Iran and the Challenge of 11 September

Seyyed Mohammad Kazem Sajjad-Pour is director general of the Institute for Political and International Studies in Tehran.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2024 in New York, Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C., marked a significant turning point in post–Cold War politics. The aftershocks of these events reverberated both inside the United States and globally, sweeping across a multitude of political actors in a variety of ways. New issues and questions are being debated in scientific, research and policymaking quarters, all of which deal with the nature of the international system, the workings of foreign policy, and the new array of forces in various regions of the world.

 

The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a neighbour of Afghanistan (which became the target of massive US military attacks), and for a variety of other reasons, was affected by the events that unfolded in the wake of 11 September. Moreover, the international role of Iran involves a variety of geopolitical, geo-economic and geocultural realities that invariably factor the country as a constant parameter into any international relations analysis.

 

The 11 September events brought international security and foreign policy discussions to the forefront of political debate in Iran. Various groups offered different opinions as to the proper course of action the Iranian government should take. Iranian academics and researchers proffered their own analyses of the post–11 September international system. These debates continue. There is no doubt that analyses of international events significantly enrich Iranian foreign policymaking. With this in mind, the present article seeks to evaluate the impacts of the 11 September attacks on the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

 

Three main questions arise in any such evaluation:

 

1. What are the implications of the events for the international system?

 

2. How will these implications affect Iran?

 

3. How has Iranian foreign policy evolved since 11 September and how ought it to evolve in the future?

 

In other words, these developments will have to be continuously reconsidered and reviewed from three perspectives: “their interpretation”, “their impacts” and “the reactions they elicit”.

 

This article suggests that first, the 11 September events were a watershed in the history of international relations. New actors have entered the system, traditional players have assumed new roles, old geopolitical rules have been revived and new soft/intangible parameters are in play. While the international environment is undergoing an unprecedented degree of securitisation, a new international agenda moulds and incorporates a combination of strategic considerations on identity, coalitions, alliances and terrorism. Second, the impact of 11 September on Iran has been enormous. It has translated into challenges and opportunities, internationalising Iran and encouraging greater interactions between domestic, regional and global variables affecting the country on a much more complex level. Third, Iranian policymakers are faced with new choices. In order to secure its interests, Iran will have to take a closer look at its capabilities and develop an integrated strategy based on its unique characteristics and identity.

 

 

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

 

 

Because of the United States’ sheer weight on the international stage, the repercussions of the 11 September attacks were felt around the world. In evaluating the scale of the impacts three perspectives have to be considered. The first holds that the post–11 September world will be completely new, everything having changed as a result of the attacks. The second perspective rejects the idea of a systemic change. Finally, the third perspective suggests a combination of continuity and change. From this latter viewpoint, the post–11 September world will be neither a continuation of the past nor a radical departure from history, but a combination of both. Certain dimensions of international relations have been transformed, while others remain intact. This third, comprehensive, viewpoint provides the analytical basis for this article.

 

The impacts of 11 September involve three sets of international relations parameters: actors, rules of the game, and the game environment.

 

Actors. Nation-states, intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and individuals have traditionally been seen as the primary actors in international relations. In the 1990s, the international relations literature predicted the waning of nation-states and the greater salience of NGOs. However, in the post–11 September period nation-states have reasserted their role as the guarantors of security; commensurately, the roles of other actors have become less significant, and this development, which harbours elements of the past, translates into new frameworks that will inevitably affect all international actors, including Iran.

 

Among international actors, the US government, owing to the peculiar situation confronting the United States, became more active on both the domestic and global planes after 11 September. Domestically, the government imposed restrictions on the traditional freedoms of US citizens—so much so that a host of pro–civil rights activists voiced serious concern. On the international front, the US government first sought revenge against Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda terrorist group and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that sheltered it. President George W. Bush’s administration scored a low-cost military victory in Afghanistan that translated into a more active global role for the United States.

