GLOBAL DIALOGUE
Volume 4 ● Number 4 ● Autumn 2002—The Era of Mass Migration The World on the Move: Current Trends in International Migration
Global history has witnessed massive movements of people between states in the past. For example, some fifty-nine million people left Europe between 1846 and 1939, mainly for settlement areas in North and South America. And statistics compiled by the United Nations Population Division suggest a great deal of continuity between global levels of migration back then and now. But UN statistics do not capture illegal migration and many states do not communicate reliable statistics, if they communicate any at all. Credible migration statistics are simply lacking in many areas of the world and there are major deficiencies even in the most developed settings. The Age of Migration is demarcated by the contemporary significance of migration to all regions of the world, the unprecedented importance attached to migration issues and the implications of human migration for bilateral and regional relations and for security, including the security of migrants themselves.
A report by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) claimed that the number of migrants in the world doubled between 1965 and 2000, from 75 million to 150 million. The UN Population Division in 2002 estimated that 185 million people had lived outside their country of birth for at least twelve months—just over two per cent of the global population. There were fifteen million refugees and asylum-seekers in need of protection and assistance in 2001, as compared to sixteen million in 1993. This suggests that international population movements are neither inexorable nor unidirectional. Successful repatriation policies and the ending of some conflicts in the 1990s in Africa, Latin America and Europe resulted in an overall decrease. But concurrently, the number of people who were in a refugee-like situation grew rapidly, as did the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
The vast majority of people around the world reside in their country of birth. Voluntary expatriation or becoming a victim of ethnic cleansing constitutes the exception, not the rule. Nevertheless, the impact of migrants is often much greater than their sheer number. People tend to emigrate in groups and immigration almost always has uneven effects on rural and urban areas and among different socio-economic groups. There can be few people today without direct personal experience of international migration and its effects. Migration and Regional IntegrationAt its core, globalisation involves intensification of transnationalism—events or phenomena that affect more than one society or state simultaneously. International migration has been termed the most humanly intensive of transnational phenomena and a central dynamic in globalisation. Most international migration is intra-regional rather than inter-regional in nature. While international migration to highly developed lands from lesser-developed peripheries captures the greatest attention, most international migration occurs between lesser-developed countries.
Many view intra-regional migration as fostering or facilitating deeper regional integration, a process often regarded as part and parcel of globalisation. However, the relationship between international migration and regional integration requires careful scrutiny.
In the case of European regional integration, putting aside less central facets like the Scandinavian common labour market, it is imperative to recall that the process which started with the European Coal and Steel Community was security-driven and had an explicit federalist goal. The stage-by-stage progression to the European Economic Community, the European Community and the European Union incrementally precluded reversion to the pattern of war.
The Treaty of Rome of 1957 creating the European Economic Community explicitly authorised mobility of labour between the six founding states. But that provision did not become legally effective until 1968. Italy viewed regional integration as a strategy to export unemployed and under-employed workers. But, as Frederico Romero has documented, this strategy encountered resistance from other member states. While Italian workers were the major beneficiaries of Article 48 of the treaty, far fewer Italians emigrated than had been expected back in the 1950s, partly because of remarkable economic growth in Italy and its convergence with other EEC member states.2
Historically, there has been relatively little labour migration between member states. In the mid-1980s, the planned accession to the European Union of Spain and Portugal gave rise to an important debate over the likely consequences regarding migration of Portuguese and Spanish workers. But capital mobility substituted for labour mobility and very little migration resulted. Similarly, Germany experienced a passionate debate in 2001–2 over the likely consequences of Polish accession. But the historical record is quite clear: expect relatively little additional Polish migration at the end of the transition period.
Turkey and Morocco have also applied for full membership of the European Union but have been rebuffed. Many factors were involved, including Turkish and Moroccan control of disputed territories. But the prospect that Morocco and Turkey would send large numbers of workers and other migrants to the European Union long after the transition period certainly weighed heavily in the rejection of their entry bids. With millions of their citizens living as third-country nationals in the European Union, Morocco and Turkey have forged a partnership and a customs union agreement respectively with the union. However, some analysts have interpreted Turkey’s failure to achieve full membership as a case where prior labour mobility impeded regional integration rather than fostered it.
