Symposium: Islam, Iran and the Dialogue of Civilisations

On 12 July 2000, President Mohammad Khatami of Iran concluded an official visit to Germany by participating in a debate on dialogue among civilisations with the distinguished religious scholars, Hans Küng and Josef van Ess. The debate was chaired by President Johannes Rau of Germany. Below is an edited transcript of the discussion.

President Rau: Ladies and gentlemen, I welcome you to this dialogue in the Palace of Weimar. Here the President of Iran will take part in a dialogue which concentrates on understanding and communication between our nations and our different ways of life. I am very grateful that Professors van Ess and Küng agreed to participate in this dialogue. We will first ask our guest to put forward his views and then we shall proceed to questions, discussion and analysis.

 

President Khatami: In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

 

Mr President, distinguished professors, dear audience, I always find it delightful to be present among the educated and thinkers, but this particular gathering is even more pleasant and memorable because of the elevated status of German culture and thought and their chief symbol—Weimar.

 

More than a year ago at the European University Institute in Florence I referred to a necessity in today’s world. I said that dialogue among civilisations and cultures is a concept arising from continued efforts to get closer to the truth and to reach understanding. Dialogue is a logic that comprises talking and listening; “dialogue of civilisations” requires listening to other cultures and civilisations.

 

Today’s world is searching for a new basis on which to regulate human and social relations. Such a basis, in my view, is a dialogue in which East and West are not the subject of “dialectic” but parties to a conversation and partners in discussion. Dialogue entails a clear and precise understanding of the world’s cultural geography. It means taking a critical look at the “self” and the “other”. It means paying attention to heritage as well as being serious about learning new experiences. Dialogue concerns humanity’s needs today and tomorrow. Therefore, opening a new door towards understanding global realities, and finding new viewpoints in the East and West, are prerequisites of real dialogue between civilisations and cultures.

 

The basic question is, How can one find a common landscape to view, a common message to hear and a common language to speak? It is not possible to engage in dialogue with deaf ears and an unfamiliar language. One must enter dialogue on the basis of Eastern and Western values and transcend the rigid framework of moulded languages and professional slogans that characterise international encounters. Dialogue, before anything else, is a search for emotional contact and sincere trust. In the common global struggle for humanity’s spiritual development and material betterment the gap between Western and Eastern understanding is narrowed. Of course, this does not mean a merger or destruction of cultures and the disappearance of variety, plurality and cultural differences. Westerner and Easterner can remain different and complementary in the parallel realms of cultures and maintain their emotional affiliation to their origins. West and East are not only geographical regions, but also kinds of worldview and ontologies. In genuine dialogue, one can accept what is true in each outlook, highlight the better truths in each by accepting their capacities, values and developments, and in a changing world look for the common human element in the median between matter and spirit.

 

It should not be doubted that the significant role in true dialogue between cultures and civilisations is played by the learned, by thinkers and the formers of public opinion. Scientists, artists and intellectual elites are the listening ear and communicating medium of nations, representing their spirit and psyche. They can chart new paths towards a new horizon in the dialogue between East and West.

 

Allow me to use an example which, because of this city and gathering, is highly appropriate: the publication of Goethe’s West-östlicher Divan¹ in 1819. Besides the German name of the book with its significant use of the term divan [collection or assembly], Goethe also used the Arabic title Al-diwan al-sharghi lelmoallef al-gharbi [The Eastern book of poetry by the Western author]. The latter may in a sense be more expressive than the German title. In addition to indicating the author’s interest in the mysticism, language and culture of the East, it shows that this great German poet did not see East and West as geographical regions, but as two of the world’s cultural and intellectual poles. He tried as a Western poet to communicate with the East and in particular with the lofty peaks of Eastern thought and culture. Iranian culture and some of its most prominent representatives have a special place in Goethe’s imagery.

 

Hafiz is one such representative of Islamic and Iranian thought and identity. Iranians refer to Hafiz as “the tongue of the hidden”. He has a firm, deep and inspirational understanding of the Holy Qur’an and of the inner nature of our people. Our culture has manifested itself in him. There is a prophetic element in Hafiz. Through him, every Iranian finds an undiscovered part of his/her cultural memory. Goethe, even though he used only approximate translations, found “the tongue of the hidden” and established contact with him. Of course, this indicates Goethe’s genius, but it is also an example of the right goal and path for the dialogue of cultures, civilisations and nations.