 

The post–11 September words and actions of the US government had a considerable impact on Iran, as will be discussed later. What I wish to note here is the emergence of a new group in the international system that is known as “network players”. Network players are those actors who are not nations, states, international organisations or NGOs. They have been able to thrive on international communications and information technology to form global networks. Al-Qaeda is a case in point, an organisation that has members in fifty to sixty countries and rests on a complex web of political, financial and human interactions.

 

Rules of the game. The second series of post–11 September impacts concerns international rules of the game. Here again elements of continuity and change can be discerned. International rules of the game have traditionally been categorised as friendly or hostile, each involving a wide range of actions and reactions. In pre–11 September days, especially after two decades of successful United Nations efforts aimed at norm-building and the preparation of dozens of international agreements, the rules of the game were primarily friendly and multilateral. The world was heading towards a new type of peaceful multilateralism. This, of course, did not portend the absence of hostility and war; rather, the movement towards international co-operation had become more pronounced. The phenomenon of globalisation was encouraged by the spirit of multilateralism and international communications.

 

Multilateralism did not come to an end after 11 September. However, because of the actions of the US government, the rules of the game assumed a military dimension, which transformed the nature of international discourse as more hostile terms were adopted, e.g., “enemy”, “coalition”, “terrorism”, “war”, “occupation” and “attack”. Moreover, unilateralism became the order of the day. All these events affected the world community and Iran alike.

 

The game environment. The third group of post–11 September impacts relates to the international environment. Here, too, continuity and change are at work. The present situation reveals that the international system is still very much grounded in the post-1991 period of transition. However, the US component has become more pronounced in this picture and the United States is more determined to exert hegemony. Moreover, in the new environment, a combination of culture and military power is psychologically decisive. Cultural and ethical debates on the role of Islam and Muslims, American values, and differences between East and West, together with a readiness to resort to military force in the face of terrorism, are the main factors shaping the psychology of the international environment. In other words, the international system is beset by tensions, cultural commotion, and military confrontation.¹

 

These three groups of events have transformed geopolitics in unprecedented ways, especially in Eurasia, the main focus of military developments in the post–11 September period.

 

Moreover, the issue of identity has been introduced into international discourse. In the post–11 September period, the issue of cultural identity has received the attention of key strategists.

 

Finally, the twin issues of the United States’ management of international relations and the management of the US element in the international system by other actors, especially governmental actors, have assumed priority in the discourse of international relations.

 

 

THE IMPACT ON IRAN

 

 

The unprecedented interdependence of today’s world is due to gigantic leaps in communications and information technology. Consequently, the 11 September events assumed an electronic/digital dimension and the pictures of the collapse of the Twin Towers were broadcast around the world. Not only states such as Iran, but innumerable individuals worldwide were affected. The impacts of the events on Iran were exacerbated by such factors as proximity to Afghanistan, the peculiar state of Iran–US relations, the religious element in Iran’s domestic and foreign policies, Iran’s stance on the Middle East peace process, and finally, the issue of terrorism. Domestic factors also played a role, e.g., press coverage of the events and the stances of domestic political groups, which were much more salient in Iran than in any other Middle Eastern country. In order to assess the impacts of the 11 September events on Iran, the conceptual framework suggested earlier, that is, the evaluation of the actors, rules of the game and the game environment, will again serve as a guide.

Actors

Governments

Regarding the actors and their post–11 September impact on Iran three separate, yet interrelated, issues deserve attention. The first is the increasing role of governments in meeting national security imperatives. In other words, the nation-state gained strength as an institution in relation to civil society, and this affected Iran in a multitude of ways.

 

Thus, the Iranian government assumed a more active role in safeguarding national security. This role became even more pronounced subsequent to President Bush’s 29 January 2025 State of the Union Address, in which he identified Iran as being part of an “axis of evil” together with Iraq and North Korea. The speech caused alarm in Iran. Although there is no consensus on the issue, there exists a general belief that government’s powers should be increased in order to face the potential US threat.

