Cheryl A. Rubenberg is associate professor in the political science department of Florida International University and the author of Palestinian Women: Patriarchy and Resistance in the West Bank (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).
Birthing the Nation: Strategies of Palestinian Women in Israel
by rhoda ann kanaaneh
Berkeley, University of California Press, 2002. 300 pages
Hardback: UK £40, US $60. Paperback: UK £17.96, US $24.95
Rhoda Ann Kanaaneh’s Birthing the Nation: Strategies of Palestinian Women in Israel provides the reader with far more than the title suggests. The book contains an excellent historical and socio-political analysis of Zionist demographic policies, here the backdrop to Palestinian reproductive decisions. Kanaaneh illuminates the various ways in which “modernity” or Western values affect and transform a traditional social order. Although her focus is on Palestinians in the Galilee—those who managed to escape expulsion in 1948 and were thrust into a Western/Ashkenazi/Israeli cultural milieu—her analysis has much broader relevance and should serve as a model for all who study societies grappling with the traditional/modern encounter. Birthing the Nation further provides a sense of the structural inequalities experienced by the 20 per cent of Israel’s population that is Palestinian.
The confrontation of Israeli-Palestinians with “modernity” has been more direct and momentous than that of Palestinians in the occupied territories and in the refugee camps of neighbouring Arab countries. As citizens of Israel, these Palestinians have been assaulted by consumerism, materialism and globalism with the result that, “although they are at the bottom of the consumerist system, they are largely enveloped by it and express their hopes and fears from within it” (pp. 84–5). The impact of these forces is such that Kanaaneh’s overriding perspective is grounded in “the consistency of a narrative of modernization and its intimate link to reproduction in the Galilee” (pp. 251–2).
Kanaaneh demonstrates the effect of modernity on Palestinian society in the Galilee by analysing several interrelated spheres. These include nationalism and national identity; the desire for material goods and a better standard of living; individual identity and concepts of “self”; transformations in gender relations and roles; and traditional mores ranging from clan norms to son-preference. Within each of these spheres there are multiple competing counter‑discourses that play out in a diversity of individual choices involving the number of children one has, the intervals between them, contraceptive use and preferences, abortion and artificial insemination—the whole panoply of issues associated with reproduction.
The nationalist discourse affects women in two contradictory ways, but in both “reproduction has been politicized and maternity nationalized. Women’s bodies are deeply inscribed as reproducers of the nation, whether by bearing few or many children” (p. 22). Thus, the “traditional” nationalist discourse instructs women to demonstrate their national identity by producing as many children as possible to fight Israel’s demographic war as well as to fight more literally. I recall here the slogans in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon in the early 1980s: “Babies for Fatah! Babies for the revolution!” In contrast, the “modern” nationalist discourse enjoins women to have fewer babies, only those they can afford to bring up well and educate, so that as adults they can compete with Israel intellectually and technologically, and in this way further the national project. In both cases, women have little or no agency.
The fundamental obstacle facing Israeli-Palestinians is Israel’s conscious and deliberate policy of attempting to limit the number of Palestinians relative to the number of Jews. This has involved ethnic cleansing, land expropriations, prohibitions on land ownership, restrictions on building permits (commercial and domestic), and discrimination in education, employment and housing. Conversely, it has meant fostering the immigration to Israel of as many Jews as possible, a goal institutionalised in the law of the “Right of Return”, which grants automatic citizenship to any Jew anywhere in the world who comes to Israel while prohibiting the immigration of Palestinians, even those born in historical Palestine. It has also meant creating Jewish towns specifically in the midst of Palestinian population centres (part of a drive to “Judaise the Galilee”); state policies of pro-natalism (e.g., financial incentives such as wide-ranging subsidies and benefits for Jews to have many children, incentives denied to the non-Jewish population); and a prohibition on inter-marriage. Thus, for Israeli-Palestinians, private decisions about families and bodies are made in a political context involving the survival of a nation.
