GLOBAL DIALOGUE
Volume 9 ● Number 1–2 ● Winter/Spring 2007—The Rise of China China’s Role in Central Asia: Soft and Hard Power
Such reasoning seems remote from reality; all the indications are that China’s expansion into the markets and politics of Central Asia is peaceful and has clear limitations. It is evident that Central Asia is a key concern of Chinese foreign policy, following closely behind other fundamental issues such as Taiwan and the “one-China” principle that the island should not be recognised as politically independent of the mainland. The last decade has seen an expansion of military co-operation between China and the neighbouring Central Asian states, especially as regards counter-terrorism and military confidence-building measures. Economic co-operation, integration, and infrastructure projects have also been priority concerns of Beijing. Chinese investment in the economies of Central Asia and bilateral trade are growing rapidly, and China looks to Central Asia to reduce its energy deficit, diversify its energy imports and transit routes, and increase its energy security. Yet there are limits to China’s influence and control over economic and political developments in the region.
Russia is still the major regional power in Central Asia, but its influence is declining rapidly despite a recent surge in activity to consolidate its position. Since 2005, Russia has pursued an aggressive strategy to regain its lost influence and economic position, with marginal success. Much of the Russian failure is due to more intense competition from China, and increased Chinese attractiveness in the political, economic and military spheres. But no Central Asian state would like to exchange Russian domination for Chinese, preferring to keep as many options open as possible.
Even though Russia and China are co-operating to marginalise the influence of other external actors in Central Asia, and most notably that of the United States, Moscow views with suspicion China’s engagement in the region—a suspicion shared by India, the United States and the European Union. It is becoming apparent that Beijing’s desire to increase its economic influence in Central Asia will create tensions with other interested powers. This is especially true if Iran and its commerce with China become attached to the Central Asian network through transit trade, energy pipelines and political and military co-operation. In only a decade, China’s political and economic might has grown tremendously, and Beijing will increasingly be able to influence the Central Asian states through military sales, exercises, and other inter-state military relations.
The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, consisting of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, has been the primary facilitator of current trends and is likely to feature prominently in the future integration of the region and also in handling any conflagrations that may occur there. It is true that much of China’s policy in Central Asia is conducted directly via bilateral relations. However, it is in Beijing’s interest to create a stronger Central Asian community with stable and peaceful relations that could foster better multilateral co-operation. This would help to secure China’s own borders, but also to improve communication links, pipelines and trade in general, for all of which a stable and peaceful Central Asia is necessary. The particularities of the region have also spurred a Chinese policy of exploiting the natural synergy that exists between western China and Central Asia. Close to 80 per cent of China’s trade with Central Asia is conducted by Xinjiang, indicating the importance Central Asia has for this westernmost Chinese province. SecurityThe primary factor driving Beijing’s engagement in Central Asia is the need to stabilise the situation in Xinjiang, decrease the economic marginalisation of the latter’s ethnic Turkic Uighur population, and secure China’s western borders against external support for the putative Islamic fundamentalist and separatist movements in the province. Beijing has made Central Asia an integral part of its “develop the west” programme, in which major economic redistributions from urban eastern China to the Chinese west, primarily Tibet and Xinjiang, have aimed to consolidate national unity and decrease incentives for separatism.
The security situation in China’s west has been a marker in Beijing’s political and military relations with Central Asia, and especially with the states that share a border with the People’s Republic. Beijing has claimed that Uighur separatist movements are supported by international terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda—a claim backed less by evidence than by emotion. Although it has been established that some Uighurs have been trained by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, possibly even a few hundred, it is far from the more than one thousand that the Chinese government claims. It is, however, true that some militants have entered China, and support and new recruits are believed to travel from Konduz in Afghanistan via Osh in Kyrgyzstan to Kashi in Xinjiang. This has made Kyrgyzstan central to the struggle against the “three evils” identified by China and other members of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (separatism, terrorism and fundamentalism).