 

Muhammad Iqbal [1873–1938], the great Persian-speaking poet, in his book The Message of the East in 1923, responded to the greetings Goethe had offered: Iqbal was born in the Indian subcontinent and spent all his life outside Iran’s geographical boundaries, but he saw himself as related to Iranian culture and wrote his poetry in Persian. Like Goethe, he believed that dialogue does not necessitate changing oneself to become as the other, but that it begins by understanding and accepting differences and the creativity of choice. Even though Iqbal lived in a colonised land (a “dead land”, in his words), he did not view Western culture solely in its colonial colours. He saw the West, irrespective of everything, as the land of thinkers such as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Tolstoy, Hegel, Marx, Byron, Comte, Einstein, Beethoven, Locke, Kant and Browning. Therefore, he made them speak together with the greatest of Eastern intellects such as Mowlana² and Hafiz, and tried to highlight the differences between Eastern and Western thought.

 

This dialogue between Goethe, Hafiz and Iqbal is a remarkable and genuine instance of dialogue between civilisations and cultures. The purpose of holding of such a dialogue is not just to satisfy an epistemological curiosity. Dialogue is carried out to discover the truth and to find salvation, understanding and co-existence. According to Hafiz, conflict and war stem from ignorance of the truth:

 

Excuse the war of the seventy-two sects, for they
having failed to see the truth, went astray.

 

Goethe similarly links knowledge with tolerance:

 

One who knows him/herself and others
will find out here
that East and West
are no longer separable.

 

Fortunately, many leading Western thinkers have shown that the tool of dialectic is not equally applicable in the fields of humankind and of nature. One cannot view one’s fellow species as natural objects. When man becomes the subject of enquiry we need another tool to know him, which can be interpreted as “understanding”.

 

Iranian and Muslim thinkers have a further message, and that is the necessity of knowing the “other” by knowing the “self”. Knowledge of the other makes us more knowledgeable about the self and knowledge of the self enhances our knowledge of the other. Because in the human realm, contrary to the realm of things, absolute otherness does not exist. And as long as we view other humans as non-absolute and consider them mere material objects, we cannot reach knowledge based on understanding—which is real knowledge in the human realm. From this angle one can obtain a fresh look at many basic issues of today, such as the relationship between modernity and tradition, freedom and justice, religious commitment and democracy, spirituality and progress. Nowadays in many Eastern and Western societies it is as if the issue of “modernity and tradition” had replaced that of “East and West” from the time of Goethe and Iqbal. The encounter between tradition and modernity, which is of cultural and civilisational significance as opposed to the mainly political significance of the encounter between East and West, is a basic concern in today’s world.

 

There was a time when poets who promoted colonialism, such as Rudyard Kipling, used to say that “East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet”. Today, the vision of a unipolar world and the dissolution of all cultures and civilisations into the dominant culture of the world is another expression of such a prejudiced and nation-oriented view. Goethe said, “The East is God’s, the West is God’s”,³ and Iqbal, as if to indicate the origin of the German poet’s inspiration, adorned his Message of the East with the Qur’anic verse that “East and West belong to God”.⁴ The objective of both poets is to show a point where East and West meet.

 

This common point of contact, in both views, is the divine origin of humanity. The feeling of estrangement that East and West have towards each other will be dissolved when each stops viewing itself as an absolute phenomenon and sees its “self” in relation to the “other” and in relation to this common origin. That is how East and West help each other towards perfection. If dialogue is to be propounded as a new chapter in the world it must transform its basis from negative tolerance to joint co-operation. No nation should be marginalised for any philosophical, political or economic reason; one must not just tolerate others, but also work with them.

 

Similarly, tradition and modernity can know neither one another nor themselves while each continues to view itself as absolute goodness and the other as absolute evil. The critique of tradition in our world is inevitable, as is the critique of modernity. But there is no doubt that the critique of either is impossible without first knowing its roots and foundations.