Increasingly, enlargement of the European regional migration framework seems driven by concerns to control migration. The candidate countries for EU entry are required to adopt acquis communautaires—the policies and rules of the European Union, including the 1985 Schengen Agreement. States party to this agreement are committed to hasten the elimination of internal boundary controls between them while creating a common external frontier. Consequently, EU-entry candidate, Poland, for example, had to impose visa requirements on Ukrainians.
Likewise, Spain had to impose visa requirements on Moroccans when it signed the Schengen Agreement in 1991, and this coincided with the first pateras (the makeshift boats used by migrants) crossing the Straits of Gibraltar. In 2001, a Moroccan workers’ association in Spain estimated that four thousand Moroccans alone had lost their lives trying to cross the Straits of Gibraltar to Spain over a five-year period.
In turn, Morocco faces intense EU pressure to impose visa requirements on sub-Saharan Africans, while Algeria is expected to do a better job of policing its long borders now that it, too, enjoys closer links with the European Union. Turkey may have three or four million aliens from nearby states residing in its territory, but its continuing quest for full EU membership could oblige it to end its de facto policy of tolerating their presence. The European Union’s attempt to create a migration cordon sanitaire to the east and the south has enormous regional security implications which have contributed to European–US tensions over extending the war against terrorism to Iraq. The EU quest for regional stabilisation runs smack into a unilateralist US war against Iraq. The prospect of mass migration must figure centrally in the fears of Arab leaders who warn of the gates of hell opening in the event of such a war. NAFTAThe North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that came into effect between Mexico, Canada and the United States on 1 January 2025 has significantly deepened socio-economic integration among the countries involved. But this regional integration framework created only a free trade area: there was no explicit political project, let alone a federalist one as in the European case. Even so, the signing of the pact triggered significant opposition, including the Zapatista revolt in Mexico.
Curiously, NAFTA, which was all about migration, contained only small provisions pertaining to it, mainly because the gap between US and Mexican views on the illegal migration of Mexicans to the United States was unbridgeable. Although NAFTA was touted as a way of reducing illegal migration, the number of Mexicans illegally migrating to the United States has soared since 1993, as predicted by Philip L. Martin, whose theory of a “migration hump” holds that trade liberalisation reduces migration only over the long term, increasing it over the short to medium term.3 In 1970, there were 750,000 Mexican-born US residents. In 2002, there were nine million, including four to five million illegally resident.
The initial pre–11 September 2001 period of the George W. Bush presidency witnessed a great deal of speculation that NAFTA’s scope would be widened through such measures as the opening up of borders and the creation of a North American common labour market. However, by the time of the 2001 NAFTA summit in Ottawa, it became clear that these were elements in President Vicente Fox of Mexico’s long-term vision for the future of NAFTA, rather than goals of the United States or Canada. The mutual pledge of the two new presidents, Fox and Bush, to reforge the historically difficult US–Mexico relationship through an immigration initiative quickly ran into old problems despite the creation of a bilateral cabinet-level group to translate the pledges and visions into policy. Most of the subsequent bilateral negotiations appeared to focus on expanding temporary foreign-worker admissions from Mexico and on an earned legalisation for illegally resident Mexicans. But the complexities of such matters did not prove amenable to a rapid resolution, dashing the hopes of the Mexican government. President Fox ended his triumphal tour of the United States shortly before the terrorist attacks of September 2001 with the promise of a US–Mexico migration initiative, but with no concrete proposals. More than a year later, partly because of the linking of migration and security issues in the wake of 11 September, little change had been made in migration between Mexico and the United States. Labour MobilityThe remaining continents similarly have witnessed quite distinctive relationships between international migration and regional integration. In sub-Saharan Africa, numerous regional frameworks have sought to facilitate labour mobility between member states with little success. Aderanti Adepoju has identified a key problem as being the imbalance in socio-economic development between member states of the regional pacts.4 This typically results in unidirectional migration to the most advanced member state. Mass deportations often ensue during periods of economic recession or political instability. The massive expulsions of foreigners from Nigeria in the 1980s were emblematic of the broader pattern.