Regardless of the size of the terrorist and separatist threats allegedly faced by China, internal security is of the utmost importance in its policy towards Central Asia and is an essential component in all Chinese activities in the region. Support for a sixth Central Asian state, “East Turkestan” (an old name for Xinjiang), is widespread among the peoples of Central Asia, even if not shared by their governments. Much of China’s attention in Central Asia has therefore been focused on reducing support for separatists in Xinjiang. And Beijing has in fact found in the Central Asian states five very willing partners in the struggle against Muslim fundamentalism. As all states in Central Asia face similar struggles against Islamic movements, they have concerted their efforts to counter these elements, fundamentalist or not. The success of this co-operation from Beijing’s point of view is perhaps most evident in the hardline approach adopted by the Kazakh government against suspected separatists among the Uighur refugee and diaspora community in Kazakhstan. The actual threat these groups pose to the integrity of the Chinese state may be questioned, but the issue is nevertheless important in shaping Beijing’s foreign policy.
Beijing’s security concerns are not confined to the integrity of the Chinese state: they also include the domestic security of neighbouring states in Central Asia and the individual governments’ stability and even survival. Beijing has assisted in safeguarding these states, either indirectly through political support or directly through military co-operation. This is because a Central Asia in disarray would directly affect China’s military security as rebels would be able to seek and obtain support from neighbouring states. Rebels could also damage China’s economic ties and disrupt trade, and perhaps more importantly, oil and gas flows. Consequently, stability has been a key concern for the Chinese government in its relations with Central Asia. In pursuit of regional stability, China has carried out numerous anti-terrorism exercises with the Central Asian states. During the autumn of 2006, China staged exercises with both Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, while Russia held similar manoeuvres with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
Political developments in Central Asia also have implications for Chinese policy in Xinjiang—which is one reason why the 2005 popular revolt in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan was so disturbing for Beijing. If the Central Asian states move towards democracy, this would complicate Beijing’s and Moscow’s relations with them as both governments fear a spillover into their own countries of demands for greater freedom. The current authoritarian climate in Central Asia also gives China and Russia leeway in influencing and supporting the ruling regimes from which the West has distanced itself, thereby reducing the ability of reformist forces to promote their cause. As China is perceived by the Central Asian regimes to be a more trustworthy ally than the West because of its strict adherence to a policy of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs, it has managed to strengthen its position at the expense of both Europe and the United States.
This was most clearly seen in the summer of 2005 as Uzbek security forces cracked down on an uprising in the eastern Uzbekistan city of Andijan. It is still uncertain how many people were killed in the violence, but the balance of influence clearly shifted in favour of China and Russia. Washington’s criticism of the Uzbek regime for its handling of the anti-government protests ultimately obliged the United States to withdraw from the Karshi-Khanabad airbase that it had used for its military operations in Afghanistan. Following the US expulsion from Uzbekistan, China and Russia seized the opportunity to consolidate their political influence by extending their support to the Uzbek government. In this regard, the non-democratic status quo in Central Asia or even a development towards greater authoritarianism seems to be the preferred option for China, as it is indeed for the governments of the various Central Asian states, an outcome that would of course preclude any hope of a regional tilt towards the West. EnergyThe question of energy is also fundamental to China’s Central Asia strategy. Beijing has determined that energy security is a prime strategic goal for China and has taken far-reaching measures to reduce the country’s vulnerability here. In 1993, China became a net importer of oil, and with its internal energy resources diminishing and its industrial base rapidly growing, the People’s Republic will become increasingly dependent on external energy supplies.
The current transit route for energy imports from the Middle East to China is through the Malacca Straits, the narrow stretch of water separating peninsular Malaysia from the Indonesian island of Sumatra. This is an extremely vulnerable transit point for China, for if it were cut off, much of the country’s oil supplies could be blocked. In the event of conflict, it would be easy for the United States or even India to disrupt China’s energy supplies by imposing a naval blockade of the Malacca Straits. As China does not possess an expeditionary naval capacity, it would simply be unable to resist such a move militarily. The solution for Beijing, therefore, is either to develop a longer naval reach, or to diversify China’s energy imports and network of transit routes, or both.
