GLOBAL DIALOGUE
Volume 3 ● Number 2–3 ● Spring/Summer 2001—Iran at the Crossroads Civil Society and Democratisation during Khatami’s First Term
In Iran we can discern three main political discourses which have successively defined political life and practices: (a) the traditional patrimonial discourse; (b) the absolutist–modernist discourse; and (c) the discourse of ideological traditionalism, of which two types have emerged, a charismatic and an aristocratic–paternalistic version. In opposition and resistance to these dominant discourses, a democratic civil society discourse has emerged ever since the Constitutional Revolution (1905–11). Recently, because of deepening crises of political legitimisation and ideological domination, this civil society discourse has spread through the public sphere and made inroads into the state apparatus.
My main argument is that the powerful discursive obstacles to democratisation and competitive politics in Iran are just beginning to weaken before the rise of the civil society discourse. I shall first describe the three dominant discourses and the way they have determined and defined political life and practices. I shall then discuss the civil society discourse and the possibilities it is creating for a democratic way of life. More specifically, I shall examine how civil society formations as well as a competitive party system may take shape within that discourse. Finally, I will consider the prospects for democracy in Iran. Traditional PatrimonialismThe traditional patrimonial discourse was the dominant discourse in pre-modern Iran, i.e., before the reform movement in the Qajar era (1794–1925) and the Constitutional Revolution. The traditional patrimonial discourse was composed of several elements, including in particular the pre-Islamic theory of Persian kingship and the political theory of Shi’ism as it was articulated in the Safavid era (1501–1722). The traditional patrimonial discourse was monarchical and religious both in its pre-Islamic and Islamic forms. Iranian traditional partrimonialism in general put emphasis on political paternalism, absolute authority and obedience, the sanctity of the state, religion and mythology, a direct relationship between the rulers and God, and a vertical, non-participatory and non-competitive power structure. As a discourse, traditional patrimonialism provided limited possibilities for the formation of individual identity and political practices, opening a space for obedience, opportunism, the authoritarian personality, passivity, silent protest, pervasive fear and negative individualism.
The traditional patrimonial discourse produced a patrimonial political culture and practices, as well as relationships of power within the state structure. In the patrimonial political culture the ruler is depicted as a heroic and sacred personality responsible for every good and evil. The patrimonial culture creates an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion among subjects and between them and the rulers. It minimises the subjects’ ability for group life and co-operation. According to a large body of research on Iran’s patrimonial political culture, the people believe that humankind is essentially evil and power-seeking, everything is in a state of perpetual change, one should be distrustful of and suspicious towards the powers that be, the government is the chief enemy of the people, and so forth. This research describes the major features of Iranian political culture as pervasive fear, mutual distrust, feelings of inefficacy and suspicion of the government.1 Thus, on the whole, the political culture which developed under the traditional patrimonial discourse provided no room for political participation and competition.
With regard to political practices, the patrimonalist state which took shape was centred on the person of the shah, who was considered the owner of the whole land and the people, and who dispensed favours among his officers and office holders. At the same time, the patrimonial state was characterised by a diversity and plurality of power centres, with the royal court seeking to uphold its position by maintaining a balance of forces. Absolutist ModernismThe second major political discourse in Iran was the absolutist–modernist discourse of the Pahlavis. As with any other discourse, it was a complex combination of several components including the pre-Islamic theory of Persian kingship, the traditional patrimonial discourse and the Western modernist discourse of development and modernisation, as the dominant elements on the one hand, and constitutionalism, legalism and populism as subordinate elements on the other. The absolutist–modernist discourse emphasised authoritarianism, modernist rationalism, Persian nationalism, political centralism, cultural modernism, secularism and industrial development.
The absolutist state which emerged in the shadow of the absolutist–modernist discourse was determined to bring about a transition from Iran’s pre-capitalist traditional formation to a capitalist, modern and secular state. Thus, the absolutist–modernist discourse with its modernist ideology and rationalist authoritarianism led to a closing up of the traditional social space and encouraged tendencies towards political centralisation and social homogenisation. In this discourse, tradition, religion, religious sects, ethnic entities and tribal groupings were categorised as “the other” which had to be ousted from the modern social order. The modernist project promoting industrialisation, secularisation, centralisation and nationalism was bound to alienate the religious hierarchy, the traditional bourgeoisie, the guilds, religious sects and ethnic minorities. Industrialisation could succeed only with the elimination of the traditional guilds and the merchant class. Secularism could proceed only at the cost of a decline in the status of religious institutions. Centralisation necessitated the subjugation of tribal communities. Integral nationalism required the establishment of a “national language” to the detriment of various ethnic languages.