Yet the traditional nationalist narrative that would beget large families, discourage contraception, prohibit abortion, and so on, comes up against the narrative of modernity—and not only in the “national” context. Kanaaneh reports that “the key to being modern in the Galilee is awareness that modernity requires a high degree of daily consumption and a high level of spending” (pp. 87–8). Families want “conceived necessities” or “luxurious necessities”, education for their children and much more, making smaller families essential. One informant told Kanaaneh she planned to have only two children because
there is an impact to economic considerations. It’s very simple: spending on two isn’t like spending on four ... in the past they didn’t have sports clubs one could join, as I’ve done ... Today children don’t accept just any kind of food, they want such a variety. Now people want their children to live at a high standard and to educate them. And even when both husband and wife are working, they can hardly keep up. (P. 86)
Moreover, a primary indicator of modernity in the Galilee is “family planning”—having fewer children, their conception being intended and with significant intervals between the births. Indeed, “the ‘self-evident’ logic that modernity requires fewer children … is considered of vital importance in the Galilee today” (p. 89). Another informant told the author: “I’ve already opened a savings account for each child [aged four and six]. You need to plan for the future, for their university and everything ... I keep on counting how much I’d need to spend if I have another kid” (p. 90). This is the dominant discourse, yet Kanaaneh demonstrates that it has not deeply penetrated the villages, being effective largely in urban areas. In rural areas and among the Bedouin, there is a counter-discourse of “traditionalism” and “authenticity”, reinforced by the continuing prevalence of clan (hamulah) social structures, norms and practices, which have greater salience than modernity. One woman stated:
Today the young generation wants to stop having children. My oldest son tells his wife that if she gets pregnant again, he’ll send her back to her parents. They feel it’s too difficult to have more children. They want to do what Israel does. Before, there used to be hunger and we did all the work by hand and we had no hospitals. Today in Israel everything is plentiful and available. The Arabs in Israel are better off than all other Arabs ... yet, they dislike children … They’re selfish and immoral and I tell my sons so. The young women of today want to take care of themselves and get dressed-up and look good. (Pp. 101–2)
Indeed, modernity in the Galilee is also reflected in “commodified standards of beauty” and the “tyranny of slenderness” that lead women to want only one or two children so as not to “damage” their bodies or detract from their physical beauty. One young woman explained to Kanaaneh:
The first time I got pregnant, I was so afraid of gaining weight. And in fact I did get very fat. Wow, you won’t believe how you hate your body, it’s terrible. But I was very happy when I quickly lost weight while breast-feeding. The only problem I have now is that my breasts sag because they grew and grew each time I was pregnant and then they shrank again. If I hate looking at them in the mirror, then what about my husband? They’re really causing me agony … I have a Cindy Crawford video and I do a lot of exercises. I’m also going to buy small weights to help my chest. (P. 168)
Modernity in the Galilee additionally involves modern sex education and sexual awareness as well as a new belief in “science”. This last has led to the widespread use of modern methods of contraception, amniocentesis and “scientific abortion” to prevent the birth of deformed children, and fertility treatment for women who otherwise could not have children. Of course, there is a counter-discourse here, too, including the use of “traditional” medicine—healers, bonesetters, “saints” and holy men, amulets and herbs, etc.—as well as an ideal of beauty grounded in “full” bodies and “motherliness”.
Regarding son-preference, Kanaaneh relates that this is declining somewhat in that modernity mandates that girls be considered as valuable as boys. And while economic considerations enjoin couples to limit the number of children, if it is two, then two girls are accepted. However, there are also “modern” reasons, besides the plethora of traditional rationales, for wanting at least one son, and here Kanaaneh’s analysis is at its weakest. Indeed, she presents more examples of women who continue to want one son than of women who are truly indifferent or prefer only girls. There are, of course, very logical economic and social reasons for desiring a male heir.
Despite the salience of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, of the various elements impinging on reproductive decisions among Galilee Palestinian women—modernisation, nationalism, economic transformations, medical regulation, new forms of social stratification and changing gender relations—nationalism appears to be the least influential. In fact, Kanaaneh’s informants’ own words suggest that “modernity”, in its material and identity formulations, is the predominant force at play in the women’s reproductive politics.