In north Africa and the Arab region, various regional frameworks have resulted in relatively modest labour mobility between participating states. Libya and Iraq, most notably, have opened their labour markets to Arab workers from neighbouring states or from throughout the region. However, diplomatic controversies and conflicts have undermined the frameworks, and migrant workers have paid a heavy price in mass expulsions. In 1984, according to Gregory White, the United States strongly urged the abrogation by King Hassan of Morocco of the Oujda Treaty, which mandated political and economic union with Libya (the treaty came to an end in 1986).5 More recently, Libya has received huge inflows of sub-Saharan Africans attracted by the possibility of employment and of transit to jobs elsewhere. However, a familiar pattern of tensions leading to clashes and mass expulsions recurred in 2000. According to A. Bensaâd, hundreds of sub-Saharan Africans in Libya were killed, tens of thousands deported and thousands of others incarcerated.6
In Latin America, the two major intra-regional frameworks have facilitated very little legal labour mobility between member states. However, several accords have obligated signatories to legalise the status of illegally resident workers from other signatory states. This led, for example, to Venezuela’s 1980 legalisation of such workers, which principally benefited Colombians.
The several Asian socio-economic and security-related regional forums have been distinctive mainly in avoiding discussion of intra-regional migration. Within the Association of South-East Asian Nations, for instance, there appears to be a tacit agreement not to put migration issues on the regional agenda, in part because of a history of strong disagreements between various member states about bilateral migration issues.
While globalisation clearly has resulted in denser regional interdependence, it does not follow that increased intra-regional labour mobility necessarily engenders enhanced “management” of these flows through co-operative regional integration frameworks. The mobility afforded EU citizens is the exception, not the rule; moreover, third-country nationals legally resident in the European Union still do not possess the mobility rights of EU citizens. EU member states have authorised limited federal governance but remain keen to protect their sovereign prerogative to regulate the residency on their soil of third-country nationals. This situation may evolve on the completion of the five-year negotiations concerning a common immigration policy authorised by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. Regulating MigrationDespite globalisation and regional integration, states continue to regulate migration but exhibit widely contrasting capacities and political wills to do so. The global variation can be glimpsed in a number of key governmental strategies to deter or end illegal migration.
Virtually all states in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have adopted laws punishing employers for the unauthorised employment of aliens. Such laws were widely adopted in western Europe in the 1970s; in 1986, the United States followed suit. Frequently, adoption of sanctions against employers followed a policy of legalising illegally employed foreigners. The overall pattern of enforcement of employer sanctions is quite mixed. Several western and northern European states have created credible and dissuasive capacities to punish the illegal employment of aliens. In the United States, on the other hand, enforcement has been lax and there is no political consensus in support of enforcing employer sanctions. A key problem is the ease with which the 1986 law can be circumvented by using fraudulent documents. The US Congress did not embrace and follow up recommendations first made by the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy and later by the Commission for Immigration Reform to implement a fraud-resistant verification system for employment eligibility.
Southern European states, which became significant lands of immigration only in the 1970s and 1980s, lag far behind countries like the Netherlands, France, Germany or Sweden in their capacity to deter illegal employment of aliens. Virtually all immigration to southern Europe in recent decades has been illegal and directed towards the underground economy.
Elsewhere, since the 1970s, many other governments in Asia, Africa and Latin America have adopted employer sanctions. Israel, South Africa, South Korea, Malaysia and Japan are cases in point. The International Labour Organisation’s instruments pertaining to migrant workers explicitly call upon governments to impose employer sanctions. Many governments around the world, however, lack the legal and administrative wherewithal to punish the illegal employment of aliens. This incapacity may be a factor in government decisions to expel foreign workers en masse. Mass deportations are a recurrent feature of public policies in Africa, the Arab region and certain Asian countries like Malaysia.
Among the obstacles to enforcing employer sanctions is the difficulty of co-ordination between diverse governmental agencies, typically including the labour ministry, justice ministry, various police and inspector services and court systems. In countries where there is no political consensus on the untoward effects of illegally employing aliens, errant employers may benefit from tacit governmental approval. Employers and illegally employed aliens have also demonstrated a remarkable capacity to adjust to enforcement strategies.
Legalisation policies have often preceded the imposition of employer sanctions. However, a number of states have eschewed legalisation altogether. Legalisation was a routine feature of French immigration policy from 1946 to roughly 1970. About two-thirds of aliens who immigrated to France during this period technically arrived in violation of French regulations. After 1970, legalisation was to become exceptional rather than routine. Nevertheless, it has been recurrent in more recent decades. Legalisation episodes in France are often of high political significance, involving mobilisations of French citizens in support of aliens engaged in symbolic strikes or church occupations to acquire legal status.