China’s reliance, moreover, on a few energy exporters in the Middle East makes the People’s Republic vulnerable to political disputes in this volatile region. China could be forced to balance its concerns over energy security with political pressures from external powers, most notably the United States. Chinese industry and foreign trade could be severely affected by regime change or military conflict in any of China’s chief Middle Eastern energy suppliers. Additionally, energy trade with the Middle East comes attached with a $2-per-barrel premium that has been a heavy burden on Chinese imports. More diversified oil and gas imports, with some healthy competition between the exporting countries, could potentially decrease this premium.
For the above reasons, China is wise to seek to diversify its energy imports. Central Asia, together with a few other states and regions, is crucial in this endeavour. A stake in oil and gas fields in Kazakhstan, Iran, and potentially Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and the Caspian is extremely valuable to the Chinese government, which has put much effort into realising this. Both state-owned and private companies have purchased equity shares in Kazakhstan, Iran and lately Russia to diversify China’s strategic energy base. China has even tried to acquire American assets, as seen in the attempted 2005 purchase by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation of Unocal, the eighth-largest US oil and gas production company. The deal was, however, blocked by the US Congress because of the perceived strategic threat posed by China’s global equity acquisitions in the energy sector.
China is also constantly seeking alternative routes for its current and future oil and gas transports. As the Chinese-constructed Gwadar port in Pakistani Baluchistan opens, China will acquire a much-needed outlet to diversify its energy imports, diminish security risks, and reduce transaction costs. China has devoted much time and effort to developing an overland energy and trade corridor running from Xinjiang via the Kulma pass in Tajikistan and the Karakorum highway in northern Pakistan down to Gwadar on Pakistan’s south-west coast, near the Persian Gulf. If the Karakorum highway is upgraded and security can be guaranteed in Baluchistan, this corridor could indeed be a major component in China’s energy security, although that will require greater economic commitment from all the governments involved.
The priority China attaches to the energy potential of Central Asia is probably best exemplified by the record time in which the Atasu–Alashankou pipeline between Kazakhstan and Xinjiang was constructed. This landmark project in Sino-Central Asian energy relations began pumping oil in December 2005 and was completed in just ten months, thanks largely to the economic and political commitment of China. When the pipeline link between Kumkol and Kenkiyak in central Kazakhstan is completed, China will also have a direct link to the oilfields in northern Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea. Trade and InfrastructureChina makes no secret of its attempts to win trade advantages in Central Asia, advantages that can only be won at the expense of Russia, primarily, but also Europe and the United States. According to Chinese customs statistics, the trade volume between Central Asia and China increased from a total of $465 million in 1992 to $7.7 billion in November 2005. This is a tremendous growth, especially as no other country has been able to achieve a similar trade expansion with the Central Asian nations. China’s share still amounts only to approximately half of Russia’s trade with the region but is rapidly gaining ground on the latter in relative terms. China’s trade with Central Asia is primarily in natural resources, especially oil and gas, while Russia dominates the arms sales to the region.
Although the Chinese trade with Central Asia has increased rapidly, it should be put in perspective. Bilateral trade with Central Asian nations amounts to no more than 1 per cent of China’s total foreign trade and is focused on a few key resources. This relatively small trade is essentially with China’s western provinces, and it is estimated that up to 80 per cent of it is conducted through Xinjiang alone. The trade is also heavily disproportionate on the Central Asian side: close to 80 per cent of it is with Kazakhstan, while Turkmenistan accounts only for 1 per cent. In sum, the bilateral trade links are heavily concentrated on the border between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan. Beijing has been trying to involve other Chinese regions in trading with Central Asia, but the heavy emphasis on energy imports to China and the export advantages Xinjiang enjoys over other Chinese provinces mean the imbalance is likely to continue.