 

Again, the government as an institution will have to be strengthened on a regional plane. Most governments of the countries neighbouring Iran sought extra powers under the pretext of fighting terrorism. In some cases, this fight took the form of suppressing the opposition or even imposing curfews. Although these developments did not affect Iran’s domestic system, the strengthening of dictatorial governments in neighbouring states will inevitably influence the course of Iran’s foreign policy.

Network Players

The second issue demanding attention is the emergence of “network players”. The impact on Iran’s foreign policy of these new actors on the international scene can best be discerned in the case of al-Qaeda’s trespassing into Iran’s territory. The entrance of al-Qaeda members into Iran challenged Tehran in an unprecedented way as these actors have high international mobility and are not restricted territorially. Consequently, Iran faced a dilemma: it had no control over the members of the al-Qaeda network, yet at the same time it had to comply with UN resolutions.

The United States

The third issue that must be considered is the unique position of the United States as an international player. That country was partially able to absorb the various blows of 11 September and to assume its most active international posture in the post–Cold War era. Iran was affected in several ways:

 

1. Washington’s dual approach towards Iran, first during the US military operations in Afghanistan, and then following the fall of the Taliban. Initially, Washington adopted a softer tone towards Iran as its co-operation in the Afghan campaign was needed. But with the Taliban out of the picture, Washington reverted to a negative attitude, and this was after Iran had played a pivotal role in precipitating the Taliban’s downfall in the context of UN-led actions. The shift in Washington’s stance bolstered the already existing perception of US unreliability in any possible Iran–US dialogue.

 

2. Iran’s domestic scene. Iran sympathised with the American people in the wake of the 11 September attacks. As a US attack against Afghanistan loomed, the view took hold in Iran that the opportunity for better relations with the United States should be seized and that the US attempt to resolve the problem of al-Qaeda and the Taliban should be supported. Whether to back US military action in Afghanistan became a heated national debate between various political groups. Iran’s official position, i.e., condemnation of the perpetrators of terrorism and compassion with the people of Afghanistan during US air raids, overshadowed the question of Iran–US relations but did not eliminate the topic from domestic debate.

 

President Bush’s later charge that Iran belonged to an “axis of evil” caused a serious reaction in the Islamic Republic, being viewed as a new act of intervention in its domestic affairs. The ensuing debates in Iran were compounded by the rivalries of various political groups.

 

The debates were between those who argued that the policy of “dialogue among civilisations”, the brainchild of President Mohammad Khatami, had clearly become passé, and those who favoured it as a means of neutralising US expansionism. The Bush administration’s words and deeds set off a new round of Iran–US confrontation, yet one of their main effects was on Iran’s national debate.

 

3. Security and military dimensions. Washington’s tone towards Iran turned hawkish as the possibility of attacking alleged supporters of terrorism was raised. Thus, the concept of “enemy” assumed a new meaning in the relations of the two countries. The Bush administration is clearly divided on Iran. The moderates, led by Secretary of State Colin Powell, are critical of the Islamic Republic, yet do not share the clear desire of the Rice–Cheney–Rumsfield troika for a military showdown with it. This divided, but largely hostile, US stance has not only led to a new phase in Iran–US relations, but has become a highly sensitive strategic debate on the international scene.

Rules of the Game

US Unilateralism

As regards the impact of the post–11 September international rules of the game on Iran, several points should be borne in mind. The first is that Washington’s unilateralism has raised concern in the international community. This unilateralism has its roots in intellectual and practical developments in the United States and is primarily based on military considerations. Second, unilateralism, because of its military and security dimensions, seeks to create specific foreign enemies. Third, US unilateralism is not pure in that Washington is still seeking to forge international alliances.

 

Given the above it can be deduced that although Iran is not central to the US decision to opt for unilateralism, it nonetheless constitutes one of Washington’s areas of concern. The reason why Iran is of concern deserves a separate analysis of its own. However, Middle East experts concur that the Washington–Tel Aviv nexus, the policies of Israel, and Israel’s American friends are to a considerable degree responsible for the United States’ adopting the stance it does towards Iran.