In the United States, legalisation was also routine during the bracero policy-period from 1942 to 1964, when nearly five million Mexican workers were admitted to the United States to provide temporary labour. Illegal migration was commonplace at this time—indeed, there were more apprehensions of illegally resident Mexicans than there were admissions of braceros. Those caught were routinely returned to Mexico, a process called “drying out wetbacks”.
The US Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 authorised a series of legalisation opportunities. Almost three million aliens were legalised as a result, but the legalisation programme for agricultural workers was marred by pervasive fraud.
In recent decades, legalisation has been common in southern European countries. Most legally resident aliens in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy are beneficiaries of legalisation. However, many legalised aliens have subsequently lost their legal status either because of administrative shortcomings or because their permits weren’t renewed.
Belgium, South Africa and even Switzerland have authorised legalisations in recent years. The terms and procedures of these policies vary greatly. Pope John Paul II called upon governments everywhere to mark the third millennium by adopting legalisation policies. The influence of the Roman Catholic Church in building support for legalisation has been discernible in many countries, including France, the United States, Spain, Italy, Portugal and even Germany, where the Cardinal of Berlin has called upon the German government to legalise aliens. The Impact of LegalisationLegalisation can be viewed as a strategy for governments to adapt to and manage international migration. However, legalisation has proven difficult to implement in many diverse settings, from Venezuela to Greece. Fraud and corruption are persistent problems. Employers usually do not co-operate and many illegally resident aliens are unwilling to come out of the proverbial shadows. There is no evidence that legalisation alters labour-market mechanisms that foster illegal migration and employment. There is ample reason to believe that legalisation prompts further illegal migration. Opponents of legalisation complain that such measures undercut legal migration and the rule of law.
Social-scientific understanding of governmental ability to regulate international migration is far from satisfactory. One major reason is the opaqueness of illegal migration. Nevertheless, legalisation policies have enabled governments better to understand illegal migration. Generally, they learn that their illegally resident populations are much more complex than commonly thought. Employment of illegal aliens is typically clustered in certain work-sectors, such as labour-intensive agriculture, restaurants and hotels, building construction, the garment industry, domestic services and gardening. The leading French student of illegal migration, Claude Valentin-Marie, contends that the flexibility of illegally employed aliens best reflects the exigencies of firms in an era of intense globalisation. Liberalisation measures often erode governmental capacity to regulate labour markets.7
Many theorists view globalisation as weakening states, if not condemning them to obsolescence. Yet states stubbornly persist in efforts to regulate international migration. Indeed, the capacity of many states to do so has grown rather than diminished in recent decades. France, for instance, is far more able to punish illegal employment in 2002 than it was in 1972. However, in other ways it seems more vulnerable to illegal entry. Human-trafficking has become more sophisticated and entrenched. New streams of immigrants have emerged. The biggest surprise of the 1997–8 legalisation in France was the 9,000 applications by Chinese, of whom 7,500 were legalised. Chinese had not previously figured importantly in migration to France.
Another aspect of governmental capacity to regulate international migration concerns the policies of countries of emigration towards their compatriots abroad. In recent years, many states have come to resemble post–Second World War Italy, which so earnestly sought to export its population. Some theorists have viewed the development of transnationalism and the persistence of nation-states as a zero-sum game in which the expansion of one entails the diminution of the other. Yet many homelands consciously foster transnationalism as a strategy for better achieving governmental goals. Mexico’s brace of new policies towards its emigrants is designed to foster continued identification with Mexico. This is deemed important, for instance, to the continued sending of remittances, which in 2001 amounted to $9 billion. Migration and SecurityHistorically, states emerged by meeting the need to provide security. The sociologist Charles Tilly once likened the process in Europe to a form of extortion racket. Present-day globalisation has challenged the sovereign state, but nothing has yet supplanted the latter in terms of providing security. Even in the EU context, member states remain the ultimate arbiters of security.