Central Asia also has a role to play as a transit region in China’s foreign trade. As the major trade gains to be won for China lie in reducing transaction costs with Europe, its largest foreign trading partner, Beijing has heavily promoted continental overland trade corridors. Transaction costs could be slashed if an effective land communication and transport corridor between China and Europe were established. Consequently, Beijing hopes to create a second Euro-Asia land bridge that would connect China, Central Asia and Europe. (The first Euro-Asia land bridge is the Trans-Siberian railway.) Currently, some 95 per cent of China’s trade with Europe is conducted through a complicated and costly system entailing road, rail and sea links. Delivery times via these routes can be anything from twenty to forty days, but if the proposed second Euro-Asia land bridge is realised it could cut the current transport time down to eleven days. Needless to say, this would make Chinese trade with Europe even more competitive, and make Europe a more attractive trading partner for China.
Besides the economic gains, a competitive overland communication network would tie China closer to both Central Asia and Europe. The transit fees accruing to the Central Asian states would give them a significant economic boost and also ensure the political interest and engagement of both China and Europe in stabilising and developing the region.
China has also invested substantially in developing a viable infrastructure linking Xinjiang with the neighbouring Central Asian nations. A railway between China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan has been planned, but its huge costs are prohibitive. China has improved its link with Kyrgyzstan by renovating the Osh–Sarytash–Irkeshtam highway running from the Kyrgyz south to the border of the People’s Republic. The China Development Bank has financed with a $30 million grant the Norak tunnel under the Shar-Shar pass in central Tajikistan. China has also helped develop Kyrgyzstan’s power stations and power-transmission lines, both within Kyrgyzstan and across the border to Kashgar in western China. The same applies to Kazakhstan, where the China Development Bank has assisted in constructing power-transmission lines to Xinjiang and in modernising power plants such as those in the north-eastern Kazakh town of Ekibastuz. Soft PowerIn comparison with China’s extensive use of soft power in South-East Asia, Central Asia has seen little of Beijing’s heavy promotion of Chinese culture, expenditure of diplomatic goodwill, and support of educational exchanges. Nevertheless, China’s ancient culture still has considerable influence on Beijing’s current relations with the Central Asian states, even if not always in a positive way as some still view China in relation to its historical military involvement in the region.
Of more immediate impact is the export of Chinese popular culture. Chinese music, films and consumer goods are increasingly popular in Asia as a whole, especially among the young. China (and to certain degree the United States and Europe) has become a direct competitor in Central Asia to the old cultural hegemony of Russia. This is despite the fact that China has put little effort into promoting its culture in the region. Its growing influence has rather been the result of the personal contacts that blossomed after the Central Asian republics gained their independence, giving people previously separated by a Cold War frontier the opportunity to visit their ethnic kin.
Given China’s promotion of its culture and Confucian heritage elsewhere in the world, it seems as if Central Asia has been neglected. For example, China has established twenty-six Confucian Institutes worldwide to increase understanding of the Chinese language and culture, but to date there are no Confucian Institutes in Central Asia. Neither is there any university in Central Asia with a strong Chinese connection, despite the growing links and synergy between China and Central Asian nations. There are more than 110,000 foreign students in China, of whom approximately 48,000 are from South Korea and Japan. But the number of students from Central Asia is low, and Central Asian nations tend to award scholarships to study in Turkey rather than in China.
All this is in contrast to the massive influx to China of tourists and traders from Central Asia, indicating that both the Chinese economy and Chinese culture do have something to offer the peoples of the region. The Kashi Trade Fair of Xinjiang and South and Central Asia, an annual event inaugurated in 2005, is one of the most popular business venues in this regard, although both Central Asian and Chinese shuttle traders cross the borders daily. With the Taklimakan desert forming the centre of Xinjiang, the province’s population is concentrated in the border regions with Central Asia. This has facilitated crossborder traffic, and the number of border crossing-points into the Central Asian states, as well as informal trade, has increased in recent years. Chinese influence as a result is perhaps most evident in the Central Asian bazaars, where Chinese goods (legal and illegal) are bartered to the beat of Chinese music from loudspeakers. However, the Russian influence is comparatively much greater and in some states, such as Kyrgyzstan, the Russification is notably strong.
