years, governments and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have begun to explore ways of tackling forced migration pressures at their source and in regions of origin. The European Union has established a High-Level Working Group that has developed plans to address the causes of migration in the principal source countries of migration to Europe. The mandate of the High-Level Working Group is to analyse the causes of influx, including the human rights situation in the source country; to assess the effectiveness of aid and development strategies; to identify the needs for humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance, and ways of assisting the reception of displaced persons in the region; to gather information on readmission agreements and the possibility of safe and voluntary return; to identify areas and means of co-operation with the UNHCR and non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and to prepare proposals for joint measures in the field of asylum and migration. Target countries originally included Morocco, Afghanistan/Pakistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Albania and Somalia, but the list has since been expanded.

 

Averting forced migration at its source is by no means a substitute for well-functioning asylum systems that protect bona fide refugees. However, measures designed to address protection requirements at the source do provide additional mechanisms for protecting and assisting those who, in their absence, may seek admission to countries in North America and Europe.

 

The next section of this paper discusses factors that are likely to precipitate continued migration. The paper then goes on to outline a range of approaches to curb the potential for forced migration, including preventive actions, national and regional protection mechanisms, and return and reintegration options.

Global Migration Trends

All migration is influenced by a combination of push factors that create a supply of migrants in source countries, pull factors that create a demand for migrants in destination countries, and networks that link supply and demand. Seven principal trends now affect migration, including forced movements of people:

1. Economic Globalisation and Economic Integration

Economic globalisation is not new. Nor is the role of international migration in stimulating and being affected by global markets. More than five hundred years ago, European exploration, conquest and colonisation of continents with rich natural resources were connected integrally with the growth of a new mercantile, capitalist economy. Today’s economic globalisation, however, gives new meaning to this old phenomenon. The growth in communications and transportation technologies, combined with the willingness of states to enter into binding trade commitments and of businesses to establish multinational entities, has permitted an integration of economies which previously had operated in separate, differentiated spaces.

 

The growth in global trade and investment has import for major source countries of migration and receiving countries. Economic development, spurred by access to global markets and capital, is widely considered the best long-term solution to emigration pressures in poor countries: illegal migration can be countered by improving the economic opportunities of people in source countries. However, there is also a scholarly consensus that emigration pressures are likely to remain and possibly increase before the long-term benefits accrue:

 

The transformations intrinsic to the development process are at first destabilising. They initially promote rather than impede migration. Better communications and transportation and other improvements in the quality of life of people working hard to make a living raise expectations and enhance their ability to migrate.¹

 

Several researchers posit what economist Philip Martin refers to as an “immigration hump”: as income-levels rise, emigration at first increases, then peaks and declines.² The experience of such countries as Italy and South Korea in making the transition from emigration to immigration countries gives credence to this theory.

2. Changing Geopolitical Interests

The post–Cold War era presents new opportunities and challenges for migration regimes. The effects are most profound with regard to forced migration. Most current refugee and asylum policy was formulated following the Second World War with the lessons of the Nazi era in mind and tensions between East and West growing. To a large degree, refugee policy was seen as an instrument of foreign policy at both international and domestic levels. Admission of refugees for permanent resettlement, asylum for victims of persecution and repression, and international aid to victims of surrogate Cold War conflicts—Central America, Ethiopia, Vietnam, etc.—were all part of the fight against communism.

 

The Cold War also made all but impossible some solutions to refugee crises, such as attacking root causes or promoting the return of refugees. With the end of the Cold War, new opportunities emerged. Many decades-old civil wars came to an end. Democratisation and increased respect for human rights took hold in numerous countries around the globe. As a result, repatriation became a possibility for millions of refugees who had been displaced for years.

 

One of the most significant changes has been in the willingness of states to intervene on behalf of internally displaced persons and others in need of assistance and protection within their home countries. Classic notions of sovereignty, which formerly precluded such intervention, are under considerable pressure. International human rights and humanitarian law have growing salience in defining sovereignty to include responsibility for the welfare of the residents of one’s territory.

 

Intervention may be expected when the actions of a sovereign state threaten the security of another state. What is new is the recognition that actions that prompt mass exodus into a neighbouring territory threaten international security. In a number of cases, beginning with UN Resolution 688 that authorised intervention in northern Iraq, the Security Council has determined that the way to reduce the threat to a neighbouring state is to provide assistance and protection within the territory of the offending state. (The changing context for humanitarian action also affects the roles of international organisations with regard to forced migrants. Formerly, most responsibility for handling forced migration crises went to the UNHCR, which mobilised resources from sister agencies. Today, new sets of actors drawn from security, military, human rights and development communities have growing participation, especially in situations involving internal displacement.)