 

Another relevant consideration in weighing the post–11 September changes in the rules of the game is the global resistance to unilateralism and to the US posture against Iran. The international community, and the United States’ European allies in particular, rejected President Bush’s claim that Iran was part of an “axis of evil” with Iraq and North Korea. Opposition to US unilateralism represents the element of continuity in the international system. US unilateralism and its rejection by Europe is not a new phenomenon and has remained a bone of contention over the past two decades. However, this unilateralism intensified after 11 September and Europe has seized the opportunity to show its diplomatic discontent, not least over US policy on Iran. This does not mean that the Europeans altogether reject US concerns about Iran or are anti-American. The point is that they oppose unilateralism. The European Union is a multilateral institution and symbolises the rule of international co-operation. Therefore, the Europeans insist on co-ordinated actions rather than unilateral methods and decisions.

The War on Terrorism

Another factor to be considered is the new perception of the concept of war. War has always been one of the major rules of the international game, but its nature is changing. Depending on how its constituents—i.e., enemy, arms, war plans—have been defined, the shape and context of war have evolved and changed throughout history. After 11 September, terrorism was considered by both the United States and the world community as a major global security threat, and the war against terrorism was viewed as the prime adversarial rule of the game in international relations. What President Bush proposed and pursued after 11 September was a long-term, multifaceted and massive plan for a war against terrorism.

 

The war against terrorism requires new conceptualisations, the translation of those concepts into an operational language, a definition of ends and a clarification of the means to those ends. The West has started moving in this direction and in order to legitimise the fight against terrorism the old international-law frameworks of a “just war” have been deemed inadequate. Yet in some cases those same frameworks are resorted to.

 

So far as Bush’s war on terrorism is concerned, it is clear that Iran is near the top of Washington’s list of states that support terrorism. Despite the fact that the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks were citizens of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, and despite the fact that the Taliban were nurtured by the Pakistani military, it was Iran that Washington branded as one of the greatest supporters of international terrorism. The reason cited was Iran’s support for Palestinian and Lebanese groups. Iran now stands as one of Washington’s prime targets and this itself reflects both a continuation of trends following the 1979 Islamic Revolution and a major change caused by 11 September and the application of new frameworks to Washington’s traditional conception of terrorism.

The Game Environment

Geopolitics Reasserted

The 11 September events prompted what may be referred to as the “reassertion of geopolitics”. The great powers and other members of the international community concluded that regions that had been left to themselves in the post–Cold War world deserved greater attention. Afghanistan is a case in point. With the end of the Soviet occupation and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union itself, Afghanistan lost its international priority and became a playground of second- and third-rate powers such as Pakistan. Afghanistan was referred to as a “failed state”, along with other countries such as Somalia. Western policymaking circles, especially in the United States, paid virtually no attention to these countries. The 11 September events forced a rethink of this attitude, showing that the territory of “failed states” could be put to uses which could not be ignored.

Eurasia

In the context of this “reassertion of geopolitics”, Eurasia in general, and West Asia specifically, assumed increasing significance in the post–11 September era. Eurasia had been of interest to Western strategists for several years prior to 11 September. And President Bush had focused on Asia as a key foreign policy area, seeking greater co-operation with India, containment of China’s military might and full containment of Russia. But 11 September highlighted the full geopolitical significance of Eurasia and the potential for conflict in West Asia. The US military campaign in Afghanistan escalated tension between India and Pakistan to the level of a nuclear threat, and the danger of the spread of instability spurred heated strategic discussion about the region.

Military Bases

The reassertion of geopolitics also conferred new significance on the possession of military bases abroad. The United States could not have attacked Afghanistan without using the air space and territory of many countries. Although Washington employed sophisticated weapons, just as it had during its campaigns in Yugoslavia, Kosovo and Iraq, and thus incurred minimal casualties, access to military bases was a crucial factor. The establishment in Kyrgyzstan of what will become the United States’ largest foreign military base is the manifestation of this new geopolitical thinking.