In an attempt to strengthen its soft power, China has established trading houses to facilitate commerce and increase contacts in Central Asia. China Radio International is also paying greater attention to the region, now broadcasting twenty-four hours a day. Transmissions to Kazakhstan, especially, have increased in length and quality over the last few years, with programmes directed towards winning the hearts and minds of the Kazak population. While China’s growing power and influence may arouse fear and apprehension in the West, developing countries take a much more positive view of the People’s Republic, and the Central Asian states are no exception to this tendency. Kyrgyzstan alone remains wary of Chinese influence and harbours a fear of Chinese expansionism.
At the political level, there have been numerous parliamentary exchanges between China and the Central Asian states. Representatives from the Xinjiang branch of the Chinese Communist Party travel frequently to Central Asia, and Chinese delegations have visited the parliaments of Central Asia to learn about their procedural practices. It is difficult to assess the impact of this on China’s soft power in the region, but it seems evident that Beijing’s unrelenting support of the Central Asian governments has created a larger degree of political trust than any other measure.
All in all, the shuttle trade, growing people-to-people contacts, and historical ties have served to reinforce the natural synergy that exists in the region, even though China’s burgeoning influence has caused some unease there. China needs to improve its soft power to offset concern about its size and rapid economic and political growth. This is especially true if China is to succeed in combating Uighur “separatism”, a cause that still enjoys support among the peoples of Central Asia.
There are limits, therefore, to the impact of all the positive developments discussed above in Sino-Central Asian co-operation on energy, trade and infrastructural projects. The crux lies in the perception of China among the Central Asian peoples and their willingness to let it have a greater role in their region. To win such a role, China must increase its soft power—a difficult task but a necessary one if it is to compete with Russia and the West for long-term influence. Without increased efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Central Asian peoples, China will have considerable difficulty in expanding its economic, political, energy and military ties. Implications for Other ActorsChina has been highly successful in expanding its influence in Central Asia in recent years, largely at the expense of Europe and the United States. This will give rise to new patterns of engagement, new coalitions and economic interactions that will shape the future of the Eurasian region.
Russia and China have joined hands in attempting to minimise the US and European presence in Central Asia. The US expulsion from Uzbekistan and the European neglect of the region have worked in favour of China and Russia. The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation has functioned as a bulwark against “external” influence in Central Asia, and even if it is not explicitly a body directed against the United States or Europe, it has in effect been used as such by Moscow and Beijing. The marginalisation of the United States and Europe has strengthened the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation as a regional body as much of Central Asian affairs is now dealt with through it or bilaterally between its members. Looked at positively, the consolidation of the organisation could create a regional security structure able to prevent conflicts. On the negative side, Chinese and Russian domination of the organisation will create an uneven regional power structure.
China’s growing economic and political strength will inevitably reduce Moscow’s influence in Central Asia, but this should of course be seen in the context of Russia’s previously total control there. Still the most powerful actor in the region, Russia is adopting strategies to counter the Chinese challenge. A priority for Moscow has been military influence and the sale of military equipment, a field China has strategically avoided so as to avoid unduly alarming Russia. Nonetheless, the Chinese presence is increasingly felt in Central Asia and the strategic partnership between China and Russia is burdened by their power struggle there. Both countries argue that their bilateral relations are more important than the question of Central Asia, but neither shies away from the reality that it is a source of friction between them. Should bilateral tensions mount, Central Asia could be the trigger for a Sino-Russian conflict in trade and politics.