 

The changing geopolitical scene is a two-edged sword, however. The end of the Cold War has also generated a need for humanitarian intervention. Rabid nationalism has replaced communism in some countries, while others have become so destabilised that no government exists to protect the civilian population. Addressing these new situations is made all the more challenging now that ideological support for generous refugee responses has unravelled. The principles of asylum and non-refoulement (non-return to places of persecution) appear to be under growing attack in Europe and North America. Further, as the failure of the international community to protect the so-called safe havens in Bosnia showed, humanitarian interests alone are often an insufficient substitute for political will.

3. Demographic and Gender Developments

Globally, fertility rates are falling, although many countries in the developing world continue to experience rapid population growth. In most developed countries, fertility levels are well below replacement rates—that is, couples are having fewer than two children. These countries can foresee a time in which their total population will decrease, leading some demographers to refer to a looming population implosion. These countries can also expect an ageing population.

 

Along with these changes in population growth and age distribution are changes in the role of women within society. Women are increasingly pursuing educational opportunities, working outside the home and participating in civil society. The 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development recognised that female education and earning power are essential elements of any strategy to restrain rapid population growth. Not surprisingly, as women gain greater autonomy through education and work, they are also migrating, not just to rejoin spouses but also as principal applicants for work visas.

 

Demographic trends affect international migration in two respects. First, they are an important factor in explaining emigration pressures in many countries. Societies with rapid population growth are often unable to generate sufficient employment to keep pace with new entries into the labour force. Environmental degradation may also result, particularly when land-use policies do not protect fragile ecosystems. Such natural phenomena as hurricanes and earthquakes can have disproportionately negative effects in densely populated areas, particularly in poor countries, with large numbers displaced from their destroyed homes.

 

Second, demographic trends influence the receptivity of destination countries towards migration, and its impact upon them. The effects are not necessarily straightforward, however. For example, a country with low fertility rates and an ageing population may benefit from the admission of working-age international migrants, but as the migrant population becomes a larger share of total population, there may be a backlash against the newcomers. This pattern is seen particularly where the migrants are of a different race, ethnicity or religion from the native population.

4. Technological Innovations

The communications, information and transportation revolutions transforming society affect migration trends in many ways. Travel is cheaper and easier than ever before, increasing the likelihood that migrants can move long distances. Similarly, global communications systems enable would-be migrants to monitor the economic, social and political situations in distant countries and determine whether and where they wish to relocate. Inexpensive transport and telephone systems also permit migrants to remain in touch with their families at home, making migration a less radical step than it was in earlier periods. These factors contribute not only to increased migration but also to transnationalism.

5. Transnationalism

Partly because of the technological revolution of the second half of the twentieth century, migrants today can far more easily live in two societies at the same time. When travel was more difficult, migrants tended to live sequentially in one country or the other. Now they can maintain two homes, shuttling easily between them. A visible manifestation of this phenomenon is the growth in dual nationality.

 

Money-flows between immigrants and those who remain at home are another important aspect of transnationalism. Remittances often exceed any other form of trade, investment or foreign aid available to migrant source-countries. According to the International Monetary Fund, an estimated $77 billion was remitted in 1997. The decision to remit and the amount remitted vary depending on the location of family members, earnings abroad, the costs of migration, destination-country living expenses, duration of stay, and other such factors. Maintaining the flow of these resources can be an important consideration in immigration policymaking.

6. Human-Smuggling and -Trafficking

Supply and demand networks explain why certain migrants move to certain locations. They also explain why the same set of push or pull factors in different countries leads to very different migration experiences. If the networks are not functioning, supply and demand never find each other.

 

A particularly troubling trend in recent years has been the emergence of professional smuggling and trafficking operations as facilitators of migration. Smuggling is, of course, one of the world’s oldest professions. When nation-states established borders and sought to regulate traffic across them, they created markets for the smuggling of humans as well as goods. What is new is the scale of smuggling, measured in numbers and profits, and also its professionalisation.

 

Several types of services may be offered: assistance in crossing borders without inspection; houses in which migrants can hide from the authorities; transportation to interior locations; and links to employers. Smugglers may sell or rent fraudulent documents for obtaining entry and verifying eligibility for lawful employment. Sometimes smugglers act like legitimate business people, guaranteeing their services and agreeing to receive final payment when the migrant reaches the destination country. Other smuggling/trafficking operations are far less benign. Smugglers pack large numbers of migrants into small, unventilated spaces to cross borders or reach ports. Fearing apprehension by border authorities, smugglers have left migrants without water or protection from the sun.