The absolutist state of the Pahlavi dynasty performed substructural functions in transforming Iranian society from a pre-capitalist mode of production to the modern capitalist formation. For this to happen, a centralisation of the means and sources of political power was essential. As a result, the absolutist state carried out some economic, military, judicial, administrative and financial reforms. Reza Shah (1878–1944) achieved an unprecedented centralisation of power by creating a modern army and bureaucracy, by dissolving tribal organisations and by subduing tribal chieftains and religious leaders. Essentially, the absolutist state from 1921 to 1979 (except for the constitutional interlude of 1941–53) subordinated all political forces—parliament, the government and the political parties. Under the absolutist–modernist discourse little room was left for political participation and competition. Ideological TraditionalismThe discourse of ideological traditionalism emerged as a reaction to the absolutist–modernist discourse. Initially, it had two main versions: one presented by religious intellectuals, and another elaborated by some dissident clerics. On the whole, the discourse of ideological traditionalism articulated the interests and values of the declining classes of traditional society, which were caught in the throes of modernisation and revolution from above. The development of a mass society and the reaction of traditional classes to the process of modernisation led to the rise of ideological traditionalism. Under such circumstances, the Islamic tradition was ideologised as a solution to the problems of modern society. This discourse was mainly a product of the pressures of the modern world and the decline of traditional society which created a sense of insecurity among the traditional classes.
The discourse of ideological traditionalism is composed of various elements, including a version of Shi’ite political theory, aspects of traditional patrimonialism, elements of modernism (such as parliamentarism), a type of populism and a charismatic element. Ideological traditionalism depicts the modern world and especially its democratic way of life as the archenemy. It attacks every manifestation of Western modernity. It is opposed to pluralism, civil society, liberalism, democracy and the whole tradition of the Enlightenment. It emphasises leadership, social discipline, traditional values, elitism and cultural control.
Ideological traditionalism evinced two major tendencies. First, there was a more radical, charismatic tendency, which was predominant from 1979 to 1989. This was followed by a second, more traditionalist conservative tendency, which was dominant from 1989 to 1997.
The political system which emerged in Iran after the 1979 revolution was organised on the basis of the traditional charismatic authority of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. With the adoption of the new Islamic constitution, a fusion of charismatic and traditional authority occurred in the institution of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the Islamic legal authority). Between 1979 and 1997, the discourse of ideological traditionalism vacillated between a more charismatic and a more traditionalist tendency. In the years 1979–89, the word of Ayatollah Khomeini was the very foundation of Iranian politics. The way Iranian society, polity and culture were organised in that period reflected his personal tastes writ large. He was the pacesetter of the revolution. As long as he was alive, the charismatic element outweighed the traditional element. He even went beyond the Islamic theory of the state when he introduced the theory of “the absolute rule of the theologian” (velayat-e motlaghe ye faqih).
But in the decade following Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989, the charismatic elements of the discourse of ideological traditionalism began to decline. The office of velayat-e faqih was routinised and turned into the bedrock of the traditionalist clerical oligarchy. The ruling oligarchy was composed of a number of core interest groups including the Society of the Militant Clergy of Tehran, the Society of Seminary Teachers and the Hojjatiyeh Society. The discourse of ideological traditionalism has sought to create a new type of subject, subservient and obedient to traditional, charismatic leaders. Personal devotion to and confidence in the leader and his values, and an emotional relationship between the ruler and his followers, constituted the core of political practice. This system promotes obedience, subservience, silence and passivity, and there is no room for individuality, criticism, active participation and competition. Civil SocietyThe democratic discourse of civil society has always emerged as a form of resistance to domination. Arising in its latest version before the presidential elections of 1997, its many elements include the legalism of the Constitutional Revolution, the anti-despotic tendency of the nationalist movement of Mohammad Musaddeq in the 1940s and a democratic reading of Shi’ite political theory.
The civil society discourse is a reaction to a deep discursive crisis in Iranian politics. As we have seen, traditional patrimonialism lost ground early in the century, although some of its elements survived in the succeeding discourses. The absolutist–modernist discourse lacked the capacity to promote civil society and a democratic way of life. Ideological traditionalism, emerging during the Islamic Revolution, created a mass society detrimental to democracy. In both its charismatic and traditionalist versions it still vehemently opposes the civil society movement. As a result, there has been a “war of discourses” since the 1997 presidential elections. The civil society discourse is not, of course, confined to the coalition of reformist Islamic groups which won the elections; rather, it encompasses a wider spectrum including the democratic discourse of a new generation of intellectuals. The social base of the civil society movement is a new, articulate, political majority of twenty million people who voted for democratic reforms. It is opposed to religious absolutism, blind traditionalism, cultural control and a closed society.