The strategic glue in bilateral relations between China and Russia has been co-operation against terrorism and separatism. Both countries also enjoy relatively friendly relations with North Korea and Iran, putting them at odds with the United States. On the other hand, Moscow is troubled by the diversification of Beijing’s energy relations and would prefer the People’s Republic to be more dependent for its oil and gas deliveries on a pipeline system operated and owned by Russia. As a result, there is a strategic competition over pipeline systems. Moscow argues that new resources should be tied to the Russian transport network as far as possible, while Beijing prefers a system transiting Central Asia and passing through Xinjiang into China. Moscow initially expected Chinese support for greater Russian control over regional energy resources but quickly realised Beijing was utterly opposed to this. China has established new sources of energy and transit routes lying outside Russian control. Unless a compromise is reached, these highly divergent views could eventually create serious tensions between the two countries.
One of the most notable aspects of China and Russia’s emergence as the major actors in Central Asia is their emphasis on political stability, largely at the expense of democratic development. Neither Beijing nor Moscow has any incentive to promote democracy in the region; on the contrary, they have every incentive to help keep the more authoritarian Central Asian governments in power. Some of the blame here lies with Europe and the United States, which have halted their engagement in the region. Without any counterweight to Moscow and Beijing, there are few prospects of any regional move towards more open and accountable polities. Over time, more repressive regimes will be created, making far harder any Western attempt to engage reformist forces in Central Asia. In the long run, this will make it difficult for new actors to break through the solid political, economic and military co-operation that China and Russia will have established with the Central Asian states.
China’s expansion into Central Asia and its development of infrastructural projects linking Xinjiang to the Arabian Sea have also caused unease in India, which fears a Chinese strategic encirclement. Although relations between the two countries have improved markedly since their war of 1962, China’s construction of roads and railways in Central Asia, southern Asia, and South-East Asia represents a strategic threat to India as these infrastructures could be used for military mobilisations as well as for trade and commerce.
Current developments in Central Asia could potentially, if unchecked, create a strong economic and political regional order that would be inward looking and increasingly exclude Europe and the United States. This would be especially true of the smaller Central Asian economies. The major threat is not that China will cease to trade with the West: economic necessity will always oblige it to keep its markets open. The danger lies much more in terms of reduced energy co-operation and the possible relative decline of Western influence and imports of Central Asian energy.
China, and the rest of Asia, has a need for energy that extends far beyond presently available resources. Central Asia could bridge part of this deficiency once its oil sector is fully functional with a proper pipeline system, hence China’s—and Russia’s—keen involvement in the region. The comparative absence of a European and US presence has caused the Central Asian states to move closer to Asia, a move that could have devastating financial effects in the West as it loses out on some very important assets, not to mention its failure to influence the region politically. No one would be happier to vacuum up Central Asia’s energy resources than China. ConclusionsEngagement with Central Asia on energy, trade, and security forms the basis of China’s strategy vis-à-vis the region. In tying Central Asia closer to it economically through trade, through energy links in pipelines and electricity grids, and through other infrastructure such as roads and railways, China hopes to secure the long-term stability and prosperity of its western border regions. Central Asia is vital to China in terms of oil and gas, but functions as a mere transit route for a greater commercial prize, i.e., better access to European markets. Such access would boost Chinese economic growth and also that of the Central Asian countries through increased transit fees.
The security interdependence Beijing has created bilaterally and through bodies such as the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation also serves to reinforce the leverage it holds over Central Asian nations. Apart from trade, which may be conceived in terms of soft power, China has mainly used traditional forms of power projection to exert this leverage. The comparative weakness of its soft power in Central Asia hinders the spread of China’s influence in the region. China must repeat there the strategy it pursued so successfully in South-East Asia of building goodwill through cultural and educational initiatives.
China is undoubtedly emerging as one of the two major actors in Central Asia, and over time it may become the most powerful. The relative decline of Russia and the failure of the West to act in the region have played out well for China. Its growing influence in Central Asia has created the potential for a power struggle with Russia. Nevertheless, both states will remain for the foreseeable future the major regional actors. Politically, the West has been increasingly marginalised as a result of Beijing’s strategy to increase its own role in Central Asia and the failure of the West to understand the situation there. Should this continue, Central Asia risks being dominated by China and Russia, and the region as a whole will move in a less democratic direction. |