 

The history of thought in Germany evinces success in its treatment of tradition and modernity. German-speaking thinkers not only opened up new horizons in theology and the understanding of religion, but the development of modern thought in Germany has also been accompanied by attempts to explain its relation to tradition and to present a comprehensive viewpoint that encompasses both tradition and modernity and overcomes the confrontation between them.

 

German thought and philosophy, because of their historical emphasis, have always had a critical component. But because this critique has targeted not only tradition but also modernity, it has bequeathed a great intellectual heritage. The important currents in the critique of modernity have come from this land. This can open doors for today’s world because you can neither surrender totally to tradition or modernity, nor sacrifice one for the other.

 

The experience of the Islamic Revolution in Iran has also opened a new chapter. The new socio-religious system in Iran was established in order to answer humanity’s ever-changing needs and questions, and Imam Khomeini, the leader of this revolution, emphasised the principles of religion and the role of the people. The solution experienced in Iran today is the establishment of popular rule compatible with religious and intellectual principles and the development of a new civil society. This solution can, on the one hand, save Islam from the grip of rigid and regressive interpretations, and on the other, make the truth of Islam immune to capriciousness and isolationism. Reforms in Iran seek the realisation of freedom, justice and popular rule in compatibility with religion. In this experience, we need the co-operation and support of all thinkers and societies that believe in dialogue and understanding. We hope that this effort will help raise the level of dialogue and international relations and create a world devoid of violence, discrimination and domination.

 

Professor van Ess: Mr President, you likened the dialogue of cultures to a tool for reaching and getting closer to the truth. Here much importance should be given to the term “reaching and getting closer to”, because with dialogue one cannot suddenly know the truth; nor is this claimed in the definition of dialogue. When we speak of the dialogue of civilisations, we are essentially using a metaphor: cultures themselves do not speak. What we mean is that people speak to one another over and beyond the frontiers of their culture, or rather that it would be good if they did. The main precept here is understanding, mutual understanding. And this is a precept that has played a significant role in philosophy and the religious sciences in Germany. The main concern here is not so much incompatibility with the truth but rather misunderstanding, for in such a dialogue different kinds of misunderstanding arise.

 

A fundamental issue is the question of linguistic misunderstanding itself. In what language should dialogue take place? Obviously it would be better if it were conducted in the language of each culture. In my view one cannot standardise dialogue with everyone speaking, for instance, English. Terms, concepts, thoughts and ideas have been derived from a linguistic background and have developed historically. Unfortunately, Europeans do not know Eastern languages, but in the Eastern hemisphere people are more fluent in English, French and sometimes even German, and you, Mr President, are a good example of that.⁵ I believe it is necessary for German students to start learning Persian. I am aware of our limitations in this respect, but we must at least try to access the world of the language and thought of others. This is a brief summary of one instance of misunderstanding and a proposed solution.

 

President Khatami: Please allow me to say a few words about the useful remarks of Professor van Ess. In general I have no disagreement with him, but I wish to make a few points. If I said we get to the truth through dialogue, that is naturally based on the assumption that truth exists. If we believe from the outset that there is no truth or that truth is essentially relative, it would be meaningless for us to try to reach the truth. One of the issues that should be on the agenda of dialogue is this: is there truth or not? Of course, much has been said about this in the West. But if one believes that there is truth then the question arises as to whether or not we can have access to it. These are all views that have been expressed by Kant and others which basically question the credibility of our knowledge. If we believe truth exists and that man is in some way a recipient of that truth—as is accepted in our spiritual philosophy and fundamental Islamic thought and generally in the East—then it is possible to understand the truth.

 

I accept that man has a historical existence in time and space, that parts of man’s deeper interpretations and understanding are subject to changing and changeable conditions and that it cannot be claimed that whatever humans understand is the truth. But if we accept these two assumptions—that truth exists and that man can generally get to the truth—then the real aim of dialogue is understanding. Because misunderstanding is itself one of the important factors that distances us from the truth and transforms people with understanding into people who are at war and in conflict with one another. But in dialogue based on understanding and sincerity, I believe we can get closer to the truth.