After the 1997 elections a war of words was waged between traditionalists and civil society reformers. The representatives of the discourse of ideological traditionalism—especially dominant in parliament, the Council of Guardians, the Council of Experts, the judiciary and the radio and television organisations—have resorted to new theorising in order to uphold charismatic traditional authority in the face of increasing threats. Some extremist groups consider the charismatic authority of the Supreme Leader to be absolute and above the constitution. Likewise, some representatives of the traditionalist clerical oligarchy have been developing anti-democratic arguments. Typical of their views is the following quotation from Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri, Speaker of parliament from 1996 to 2000, in which he claims that the people lack the requisite knowledge to determine which religious figure is theologically competent to be Supreme Leader:
With regard to the relationship between the Leader and the people, some newspapers claim that the legitimacy of the system and of the leadership depends upon the people’s opinion and vote, whereas in reality, the legitimacy of the system has nothing to do with the votes and opinions of the people … because the people cannot discern the qualified theologian.2
Other representatives have described velayat-e faqih as a heavenly institution which has nothing to do with popular sovereignty. Some have even described the people as “orphans who need supervision”.
In contrast, within the discourse of civil society a democratic interpretation of Shi’ite political theory has been advanced. On this interpretation, in the period of the “Greater Occultation”,3 the constitution and parliament are a substitute for the rule of the Imam. Thus, a constitutional religious government is possible. The religious principle of “consultation” (shoura), on this view, constitutes the foundation of legal democratic and representative government. DemocratisationThe future of democracy in Iran depends on the possibilities provided within the civil society discourse for the activation of civic associations and political groupings, and their participation and competition in the public sphere. Structurally, Iranian society has a pluralistic tendency, i.e., it is capable of producing a multi-party system. Some structural cleavages—for example, between traditionalism and modernism, Islam and secularism, constitutionalism and absolutism—form the foundations of this tendency to pluralism. A multi-party competitive democracy is usually based upon a structure of cleavages which, given the existence of democratic rules of the game (or a democratic discourse), provide a foundation for party competition and coalition.
At the present time, the Iranian society and polity can potentially create a multi-party system on the basis of two major crosscutting cleavages, leading to the emergence of four party-political blocs. The first cleavage is that between traditionalism and modernism (in social, cultural and political life). The second is that between a free market economy and a kind of statism, or more simply between “right” and “left”. All the potential and existing political groupings and parties can be located within the space created by the intersection of these two divisions. Thus, four possible blocs of political parties may emerge: (a) a conservative–traditionalist bloc; (b) a reformist Islamic bloc; (c) a liberal–nationalist bloc; and (d) a social democratic bloc. The two latter blocs have not been politically active or have not entered the power arena in the Islamic Republic, which has been dominated by the two former blocs.
The first bloc of conservative–traditionalist Islamic groupings and parties at present includes the following:
• The Society of the Militant Clergy of Tehran. This grouping of traditionalist clerics acquired a leading position in the Fourth Majlis (1992–6) and became the dominant faction in the Fifth Majlis (1996–2000). It has had wide influence in the judiciary, the executive and the Council of Guardians. The newspapers Resalat and Abrar are its organs or express its views.
• The Motalafeh Society. This bazaar-based political grouping has influence especially in the Chamber of Commerce and has always had a say in the appointment of the minister of commerce. It has been a natural ally of the Society of Militant Clergy. The newspaper Shona is its organ.
• Other groupings and associations falling in this bloc include the Islamic Society of Engineers, the Islamic Society of Academics, the Islamic Society of Preachers, the Islamic Society of Workers and the Islamic Society of Guilds. At the extreme right of this bloc we find the Society for the Defence of Islamic Values, whose views are expressed by the newspapers Sobh and Arzeshha.
The conservative–traditionalist Islamic groupings draw their support from the bazaar, the merchant class, the petite bourgeoisie and the main body of the clergy. They have been dominant in parliament since the Fourth Majlis. They have also dominated the Council of Experts and the Council of Guardians. The latter claims to have a constitutional right of discretionary supervision over the nomination of candidates for all elections on the basis of their religious and ideological commitment to the Islamic system. The conservative groups have been opposed to land reform, state intervention in commerce, foreign investment, nationalisation of property and services, active popular participation in politics and normalisation of foreign relations. Instead, they are in favour of a theocratic state, i.e., the rule of the Mojtaheds,4 political paternalism, social and cultural control and commercial capitalism.