Iran

All of the above developments in the international game environment will directly affect Iran. First, Iran’s geopolitical significance has increased because of the country’s position in Eurasia and proximity to geopolitical centres of tension. In no geopolitical debate can the Iranian element be disregarded; from the US campaign in Afghanistan to the future of Iraq, Iran’s geopolitics will have to be factored in.

 

Second, the reassertion of Iran’s geopolitical standing on the one hand and disregard of this reality by certain US strategic centres on the other will cause Washington’s policy on Iran to be confused. Bush’s Iran policy is the continuation and intensification of the containment introduced by his predecessor, Bill Clinton. But containment underestimates Iran’s geopolitical significance, and so with the current reassertion of geopolitical factors is likely to result in policy confusion and contradiction on the part of the United States.

Global Militarization

Iran will also undoubtedly be affected by the greater militarisation of the world, which in turn is due to the militarisation of US policies. (NATO’s secretary-general, George Robertson, has pointed out that in order to keep pace with the United States, European countries need to increase their military budgets.) The $400 billion US military budget is based on a peculiar perception of international relations and has contributed to the militarisation of the international environment. This militarised environment will affect Iran in at least three ways. First, Iran will become a US military target. Bush’s State of the Union Address in January was a clear indication of this fact, as were the Pentagon contingency plans, leaked to US newspapers in March 2002, for the possible use of nuclear weapons against seven countries, including Iran (the others were China, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Russia and Syria).

 

The leaked “nuclear posture review” marks a whole new development in US military thinking and in global nuclear history. Although US spokesmen stressed that the review was merely a contingency plan, and that there was no definite intention to use nuclear weapons against the seven countries, the very entertaining of such a possibility is extremely alarming. There is no doubt that if the 11 September events and subsequent militarisation of the United States’ international behaviour had not occurred, such ideas would have been less likely to be considered.

 

Another aspect of global militarisation that will bear upon Iran is arms proliferation in the Middle East. This region is becoming more violent and militarised, both structurally and situationally. Daily doses of violence in Palestine, the mooted US invasion of Iraq and US activities in eastern Afghanistan are among the factors contributing to the militarisation of the regional psychological environment in which Iran finds itself. Even before 11 September, the Middle East was more militarised than other regions, a factor that intensified its socio-economic developmental lag—a lag which has become even more pronounced in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks and will continue its downward spiral in the future.

 

Finally, global militarisation will increase the pressure on Iran to expand its military spending. Although Iranian officials have stressed that Iran is not militarily adventurous or a warmonger, the country will have to maintain its military preparedness, which will necessitate an increase in defence spending.

The Securitisation of Identity

Besides the reassertion of geopolitical factors and the greater militarisation of the international environment, a third issue deserves consideration: the worldwide securitisation of identity, a factor that will have complicated consequences for Iran. But what is meant by the “securitisation of identity”?

 

In the new environment and in its war against terrorism, the United States is stressing its values and norms. In the aftermath of 11 September, one of the main domestic debates in the United States centred on the questions, “Why have we been targeted?” and “Why do they hate us?” The mainstream response was that the United States was hated because of its “special values”. This viewpoint was echoed in the letter signed by sixty US academics backing President Bush’s war on terrorism. In that letter and similar declarations, it is claimed that the United States’ identity has been targeted by terrorists and that the identity of others is being indirectly threatened. Bush’s famous declaration that in the war on terrorism, “you are either with us or against us”, resulted to some extent from this outlook on the question of identity.

 

This type of self-perception will result in the securitisation of the identities of other countries. In this light, it is not only the military capabilities of others that constitute a threat to the United States, but also their identity. US unilateralism is to some extent rooted in the securitisation of the phenomenon of identity.