 

The other point that Professor Van Ess alluded to is also correct: cultures deal with values. But I believe that—without getting into the discussion of whether or not values are deducible from fact, whether “ought” can be deduced from “is”, which is a topic in itself—I still believe that values have certain relations to realities and truths. One who stands by a value must already have a belief. That belief may be superstition, it may be a habit transmitted to him by others and it may be that he reached the truth through reason or observation. There is no value that does not have a dialectical basis—a basis that is not necessarily rational or philosophical. Therefore, even a discussion about values will turn into a discussion about the basis for values, and thus it would not be contradictory if we, in our discourse on cultures which focuses mainly on values, could arrive at some intellectual principles and find the truth.

 

The problem of language is an important one. As one Western thinker said: “Translation is treachery. One must try to minimise the treachery.” When there is no common language, understanding is more difficult, though I believe that in the world today verbal understanding has become easier, especially as many people in Eastern countries have learnt a Western language. Of course, there are also some in the West who know Eastern languages very well. For example, in our gathering here today I know three distinguished figures whose understanding of Arabic or Persian, if not deeper than that of Easterners themselves, is definitely not less. Professor van Ess has given us a valuable reminder about the importance of attempting to learn the language of the culture with which we wish to establish dialogue, and I fully support his view.

 

Professor Küng: Mr President, I agree with you and I would like to offer you my thanks, for the specific reason that it was you who proposed that the year 2001 be the year of dialogue among civilisations. This is important to me for two reasons. First, I believe that all present in this room would agree that the opposite outlook is false: the clash of civilisations, which in Germany is usually referred to as the clash of cultures, is preventable. It may be that there is confrontation in a town, in a street, in a school, in a family; but the great clash between Islam and the West, which Samuel Huntington has referred to in his book,⁶ is a meaningless and irrational claim.

 

The second important point is that your message found a receptive audience in the United Nations because it was the message of Islam. If this proposal had come from the West it could not have attracted the agreement of all parties in the United Nations. Therefore, this development is in my view a momentous one. And this is a message from Islam that there should be a dialogue of civilisations.

 

Moreover, I am very glad that you raised the question of tradition and modernity. The issue that exists for all three Abrahamic religions is that we have spent a very long time in the Middle Ages. Most of the traditions that we have belong to the Middle Ages and this is particularly true of Catholicism, Judaism and Islam. As Your Excellency pointed out, modernity is in conflict with much of tradition. Modernity, as we know, began with philosophers such as Descartes. Natural sciences began with Descartes, Kant and obviously with Galileo in the seventeenth century. So did new understanding about government; there was a new outlook and new thinking on democracy. The question I want to ask is this: why did this new thinking arise first in Christianity? Because it could have occurred in Islam, too. Modernity could also have arisen in Buddhism, in Japan, China or Iran. But it arose in Europe.

 

I think we should focus on a factor and a development here, which I point to not because our president is a Protestant but because it is a historical fact: modernity in its current form would not have been possible without the Reformation. The freedom of the Christian was a precondition of the individual freedom that modernity has brought about. As we know, there has been no reformation movement in Islam, although there has been one in Judaism (here we should remember Moses Mendelssohn [1728–86], who started it). Now we must ask for your views in this regard. Even though some reforms have taken place, Islam has generally remained as it was. As you said, there has been critical discourse in Europe about traditions, and there has even been such discourse about the Bible. Doing this with the Qur’an has not been possible in Islam. My question is this: what is the status of reformation in Islam? And in your view how will this develop in the future?

 

President Khatami: Professor Küng has raised some truly interesting points. I would like to discuss tradition and modernity in general and then we can examine them in the Islamic world. Tradition is our historical past. That means those wishing to know themselves must know their tradition and be bound by it. Tradition is a part of our lives, but sometimes customs and habits and what has developed over time or according to the needs of a group tend to persist and turn into prejudices which become problematic. Habits whose time has passed and which belong to another historical era can act as obstacles to humanity’s progress if they remain in place. Tradition, however, has a truth which is a kind of ontological connection. Depending from which angle and in what aspect of truth this connection is made, various traditions may come to be realised, all having the same root—unless we do not believe in truth at all.