 

The most disturbing form of smuggling involves human-trafficking, where the smugglers not only bring migrants across borders but exploit and abuse their labour in the process. As smuggling fees increase, and migrants find it difficult to pay all costs at once, smugglers “sell” migrants to businesses that cover the fees in exchange for indentured labour. This can amount to virtual slavery, particularly for women and children forced into sexually exploitive occupations.

7. Harmonisation through New Regional and International Mechanisms

Historically, states have seen immigration policy as a question of national interest, often adopting unilateral measures to regulate entry and exit. Nations treat the admission of immigrants and control of unauthorised migration as quintessential matters of sovereignty. After all, immigration policy deals with fundamental issues of national identity as well as national security. The protection of its borders is key to a state’s definition of itself.

 

While few would deny that states do, in fact, have both the authority and responsibility for making decisions on immigration, there is growing recognition that sovereignty limits the ability of states to address the realities of today’s international migration. The UNHCR has long been mandated to help governments deal with the impacts of refugee movements, while also ensuring that the rights of refugees are protected.

 

A new development is the increased co-operation among states in managing other types of migration. During the past decade, regional mechanisms have been established in the Americas, Europe, East Asia, Africa and elsewhere to allow receiving, source and transit countries to address issues of mutual concern. For example, the Regional Conference on Migration, referred to as the “Puebla Group”, brings together all the countries of Central and North America for regular, constructive dialogue on migration issues, including an annual session at the vice-ministerial level. The Puebla Group’s “Plan of Action” calls for the exchange of information on migration policy, exploration of the links between development and migration, the combating of migrant-trafficking, the return of extra-regional migrants, full respect for the human rights of migrants, the reintegration of repatriated migrants within the region, the equipping and modernising of immigration control systems, and the training of officials in migration policy and procedures.

Measures against Forced Migration

Averting forced migration involves a combination of approaches such as addressing its causes, finding alternative mechanisms to protect forced migrants, and helping forced migrants return and remain home when conditions permit. These are discussed in turn:

Ameliorating the Causes of Forced Migration

Ultimately, diminishing the push and pull factors is the most sensible way of tackling migration pressures, whether voluntary or forced. Peace, respect for human rights, and reducing income differentials between rich and poor countries are the best long-term solutions to uncontrolled migration.

 

Clearly, there are neither the resources nor the capacity to prevent conflict, ensure human rights or promote economic security in all countries that may produce forced migrants. However, those concerned to reduce forced migration can (1) advocate alleviation of its causes; (2) stimulate early warning of and responses to refugee emergencies to prevent displacements and mitigate longer-term impacts; (3) urge utilisation of humanitarian assistance in a manner that reduces tensions, stabilises communities, curbs its diversion to military purposes, and reaches those in need without unnecessarily requiring their movement towards the aid; and (4) encourage safe and orderly repatriation in a way that supports peace and reconciliation. At the same time, it is important to emphasise that prevention does not mean preventing people from seeking safety and protection abroad.

 

Expatriate communities can play an important role in supporting democratisation and human rights in home countries, particularly by promoting respect for minority rights. This contrasts sharply with a better-known role that expatriates play, namely, supporting continued conflict by supplying funds for arms purchases. Just as expatriates send financial remittances to their home communities, so they can send information and support for the democratic practices and rule of law that are common in their adopted countries.

 

Helping establish the rule of law, including protection of minority rights, is a key element in any prevention strategy. Many countries do not have fully operating judicial systems. Nor do they have mechanisms to prevent or prosecute the discrimination against minorities that may precipitate flight. Legal procedures for reclaiming land and other property, particularly upon return, are also sorely lacking in such societies. To the extent that destination countries—including expatriates who have developed new skills in mediation, minority rights and law—can help source countries to establish the rule of law, pressures for outward migration may be significantly diminished.

 

Reducing economic pressures for flight is a further way of averting forced migration. A combination of increased trade, foreign direct investment and foreign aid will be needed in most countries if people are to have sufficient economic opportunities to remain at home. Foreign aid alone or in its current configuration is unlikely to stimulate the necessary economic development to deter emigration without the economic activity generated by trade and investment. Apart from problems caused by inadequate levels and inappropriate use of aid resources, there is the need to target aid more effectively at the causes of migration. Examples of targeted aid include micro-credit for would-be migrants who would prefer to invest in their home communities, income generation options for women left behind by migrating spouses, infrastructure development to create new markets and economic opportunities in emigration source regions, and education and health-care services for families in such areas.