Among the many trends influencing international migration in recent decades, perhaps the most notable has been the securitisation of migration policies. This linkage of migration to security had occurred in western Europe long before 11 September 2001. In the United States, however, securitisation of immigration policy began in earnest only after the 2001 attacks (the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center failed to produce such a response). In its broadest sense, “security” refers to all perceptions of possible threat. Curiously, few students of international migration, despite the enormous growth of the field and its far-ranging interdisciplinary scope, had deemed security germane to their subject. Indeed, pioneers in the study of migration and security like the late Myron Weiner were excoriated for linking the two. How could anything so generally beneficial as migration have a dark side?
Weiner was an astute observer of politics and noted in a path-breaking 1993 book that migration frequently gave rise to conflict.8 Anyone familiar with the Arab–Israeli conflict would have concurred, but the consternation generated among experts on international migration attested to a glaring shortcoming in scholarship in the field.
In reality, international migration is always germane to security because migrants are vulnerable persons. Depending on their mode of admission and the sociopolitical context of their reception, international migrants encounter a gamut of possibilities, some of which are adverse to their security and that of those affected by their arrival, others of which are conducive to the security of all involved. Legal frameworks surrounding migration or migration policies are rarely conceptualised in terms of security, but in fact have a great bearing on security. Legal immigration policy environments, such as those found in traditional lands of immigration like Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, are highly conducive to immigrant integration and incorporation. Other contexts are much less likely to result in migrant or societal security. The range of variation is immense.
Virtually everyone concurs that the growth of human-trafficking since the end of the Cold War constitutes an important security concern. The industry may generate profits of $5–10 billion, and women and children are disproportionately affected. The 2002 US State Department report on global human-trafficking estimated that up to four million persons worldwide had been victimised.
Other salient security aspects of migration are the potential for a spillover of conflicts from emigrant source-countries to destination countries, and for political extremism to develop among migrants or their offspring. A few examples can serve to illustrate.
Of the more than two million Turkish citizens in Germany, about one-third are thought to be of Kurdish background. The insurgency led by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey adversely affected German national security in the 1990s. German intelligence estimated that there were fifty thousand PKK sympathisers residing on German soil and as many as seven thousand actual PKK members. Many Kurds became involved in violent street protests. PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan even declared Germany to be a “second front” in the PKK’s conflict with Turkey.
In the wake of the 11 September attacks, over one thousand people were detained by the US authorities, and several hundred were arrested in Europe on suspicion of belonging to al-Qaeda or allied movements. Most of those detained in the United States were immigrants from Islamic countries, and were held for violating US immigration laws. In Europe, most of those detained appear to be immigrants or the offspring of immigrants.
While the secrecy surrounding the US detentions makes it difficult to speculate about the possible connections of the detainees with terrorist movements, it seems clear that at most a tiny fringe of Muslim immigrants in the West has been susceptible to mobilisation in violent organisations. German officials estimate that one per cent of Germany’s three million Muslims are political extremists. Obviously, Western societies are highly vulnerable to violence perpetrated by tiny minorities and due vigilance is required. But despite the barriers and prejudice encountered by many Muslim immigrants in Western societies, the overall pattern appears to be one of gradual integration. Indeed, the attacks of September 2001 underscored the vital stake Western democracies have in integrating their Muslim immigrants.
The securitisation of migration has greatly affected policies on asylum-seekers and refugees. Many scholars argue that west European policies underwent a fundamental change in the 1990s. Case-by-case adjudication of claims gave way to blanket or group decisions. Generally welcoming policies were replaced by measures intended to deter asylum-seeking. Increasingly, European states sought to deflect asylum flows elsewhere by adopting safe-country measures which denied asylum to persons who had transited through such a country. The eastward and southward expansion of the European Union and its associated states appeared to be governed by migration control concerns. Global GovernanceTheorists like James N. Rosenau hold that globalisation has reduced the purchase of national governments in authoritative decision-making.9 Increasingly, national governments are obliged to interact in complex ways with local governments, non-governmental organisations and international bodies in order to achieve goals. Rosenau terms this “global governance”.
Migration looms large in global governance because the world lacks an international regime to deal with it. Yet as Jonus Widgren has argued, elements of an international regime, i.e., mutually agreed norms and predictable behaviour, already exist.10 There are the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, for instance.