 

In the West, even modernity did not mean doing away with tradition. But because the West wished to revoke the customs of the Middle Ages, it embarked upon the Renaissance. This was a kind of return to traditions from which the West believed it had been sundered by the Middle Ages—traditions which were the West’s true roots and which existed in Rome and Greece. The West established contact with these roots, and with this orientation towards tradition modernity was born.

 

However, the problem is that the West, I believe, was unfair in its critique of the Middle Ages. There were some notable aspects of the Middle Ages which man denied, and humanity suffered as a result. In the Middle Ages, because the prevalent belief was rejection of the world and an extreme attention to spirituality, the balance of man, which lies on the border between spirituality and materialism, was upset. Modernity came about through the rejection of this concentration on the spiritual at the expense of human, social and material concerns. Unfortunately, because it was a reaction to extremism, modernity itself went to extremes, namely, fascination by materialism. I believe the West now suffers from this imbalance and the abject condition of modernity is the cause of this crisis.

 

Just as some values became absolute during the Middle Ages and aspects of man were forgotten, with humanity losing its balance, so too in modernity, at the peak of its vanity, a number of values became absolute, aspects of man were ignored and certain imbalances came about. I do not wish to discuss this at length here. But I believe, as I have stated at other venues, that we are in need of two critiques, a critique of tradition and a critique of modernity. Tradition, too, is a human affair. Even if we believe that man can have relations with one absolute truth, he is not summed up by those spiritual and sublime aspects alone. Humans are earthly and historical creatures. Their understanding of the truth changes with the passage of time and change of location. Humanity should therefore constantly critique its views and traditions. But we should also critique modernity.

 

Perhaps some people in the East should do away with some of their prejudices. Unfortunately, the feelings of Easterners towards Westerners are coloured by the colonial face of the West. Much Eastern discontent with and concern at the policies of the West has spilled over to the intellectual and civil principles of the West. A kind of fighting the West—instead of fighting colonialism—was established, and wherever hate or infatuation arises, the ability to know and critique a truth is lost. If the East can rise above this problem and begin to separate the intellectual and valuable aspects of the West from its political aspects, I believe that Easterners can better critique Western civilisation. But Easterners should not be so prejudiced as not to critique their own tradition as well.

 

Islam, I believe, is in a way like Christianity in that there are critical outlooks and new thinking among Muslims. Prejudiced and reactionary outlooks also exist among Muslims—we cannot say that all Muslims think alike. But in any event, the ijtihad⁷ movement, in the general sense of the word, which has existed in parts of Islam, and particularly in Shi’ism, has laid the ground so that we can critique the past and look at issues from a new angle. Although we are bound by principles, we can look at the concerns of humanity today and even consider the questions of tomorrow.

 

This type of thinking has been particularly evident in Iran over the past hundred years. It has been there since the time of Seyyed Jamal-al-Din Asadabadi,⁸ It manifested itself during the Constitutional Revolution [1905–11] and throughout this period engaged in a kind of political war with all powers dependent on colonialism.

 

On critiquing the Qur’an, I believe one can have newer understanding of the Qur’an and religion. As has been witnessed throughout the ages, new interpretations have appeared with varying frequency. But a basic difference that goes to the roots is that Muslims believe that the Qur’an as it stands today is the same as it was revealed to the Prophet. By contrast, Christianity does not claim that whatever is in the Bible is the word of God as revealed to Jesus Christ. It acknowledges that human intervention has been at work in the compiling and interpretation of the Bible. Therefore, critiquing the New Testament or the Old Testament is much easier in the world of Christianity than is the equivalent sort of thing in Islam. Religion is the Word of God and almost all Muslims are in full agreement that the Qur’an is exactly as it was revealed to the Prophet. Therefore, there is a commitment to this framework for a Muslim. This difference does exist between Islam and Christianity, but that does not rule out new interpretations. As the Prophet said, the Qur’an contains seventy layers. He also said that different minds have different interpretations. In other words, ijtihad is one of the important pillars that can help the Islamic world in making new interpretations.