 

The diaspora can contribute to economic development through its financial resources and skills, entrepreneurial activities and support for economic liberalisation. Individual remittance transfers remain an important source of subsistence for many families in crisis countries. Governments can co-operate to facilitate such transfers, provide technical assistance to ensure their effective use, match the funds to stimulate additional contributions, regulate transfer fees and exchange rates to reduce transaction costs, and take other steps to encourage remittances for economic development. In addition, associations of migrants often band together to raise and transmit funds for infrastructure development and income generation in their home communities.

Strengthening Protection in Regions of Origin

To the extent that protection is available in neighbouring states, asylum-seekers will not feel pressure to migrate to more distant countries. Further, if forced migrants can seek admission to highly developed countries via legal channels, unauthorised migration pressures may be reduced. Adoption of the following policies would provide a greater variety of protection options for forced migrants:

 

• Forms of protection that complement asylum, with a focus on persons who flee generalised conflict and violence. States should uphold minimum standards of treatment for those granted the complementary status, affording similar protections to those spelled out in the 1951 UN refugee convention. The principal obligation of states should be non-return of migrants to conditions in which they would be endangered. If such conditions persist for some time, states should be encouraged to permit those granted the complementary status to remain permanently.

 

Complementary statuses serve not only to protect the large number of asylum-seekers who flee conflict rather than persecution, they also facilitate both the appearance and reality of migration control. At present, it appears as though states have less control over their asylum systems than is the case. Although a sometimes small minority of applicants are accorded asylum, a much larger number are permitted to remain on other humanitarian grounds. Because they are framed solely as asylum policies, however, these other forms of relief tend to be disregarded. Yet they do have value, apart from their humanitarian one, in that they allow states to keep track of persons within their territory, determine what rights accrue to specific statuses, and require return should conditions permit.

 

• In-country processing of protection requests to minimise the negative effects of such migration controls as visa requirements and carrier sanctions. In particular, states should explore the feasibility of allowing asylum-seekers to request protection prior to departure. Several options should be considered: creating special “refugee” visas that embassies and consulates would grant to persons who do not qualify for regular visas but who can demonstrate that they are or will be endangered if they do not leave their home countries; establishing UNHCR offices in countries of origin where asylum-seekers could request protection, with the understanding that they will be evacuated to countries willing and able to receive them; and broadening the responsibilities of pre-inspection personnel and other immigration officials assigned to overseas locations so that they can assess the asylum claims of persons seeking to board aircraft and other carriers without proper documentation.

 

These various mechanisms are largely untried, and they certainly are not substitutes for a functioning asylum system. The experience with in-country processing has been mixed, to say the least, for both refugee protection and migration management. For example, the Orderly Departure Programme (ODP) from Vietnam and Cuba at least partially curbed large-scale departures in unseaworthy boats, saving lives and providing a safer avenue for migration. The departures were stemmed, however, because both governments agreed to halt the movements. Bona fide refugees who were afraid to apply for orderly departure (and thereby make themselves known to the government) had even more limited options for flight. In Haiti, in particular, the presence of in-country processing was used by the United States as a reason to return interdicted boats directly to Haiti without affording passengers the opportunity to apply for asylum.

 

From the immigration management vantage, ODP arrangements could hinder the capacity of the receiving country to set its own priorities for admission. In the Vietnamese ODP, for example, the United States established lists of persons who sought entry and met minimal criteria for admission, and Vietnam set lists of those it would grant exit permission. Generally, only those who were on both lists were able to leave, but these individuals may not have been as high priorities as other applicants. Despite these problems, and the necessity for the UNHCR continually to emphasise that in-country procedures cannot be a substitute for asylum, such procedures hold one overriding advantage: they provide opportunities for victims of persecution and other abuses to find safety without resort to subterfuge and further violation of their rights.

 

• Regional protection mechanisms. Regional protection holds the promise of helping states balance twin interests: on the one hand, providing protection to refugees, and on the other, refusing admission to persons who do not otherwise qualify for entry. As discussed above, international migration generally requires both push and pull factors. In the case of refugees seeking entry into the highly developed countries of North America and Europe, the push may be persecution or conflict, but the pull is generally better economic opportunities. Regional protection—that is, protection in neighbouring or nearby countries with economies similar to those of the country of origin—offers safety without the potential magnet for unauthorised migration represented by admission to wealthier nations. It should also facilitate repatriation when conditions permit because the economic advantages of remaining outside one’s country are reduced.

 

Regional protection is hardly a new concept. The vast majority of refugees have always found asylum within their regions of origin, generally in neighbouring countries. What is new is the interest of European and North American states in redirecting migrant flows towards regional centres.