Civilisational Conflict

One consequence of this outlook is a new security polarisation that is no longer based on traditional sources of threat, but on culture and identity, in line with Samuel Huntington’s thesis of a “clash of civilisations”. Although not all statements made by US officials should be appraised in the context of Huntington’s views, similarities do exist. Given Iran’s attachment to Islamic culture and civilisation, the security implications for the Islamic Republic will be significant. Thus, Washington will embark on a massive social engineering exercise in the Middle East in order to encourage certain norms and values, while discouraging others. (Following 11 September, the US reportedly asked Saudi Arabia to limit the hours of religious teachings in the kingdom’s schools.) This US policy approach will translate into immense security dilemmas for the countries of the region.

“Axis of Evil”

A second consequence for Iran of the US securitisation of identity relates to the religious undertones of Washington’s security perspective. When George W. Bush refers to an “axis of evil”, he is not only securitising the identity of specific countries, but is also giving the conflict a religious dimension. By adding North Korea to the list, the Bush administration aimed to avert the impression that its quarrel was with Islam. But the very use of the term “evil” projects a religious picture on to the new security battle in which Bush is the saviour who fights the demonic powers single-handedly.

 

It should be noted that the concept of an “axis of evil” has not necessarily been accepted by the world or even by all ruling circles in the United States. The important point, however, is that the purpose of such terminology is to decrease the insecurity besetting US society since 11 September by stressing the superiority of America’s identity over that of the perceived enemy.

Regime Change

A third impact of the securitisation of identity has been the onset in conservative US circles of a debate focusing on the threat allegedly posed by Iran without due regard to the roles of various structures, individuals and orientations in the Islamic Republic. This debate urges a change of political regime in Iran and a “transition from Khatami”. It posits an identity picture of the Iranian government, securitises it and advocates its change. US proposals for regime change in Iran have repeatedly surfaced since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, but their recent shape is very new and is undoubtedly influenced by Washington’s success in toppling the Taliban.

 

Iran is by no means the sole country for which regime change is proposed. Under the banner of its “war on terrorism”, the United States has waged limited wars in several countries deemed to harbour terrorist networks. Besides unseating the Taliban regime and dismantling al-Qaeda’s operations in Afghanistan, the United States has conducted military operations in the Philippines, Somalia, Yemen and Georgia. In these operations, triadic concepts of identity, security and mission became tightly knit and are likely to remain so in what lies ahead.

 

In sum, it may be said that the post–11 September international environment has become more complicated. The emergence and processing of whole new concepts has militarised the world, placing the United States and the West on a confrontational path with other players. This new reality is creating a range of challenges and opportunities for Iran.

 

 

IRANIAN POLICY

 

The Initial Responses

What has Iran done and what must it do in this new environment? Three phases may be discerned in Iran’s response to 11 September:

Balanced Crisis Management

There is no doubt that 11 September precipitated a crisis of global proportions, during which Iran attempted to strike a balance between domestic, regional and international structures and forces. The main elements in Iran’s response were a condemnation of terrorism, satisfaction with the elimination of the Taliban as an anti-Iranian element, concern about US hegemony and the threat of regional instability, and internal differences of opinion over which direction Iranian foreign policy should take.

Limited and Optimistic Involvement

A second stage in Iran’s response to 11 September began when Afghanistan was liberated. Iran now hoped to become more involved in Afghanistan as an effective force for reconstruction owing to a variety of reasons, namely, cultural and geographical proximity and its assistance to the forces opposing the Soviet occupation and later the Taliban. This hope was soon dashed by President Bush’s harsh statements against Iran. This did not mean that Iran was completely ruled out of participating in the reconstruction of Afghanistan; what portended instead was the onset of a new period of interactions marked by Bush’s 29 January State of the Union Address, in which he identified the Islamic Republic as part of an “axis of evil”.