Indeed, one of the most interesting illustrations of Rosenau’s insight would appear to be the eleven regional forums concerning international migration monitored by the IOM in 2001.11 An IOM report cited four reasons for the inception of such forums: the post–Cold War increase in illegal migration, including human-trafficking; the growth in the number of states and regions affected by international migration; the regional scope of most migration; and the non-binding nature of the consultative processes themselves.
Governments are increasingly seeking to manage migration through bilateral and regional co-operation, but the track record thus far has been disappointing. The onset of economic recession or depression greatly complicates matters, as migrants disproportionately suffer the consequences of downturns.
Theorists such as Martin Shaw talk of an embryonic global state, others of a world polity, and Hardt and Negri of a US-dominated empire.12 Despite their sharp ontological and prescriptive differences, all such notions can be viewed as conceptual undergirding for global dialogue about international migration. Elements of such dialogue have taken place under the auspices of the International Labour Organisation and the United Nations. Willy Brandt’s vision of North–South dialogue clearly subsumed international migration. Indeed, the need for a global discussion on migration was palpable by the time of the initial efforts of the OECD and the then European Community to promote Euro-Arab and trans-Mediterranean dialogue in the 1970s.
Instead, the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy and enlargement evolved in ways that damaged agricultural economies in states like Tunisia and Morocco, while fostering growing demand for labour in Europe’s agricultural sector. Under President Ronald Reagan, the United States steadfastly opposed anything resembling North–South dialogue. Indeed, the US delegation to the OECD’s “Future of Migration” conference in 1986, of which I was a member, received explicit instructions to avoid any semblance of North–South dialogue. That is why the US delegation criticised the notion of convergence in migration-related policy matters among OECD member states—because it seemed to lend credence to a need for North–South dialogue. Ironically, I had inserted convergence into the three annual OECD reports on international migration (the Sopemi reports) that I drafted from 1984 to 1986, precisely because the growing similarities in trends, policies and issues lent themselves to systemic analysis.
Subsequent US administrations also were wary of discussion or negotiation of migration matters in global forums, especially the United Nations. The presidency of George W. Bush began with a strong unilateralist tilt, became more multilateralist in the immediate aftermath of 11 September, and has since swung back to unilateralism, with an apparent drive to maintain US military and strategic pre-eminence. Nevertheless, it is highly significant that President Bush has authorised a considerable increase in US foreign assistance to support the UN Secretary-General’s campaign to attack the socio-economic roots of terrorism. Hence, it may be that the war on terrorism will force the United States to come to grips with socio-economic disparities that foster grievances and violence, which are increasingly directed against the United States. It is clear that if and when global dialogue about migration takes place, the United States will be profoundly implicated.
International migration processes link the fates of zones of emigration with zones of immigration. Enlightened governance or the lack thereof will determine whether the current pattern of tension will be attenuated or exacerbated in the future.
2. See Frederico Romero, “Migration as an Issue in European Interdependence and Integration: The Case of Italy”, in The Frontier of National Sovereignty, ed. A. Milward et al. (London: Routledge, 1993).
3. Philip L. Martin, Trade and Migration: NAFTA and Agriculture (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1993).
4. Aderanti Adepoju, “Regional Integration, Continuity and Changing Patterns of Intra-Regional Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa”, in International Migration into the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Reginald Appleyard, ed. M. A. B. Siddique (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2001).
5. Gregory White, “Encouraging Unwanted Immigration: A Political Economy of Europe’s Efforts to Discourage North African Immigration”, Third World Quarterly 20, no. 4 (1999).
6. A. Bensaâd, “Voyage au bout de la peur avec les clandestins du Sahel”, Histoires d’Immigration (Le Monde diplomatique, 2002), pp. 15–20.
7. Claude Valentin-Marie, “Measures Taken to Combat the Employment of Undocumented Foreign Workers in France”, in Combating the Illegal Employment of Foreign Workers (Paris: OECD, 2000).
8. Myron Weiner, ed., International Migration and Security (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).
9. James Rosenau, Along the Domestic Foreign Frontier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
10. Jonus Widgren, “Multilateral Co-operation to Combat Trafficking in Migrants and the Role of International Organisations” (paper presented at a seminar for the International Organisation for Migration, Geneva, 1994).
11. For example, the Regional Conference on Migration, or “Puebla Group”, which brings together representatives of many Caribbean, Central and North American countries on a regular basis to discuss migration issues.
12. See Martin Shaw, Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). |