 

This approach was pioneered in South-East Asia, when a processing centre was established in Bataan, the Philippines, to receive refugees admitted to Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong for temporary asylum before they were resettled elsewhere. Because the numbers seeking entry outpaced resettlement capacity, the processing centre relieved the pressure on first-asylum countries and allowed the resettlement countries to examine applications carefully to determine who was admissible. The processing centre effectively served the ends of both protection and migration management.

 

A different form of regional protection was used in 1994 to address an increasing number of boat departures from Haiti. In this case, regional protection was offered as an alternative to admission into the United States. Fearing that access to US territory would serve as a magnet for further flight, the United States instead offered safe haven at its Guantanamo Bay naval base in Cuba and, through a regional agreement, in Panama and the Turks and Caicos Islands; but it emphasised that there would be no admission to the United States. This policy led to an abrupt decline in boat departures, but not before about forty thousand Haitians utilised this regional protection. The need for safe haven lessened considerably when international pressure and the threat of military intervention led to a restoration of the elected government and the presence of peacekeeping forces in Haiti. The vast majority of those offered protection chose to return home when conditions permitted. A small number were permitted entry into the United States to pursue asylum claims or seek medical attention.

 

This brief review shows that regional protection has utility, but it also confirms that it must be accompanied by mechanisms for broader sharing of responsibility regarding the costs of maintaining regional protection as well as the resettlement or relocation of at least some of those requiring protection.

 

• Increased resettlement opportunities for refugees in first-asylum countries. Many refugees remain for lengthy periods in refugee camps, settlements or urban areas of asylum countries in their region of origin. They may face considerable protection problems, including the threat of forced repatriation, sexual exploitation and assault, separation from close family members, and general violence and attack. They may also have no other options, unable to return safely to their home countries or integrate into the country of asylum. For their part, most countries of asylum are themselves poor and often face instability when the conflicts that produce refugees spill over their borders. Some refugees in these countries may be tempted to resort to smugglers and traffickers to make their way to richer and safer states. Providing a method for legal and secure migration would benefit the refugees while reducing pressures for unauthorised migration.

 

A small number of traditional destination countries—most notably the United States, Canada and Australia—have formal programmes for resettling refugees. In addition, several European countries will admit refugees at the request of the UNHCR. The number of resettled refugees is, and will probably continue to be, small by comparison with the total number of refugees. The most desirable end to a refugee flow is not resettlement but repatriation—helping refugees re-establish themselves in their home countries. However, repatriation is not an option for some refugees, making resettlement a valuable alternative in protecting them and providing a durable solution to their plight.

Reintegration and Reconstruction

Averting forced migration requires innovative approaches to reintegrating migrants when conditions permit their return home. Large-scale return movements to countries where personal security is at risk, where economic opportunities are scarce or non-existent, and where commitment to peace is fragile, create more problems than they solve. Political leaders in host countries and those in post-conflict countries of origin have legitimate and contradictory interests: the former face popular resistance to growing numbers of refugees, the latter contend they are unable to incorporate certain groups—or very large numbers—of returnees. This has been seen in areas as different as the Balkans and Central America.

 

Contentious problems such as recovery of land, property and professional licences, political representation of minorities, and the monitoring of human rights are best merely referenced in peace agreements, but left for later solutions. These issues arise frequently, warrant far more attention than they have thus far received, and should be systematically analysed by policymakers and experts.

 

Many post-conflict societies evince good practice in enabling return and reintegration to proceed smoothly, although often on a small scale. Such practice includes programmes to promote reconciliation among formerly warring parties who return to the same communities; to protect the rights and safety of returnees who are minorities in their home communities (particularly where ethnic cleansing has been attempted); to help returnees reclaim property or obtain appropriate compensation; to bring community members, including returnees, together to rebuild destroyed homes, infrastructure and community resources; to promote reintegration of households headed by women or children; to demobilise and reintegrate soldiers, including child-soldiers; and to help victims of violence and sexual abuse deal with conflict-induced trauma.

***

 

Averting forced migration is a challenge for the international community. Preventing persons who have a well-founded fear of persecution from fleeing is a violation of international law and common decency. Averting forced migration, particularly into more developed countries, should not involve draconian steps that put lives at risk in this manner. Rather, the focus should be on reducing the causes of forced migration, finding alternatives for those who need protection, and supporting sustainable repatriation and reintegration when forced migrants can return home. None of these steps is easy to accomplish, yet the safety, security and dignity of millions of people depend on finding solutions to forced migration.

 

Endnotes

1. US Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, Unauthorized Migration: An Economic Development Response (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 34.

 

2. Wayne A. Cornelius and Philip L. Martin, The Uncertain Connection: Free Trade and Mexico–US Migration (San Diego, Calif.: Center for US–Mexican Studies, University of California Press, 1993), pp. 31–3.