 

President Rau: Mr President, I would like to focus on what you said. In your introduction, you mentioned what the Islamic Republic has brought about and what it must still achieve. You said that the issue is to turn away from a regressive Islam which looks to the past, and that your belief is in governance based on Islam but at the same time rule by the people. My question is this: what if those two maxims, “based on Islam” and “rule by the people”, come into conflict with one another? What will happen nationally and internationally? In other words, what will become of the relations a religious government has with a world which has become pluralistic? Because our world is not only becoming more secular, it is also becoming more pluralistic. That means that the flood of information, communication facilities and the dangers of loss of identity are constantly increasing. How will a government which does not want to forgo its Islamic basis deal with such a society?

 

Again, governments today have to be assessed according to certain common principles—the Charter of the United Nations, basic human rights, freedom of speech and the press, and the protection of minorities. How will a religious government deal with these issues, a government which does not wish to lose its identity and become secular, as understood in the West?

 

President Khatami: First of all, I must point out that accepting change and establishing a reformation movement in a society do not necessarily require that we must accept one hundred per cent values that are accepted elsewhere. In other words, Westerners who have certain values and principles cannot say that whoever accepts their values and principles is a reformer and whoever rejects them is regressive. This goes against the necessary condition of dialogue that different realities have to be accepted and that one should not seek to dictate any values as absolute. Why should we say that the superior value is secularism and that the world is moving towards secularism? Is this not the same dangerous and destructive claim as Mr Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis,⁹ according to which world history has fulfilled itself in Western liberalism, and the whole world should accept this ideology?

 

Such absolutism and the resultant pride create many problems for humanity and destroy the truth. There should be no definitive expectation that our criteria are based on the likes or dislikes of Westerners. While we grant that we should respect the West, the West should also respect the East. We should draw from the West as well as from our own achievements. But we should discard the mentality that equates reform and transformation with nothing but values accepted in the West. I do not believe that secularism is the final stage of humanity’s evolution.

 

On the question of differences between factual and value-related issues, there is much to be said. I believe that many outlooks change. For example, in Islamic societies, have not views on women and their rights changed in the past fifty or one hundred years? Are such views in the Islamic Republic of Iran the same as those of the Taliban [regime in Afghanistan], whose mentality is that of four to five hundred years ago? Such transformations are possible considering changes in time and location.

 

I would like to note the outlook of the late leader¹⁰ of the Islamic Revolution. He said, “Islamic governance is an important matter. The basis of Islamic governance—of a society that wishes to have its system based on Islam—is the good of the people, and if the good of the people comes into conflict with even the most basic tenets of Islam, then ignore the tenets for the good of the people.” This is a very, very important attitude. Even religious tenets cannot stand against the clear good of society.

 

Professor Küng: Therefore, the point is that religion, where it contravenes the interests of humanity, should be modified; it should be modified where it does not afford humanity its rights. The question of women was mentioned here, but for us the question of minorities is definitely more important. In this gathering, we as friends of Iran and of Islam ask the question, How are minorities treated in Iran? Take, for example, the conviction of those Jews in Iran.¹¹ There is the impression that their being Jews was a factor in their convictions. We, too, in Germany (and I hope you will not think of this as polemical) have a religious community which consists of Bahais. And originally they came from your country. I am aware that the issue of the Bahais is a very difficult and complicated one for all Muslims. I would be very glad if you stated your views concerning this small group. Of course, this is difficult, because they have introduced a new prophet after Muhammad, which a true Muslim could never accept. But as we know, they are a harmless group, they have suffered very much and many of them have been executed. I would just like to raise this subject with you as a petition. I hope these minorities, whether Bahais, Christian or Jews, can find in you a protector.

 

President Khatami: This in itself is a valuable experience: that someone like Professor Küng, who is among the great intellectuals, should speak like the foreign minister of a country. The points raised by Professor Küng are the product of propaganda and rumours that unfortunately are directed against the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the world generally and particularly in the West. I did not wish to discuss these matters at this gathering. They should be discussed at press conferences. Here I wished to discuss the dialogue of civilisations and related issues.