Peaceful Surprise

Having co-operated with the United Nations in ending Taliban rule, Iran was taken aback by Bush’s new approach. The unfriendly US posture was a continuation of past policies, but its latest harsh manifestation was unexpected. Reacting to President Bush’s statement, the Iranian government heavily stressed the importance of pacifism.

A New Approach

In the various stages of its post–11 September response, Iran has taken a defensive and measured stand with a view to controlling potential crises. What Iran needs is a new conceptualisation of the emerging international conditions that also meets its multilateral security needs. Any such conceptualisation must pay due attention to the actors, the rules of the game and the international environment.

 

As regards international actors, it can be maintained that despite the United States’ increasing role in global politics, the structure and distribution of power on the international stage will make it difficult for Washington to attain all of its objectives. The domestic and foreign policy limitations of the United States must be considered in any comprehensive assessment of international power.

 

Second, Iran is a regional and international actor to be reckoned with. Its position derives from a combination of strategic, symbolic and intangible/soft capabilities that undergird its power. Iran also enjoys notable cultural, intellectual and civil resources that enhance its security.

 

Third, Iran cannot capitalise on the divergence of views between Europe and the United States. There is no doubt that on a number of issues the stances of Europe, Russia, China and Japan differ from that of the United States, but these distinctions are not so pronounced as to drive the former countries into an anti-American coalition. Their differences with the United States are not structural but methodological, and will not force a rupture with Washington over Iran.

 

With regard to the rules of the game, Iran, while maintaining its defence readiness, must be careful not to provoke a military attack. The United States seems to have become an irritated actor willing to resort to military force in order to establish greater international control. The success of US military operations in Iraq, the Balkans and Afghanistan, and the sizeable hawkish element in Bush’s team, encourage his administration to believe that foreign policy objectives are attainable through military means. The new rule of the game for other international players is to prevent the United States from resorting to military force.

 

At the same time, Iran should draw upon the political and diplomatic avenues available to it. The fate of politics is never pre-determined and diplomacy can be an effective tool of international relations. Benefiting from its past experience, Iran can embark on serious diplomatic efforts to attain its goals, aided by the existence of significant international resistance to Washington’s aggressive unilateralism.

 

As regards the new international environment, the Iranian government must be cognizant of the fact that its power derives from the degree of its popular support and legitimacy. Issues of security and identity must be taken more seriously. The identity that Iran projects regionally and globally must be reconstructed so as to encourage a change of perspective in the United States as regards both Iran and Islam. This would ultimately enhance Iran’s security.

 

New diplomatic methods must also be contemplated, i.e., popular diplomacy, conference diplomacy, public relations diplomacy, ideational diplomacy, research co-operation diplomacy and media diplomacy. The US administration can undertake no military move without the support of public opinion. Bush’s military threats against Iran do not enjoy the necessary domestic and foreign support. Iran can benefit from the untapped intellectual, media, research and political resources that exist inside and outside the United States.

 

Diplomacy and image improvement, meanwhile, do not preclude defence and military readiness. What is crucial is to tend to those domestic and international potential assets that can enhance Iran’s security depth.

 

To conclude, I have argued that the post–11 September world is neither totally new nor totally transformed. It is against a backdrop of continuity and change that the greater role of nation-states in security spheres, the diminishing salience of NGOs, and the emergence of network players must be appraised. The United States is assuming a new role that has deeply changed the international rules of the game. Unilateralism, militarism and the securitisation of identity are the new challenges that must be confronted by all states, not least Iran. To do so, while paying proper regard to the need for military readiness, Iran should draw upon the intangible/soft ingredients of power in order to solicit the support of domestic and international public opinion. 

Endnotes

1. As one example of this cultural commotion, see “What We’re Fighting For: A Letter from America”, a declaration by sixty American scholars in support of President Bush’s “war on terrorism”, and two counter-statements opposing the war, one by American intellectuals (“Letter from United States Citizens to Friends in Europe”), the second by 153 Saudi intellectuals (“How We Can Coexist”). The text of all three letters is available at [www.americanvalues.org/].