Reading Kanaaneh was of particular interest to me as I had interviewed 175 Palestinian women in West Bank villages and refugee camps in 1997–9 for my book Palestinian Women: Patriarchy and Resistance in the West Bank and found completely different attitudes on reproductive issues. I consciously excluded urban women from my study; had I included them, certainly my findings would have been quite different. But I wanted to find out how the 60 per cent of West Bank women living outside the urban centres viewed their world. I wanted to listen to these women articulate their experiences. This differing focus of our two studies makes comparisons difficult, but it also raises a concern I have with Kanaaneh’s book: her lack of definition or characterisation of her research sample.
The author does not clearly indicate who, in an aggregate sense, constitutes the group of women she studies. They appear to be mainly urbanites, although she also interviewed rural and Bedouin women. Kanaaneh presents the “counter-discourses” (counter to modernity) that emanated from the rural areas, but she gives no sense of the relative proportion of Galilee women who had fully absorbed the modernity discourse, of who had partly absorbed it, and of who remained “traditional”. In the end, we do not know how extensively the discourse of modernity has penetrated the Galilee. It seems as though Kanaaneh interviewed fewer rural than urban women and relied, at times, on the stereotypical perspectives of rural women held by many of her modern informants. For me, at least, the book would have been strengthened by a more systematic breakdown of attitudes, perspectives and trends based on specific indicators—e.g., urban/rural/Bedouin, class/social status/income, educational attainment, religious commitment, nuclear versus extended families, etc.
Yet, even in the absence of such information, it seems evident that Kanaaneh’s focus on modernity accounts for the stark disparities between the “conservative” women I studied and the “modern” women she studied. Still, I was intrigued by the fact that most of her respondents wanted only two or at the most three children, whereas the overwhelming majority of mine wanted at least four, had six, and were under pressure from their husbands to produce more. (In the West Bank, among Palestinian village women the fertility rate is 6.30 and among camp women it is 6.85.)
Similarly, it appears that the overwhelming majority of women she talked to used a “modern” form of contraception (i.e., the pill, IUD), or alternatively “withdrawal” or the “rhythm” method. Regardless of method, though, it is inferred that most women in the Galilee practise some form of birth control and “mistakes” are derided. However, among all married West Bank women only 34 per cent use “modern” forms of birth control. Moreover, most women in my study did not seek birth control until after their sixth child and most preferred “natural” methods.
The men in Kanaaneh’s research sample were deeply involved in reproductive decisions. Indeed, it appeared to be the men who most wanted to limit the number of children. Her couples discussed how many children they wanted, what intervals to leave between births, and what form of birth control was best for them. Frequently, the men were willing to be responsible for birth control, either through withdrawal or, less often, using condoms. Conversely, in my research sample there were virtually no discussions between couples about any aspect of reproduction. Of the women I talked to who used birth control, either “modern” or “natural”, most did so clandestinely because their husbands wanted “all the children God gives us”.
While men in the Galilee calculated the costs of children and felt a need for planning, most men in West Bank villages and refugee camps believed simply that “God will provide”. Finally, while I had expected women living under occupation to be motivated by nationalist sentiments, not more than 3 per cent of the women I interviewed gave “national” reasons for wanting large families with many sons. Rather, a far stronger factor in this regard was the combined imperatives of kinship connectivity, patriarchy, poverty and prevailing social norms.
In the final analysis, however, Birthing the Nation must be judged on its own merits, which are considerable. The book will be of interest to historians and political sociologists of Israel, the Palestinian–Israeli conflict and the Palestinians in Israel. Regarding the last, it nicely complements As’ad Ghanem’s The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 1948–2000 and other, earlier, studies by Sabri Jiryis, Elia Zureik and Ian Lustick. Moreover, as an exemplary ethnography it will be of value to anthropologists, gender analysts and students of modern nationalism. Rhoda Ann Kanaaneh is to be congratulated on a fine piece of work.