 

Professor Küng did not even ask, but judged, by stating that those convicted were found guilty because they were Jews, or that Bahais had legal problems because they were Bahais. I would be glad if you as a professor who always presents documented arguments could also provide the evidence for these claims. If, heaven forbid, they were proven to be true, then we would have to correct ourselves. However, this is not the case.

 

So far, we have arrested many spies. A great many of them were Muslims. Usually we either executed Muslim spies or gave them life sentences. In the early years of the revolution even a high-ranking official was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment. (His sentence was later reduced.) The group that has been arrested now includes some Muslims, too. When I am asked about the Jews, my response is to ask whether, if those arrested had been Christians or Buddhists, would the Islamic Republic be under so much pressure? If an African, or a non-Jewish Iranian, was arrested, would there have been so much pressure on the Islamic Republic? Are these pressures due to the accused being Jews or due to their trial? There is no discrimination against them. Let me say that our courts are quite independent and are not influenced by the executive at all. Neither do we, as the executive organ, interfere. There may be likes or dislikes but there is no interference. These people were arrested on charges of espionage and the rulings on them, if I remember correctly, have been less punitive than against those who were convicted on similar charges and were Muslims. Also, there is an appeals procedure to which they can resort, and then there may be a new ruling on them.

 

On Bahaism, let me say that it is not officially recognised as a religion in Iran, but Bahai or not, they are Iranian citizens and their rights ought to be protected. The president, who sees himself as responsible for the rights of Muslim citizens, also sees himself as responsible for the rights of Bahai citizens. Although the death penalty is not pleasant, in every country citizens are tried and sentenced according to the laws of that country. In Iran, if a Bahai or non-Bahai committed a crime carrying the death penalty, then they were duly executed.

 

Professor van Ess: There is no doubt that Iran has the right to find its own path. That is non-negotiable. Every nation goes its own way and there is no reason why Iran should accept Western values, because Islam has values of its own. Moreover, we have many values in common and we discover these in discussion. In my view, debate arises when a hierarchy of values is proposed. The highest values in the two religions and the two societies are different. The highest value in the West is freedom and the highest value in Islam is justice, social justice.

 

I believe there is a difference of opinion about the term “secularism”. We Germans believe secularism leaves people free in religious matters and that government is there to ensure this freedom. But a Muslim has a different view and outlook. We must not forget that even within Europe examples differ. The French example is different from the German one. France has experienced an atheist era and has had positivism in the twentieth century, experiences which have had historical repercussions. This must be attended to in discussion.

 

In my view, language can lead to misunderstanding. Therefore, I ask if there can be dialogue in which language is set aside. Who should conduct this dialogue? Theologians, of course, philosophers and those involved in cultural studies. But they should not be the only ones. How can we reach wider groups of people? Can we engage in dialogue with pictures and/or the arts? Goethe and Hafiz are good examples. Hafiz had passed away, but Goethe understood him well, because they were poets. When I think of pictures it reminds me of the very good Iranian cinema. Iranian films show how Iranian people live and think. I do not know if they still show these films in Germany, but they used to in the past. Would it not be possible for television to broadcast the films of other countries so that peoples can see each other? The path to understanding is long but this may make it a little easier.

 

President Khatami: I agree that in expressing the inner realities of humanity art is more honest than language. Artists and art have an effective role in the contact between nations and cultures and the dialogue between them.

 

Professor Küng: First, let me say that I did not speak as the foreign minister! I’m not sure about the quality of the interpretation here. I did not wish to claim that Jews have been tried for being Jews. But I do not wish to pursue this topic. I want to discuss a positive topic. It was highly appropriate that in your opening talk you mentioned that the world is in search of a serious basis for co-existence. Obviously, this issue has preoccupied us all in the era of globalisation: we will not achieve progress without universalising morality.

 

Please, Your Excellency, tell us where you see common criteria between Islam and Christianity. I believe there are such commonalities and it is obvious that we should benefit from them so that the three million Muslims living in Germany can continue their lives without self-denial. You also have lived in our country and have wide experience. Now, in your present position, how would you answer this question?