The second bloc of reformist Islamic groups and parties includes:
• The Association of Militant Clergy. This group branched off from the Society of Militant Clergy in 1988. It was the dominant faction in the Third Majlis (1988–92) but lost out to the conservatives in the Fourth Majlis. The Council of Guardians rejected the candidacy of many of its members in the elections to the Fifth Majlis. The newspaper Salaam is its organ.
• The Organisation of Crusaders for the Islamic Revolution. This group became prominent in the Fifth Majlis after forming “The Coalition of the Line of the Imam” against the conservatives.
• Other groups which fall in this bloc include the Association of the Line of the Imam (a different body from the similarly named coalition just mentioned), which has branched off from the Association of Militant Clergy; the Bureau for Consolidating Unity, or the Islamic Union of Students; the Islamic Association of Teachers; and the Association of Women.
In general, the reformist Islamic groups support a kind of statism, social justice, some cultural and social reform and a more modern interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence.
The third bloc of liberal–democratic and nationalist parties, such as the Freedom Movement and the Islamic Association of Militant Muslims, has been denied any access to power. Its social base is to be found among the modern middle classes and intellectuals. It is opposed to the fusion of religion and politics, especially in the form of velayat-e faqih, and supports Iranian nationalism, political pluralism and constitutionalism.
The fourth bloc, the social democratic bloc, has been totally suppressed and is completely disorganised. The FutureThe democratic discourse of civil society has arisen as a reaction against the dominant political discourses, especially traditional patrimonialism and ideological traditionalism. Within it, a new pattern of political practice and participation is emerging. It is giving a different self-perception and identity to the individual citizen, in opposition to the paradigm of the obedient subject subservient to the traditional monarch or the ruling theologian.
As mentioned above, the civil society discourse is the latest manifestation of the wider democratic discourse that was born around the time of the Constitutional Revolution, was retarded by the absolutist state, grew in the 1940s and made a short appearance after the Islamic Revolution. The Islamic Revolution raised further obstacles in the process of democratisation. As a conservative, anti-modernist revolution, it created a mass society and articulated a totalitarian traditionalist ideology which dominated social, cultural and private life. Hence, the discourse of ideological traditionalism has been far more detrimental to democratisation than the other dominant discourses.
Today, given the ongoing crisis of ideological traditionalist domination, a new wave of democratisation has set in and the various socio-political groupings mentioned above are beginning to crystallise within the civil society discourse. However, there are still major obstacles to the advance of democratisation.
Thus, the political identity and self-perception of Iranians have been formed by patrimonial and traditionalist discourses for a very long time. So, one major obstacle to democratisation may be found in political culture and socialisation, which we may call “discursive subject-building”, or “subjectification”. Another major obstacle is the fusion of religion and politics, both on a theoretical and institutional level. The intellectual history of Iran is dominated by Islamic jurisprudence: rational thought has been weak throughout that history. Religious leaders have always had a claim to government and consider it their own prerogative. Shi’ism, unless reinterpreted in the light of modern necessities, has no capacity for democracy and can give way only to charismatic authoritarianism. Islam in general has an exclusive claim to knowledge of the truth, regarding all other doctrines as falsehood. Islam is the only gate to salvation: “Anyone who chooses a religion other than Islam, his religion will not be accepted and he will be a loser on the day of judgement” (Sura 3:85). Islam, in its orthodox interpretation at least, recognises no private realm and no secular arena in human life. Everything comes under the rule of Islamic law, which is total and unchangeable.
Nevertheless, some prospects are emerging for the coming of democracy in Iran. The introduction of the concept of “reason of state” in Ayatollah Khomeini’s theory of the absolute rule of the theologian may itself act as a factor in driving religion away from politics. This concept holds that the interest of the Islamic state is the highest necessity and first principle of Islam, whereas all the other rules and laws of Islam are “secondary”. Also, one could argue that Islamic jurisprudence is itself in a process of revision and renovation as a result of its inevitable confrontation and compromise with social change. Shi’ite political theory is being reinterpreted in a democratic way.
At the same time, a new, wider intellectual trend is emerging which, in contrast to the previous intellectual trend, favours dialogue and discourse as opposed to violence and revolution. Democratic means and methods are no doubt essential for democratic aims and goals. Furthermore, it seems that charismatic and traditional authority as the foundation of the Islamic Revolution is in a state of deepening crisis, further paving the way for legal–democratic authority. All these strands come together to make what I have called the democratic discourse of civil society.
2. Salaam (newspaper), 18 Mehr 1377 (10 October1998.)
3. The second period of absence or concealment of the Twelfth Shi’ite Imam, Mohammad al-Mahdi, which began in 941 ce and will end only with his eschatological reappearance. Ed.
4. Those entitled to give a ruling on points of theology or law.
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