 

President Khatami: I am grateful for the points raised by Professor Küng. Allow me to make one point about globalisation. Given the state of communication and the removal of barriers, the impact of countries and systems on one another, be it economic, political or cultural, is increasingly enhanced. Minds and ways of life tend to converge. In this sense men are becoming more globalised and have more in common. But there are also other interpretations of globalisation, which we must avoid. One is philosophical and scientific, meaning that the world should acquire one culture and that diversity should disappear. This would mean the death of man’s progress and of the evolution of humanity. I believe we want a world that has commonalities, co-existence, but that also has differences and variety. We must strive to ensure that there is no conflict between these differences.

 

Together with economic and political globalisation, identification with local cultures and religions has been on the increase. It may be that with the rush of globalisation and the possible merging of cultures, local traditions have felt threatened and have therefore started a return to the “self”. We can see the strengthening of local cultural principles in the world. Today, the sensitivity displayed by the French about their own culture, for instance, is much greater than that expressed thirty, forty or fifty years ago. A similar sensitivity is seen in the newly independent countries of Central Asia, the Caucasus, Africa, Asia or other places where cultural identity is an issue. Therefore, I believe humanity cannot accept a merger of cultures into one another, nor is it good for humanity to do so.

 

Also very dangerous is the political interpretation of globalisation—that is, world affairs being run according to the interests of the power which possesses the most scientific, material, informational and military facilities, the world being governed by one pole which issues orders for everyone else to obey. This particular interpretation of globalisation exists in the minds of some politicians. To save humanity from politicians who seek their usual interests, thinkers must come forward and prevent this calamity. Of course, nations will not surrender to big powers just because their own technology and facilities are inferior.

 

In ethics, too, globalisation may lead to a narrowing of the gaps. In a borderless world, we cannot have people with completely opposite value systems and conduct. We should automatically seek certain standards in the framework of which all peoples can live in understanding, but maintain their own values, without leading to any confrontation with others.

 

Concerning what can be done regarding relations between Protestantism and Islam, you as a theologian are well qualified to put forward proposals. It is up to specialists in religions to show the way in finding dialogue and solutions between Protestantism and Islam, or Catholicism and Islam, or Buddhism and Islam, or Judaism and Christianity. But I believe there is much in common between the monotheistic religions.

 

We as Muslims have an easier task in accommodating Christians than vice-versa, and that is because we believe Jesus Christ was a Prophet of God and that he was divinely inspired. We see one root in all divinely inspired religions and believe all Abrahamic religions have the same nature. As we respect our own Prophet, so we also respect Jesus, Moses and Abraham as Prophets of God who conveyed to humanity the same truth as did our Prophet. Therefore, Christianity, despite our differences, is accepted as a religion of God; we have common values and can accommodate Christianity.

 

Such accommodation is rather more difficult for Christians, who do not believe in a messenger after Christ, or for Jews, who believe the messiah has not yet come. They should try to recognise Muslims, as Muslims recognise them, so that understanding and, God willing, achievement of common standards is made possible.

Endnotes

1. “West–Eastern Collection.” This book of poems was inspired by Goethe’s reading, in 1814 at the age of sixty-five, a recent German translation of the work of the great Persian poet, Muhammad Shams al-Din (1326–89), known as Hafiz. (This and all subsequent endnotes to this symposium are the editor’s.)

 

2. “Our Master”, an honorific title for Jalal al-Din Rumi (1207–73), one of the greatest of Persian mystics and poets.

 

3. The opening lines of “Talismane” (Talismans), from the West-östlicher Divan.

 

4. Sura 2:109.

 

5. President Khatami has lived in Germany and speaks German, English and Arabic besides his native Farsi.

 

6. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

 

7. In Islamic jurisprudence, the exercise of independent judgement, unbound by case law or precedent.

 

8. Writer and liberal religious leader, also known as al-Afghani (1838/9–97). He urged the adoption in Iran of certain Western social and political reforms in an Islamic context.

 

9. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, The National Interest, no. 16 (summer 1989).

 

10. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, 1902–89.

 

11. In the summer of 2000, ten Iranian Jews and a number of Iranian Muslims were convicted of spying for Israel. The Jews received prison terms ranging from four to thirteen years. An appeals court later cut the sentences by several years, reducing the maximum term to nine years.