Who Is Osama Bin Laden?
The Pursuit of Supremacy
China and the United States: Conflict or Co-operation?
James H. Nolt
Evidence and Interpretation: Against Historical Triumphalism
Irene L. Gendzier
Culture, Ideology and History
Containment: Misreading Soviet Russia
Roger S. Whitcomb
A Just Conflict, Ethically Pursued
Ernest W. Lefever
How the Cold War Ended
A Soviet Defeat, but Not an End of History
Robert H. Baker
Three Theses on the Cold War
Origins and Ending: The Historical Debate
Deterrence and Reassurance: Lessons from the Cold War
Richard Ned Lebow
The Cyprus Problem: A Cold War Legacy
Facing the Unimaginable
A Jewish Voice for Co-existence
The Human Impact of Globalisation
Volume 3 ● Number 4 ● Autumn 2001óCold Wars, Old and New
Three Theses on the Cold War
The most prominent effort to this effect was the book by John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know.1 Despite this title, it is by no means clear that the new evidence has unambiguously resolved the many controversies that abound in the literature on the Cold War. This article takes a somewhat less ambitious approach. It addresses some key issues of interpretation and seeks to provide an overview of the new information that is now available. It presents its conclusions in the form of “theses” on the Cold War. These are not to be understood as representing final conclusions, but rather propositions that suggest themselves from the evidence examined and which can form the basis of further research.
I. HOW DID THE COLD WAR BEGIN?
The origins of the Cold War remain deeply controversial. The academic literature distinguishes three different perspectives on this question—traditionalist, revisionist and post-revisionist.
The traditionalist perspective has relied on two distinct and to some extent contradictory theoretical models for explaining Soviet foreign policy behaviour. The first is that of realism, according to which the Soviet Union acted as a great power, seeking to maximise its security and might. Another model sees ideology as a basic driving force of Soviet policy. The ideological basis of the view of the Soviet Union as a world revolutionary force is the Marxist–Leninist vision of a world communist society, which involves the abolition of the nation state and the establishment of a classless society. The resulting image of the Soviet Union was expressed in what Daniel Yergin terms the “Riga axioms”: the Soviet Union was seen as
a world revolutionary state, denying the possibilities of coexistence, committed to unrelenting ideological warfare, powered by a messianic drive for world mastery.2
Not all specialists in Soviet foreign policy would have expressed it in those terms. Nevertheless, there was a consensus that the Soviet Union was fundamentally expansionist and that therefore Soviet military power represented a deep threat to the West.
From this traditionalist perspective, the Soviet Union is seen as responsible for the Cold War. The policy of containment, first announced by President Harry S. Truman of the United States, was a necessary response to a growing threat. As the Soviet Union recovered from the Second World War and consolidated its grip over Eastern Europe, the Cold War pattern of international relations established itself.
The revisionist literature on the Cold War, the beginning of which can be dated to the publication of Gar Alperovitz’s study Atomic Diplomacy in the mid-sixties, developed an entirely different framework for the interpretation of Soviet foreign policy.3 Daniel Yergin has described it as one which
downplayed the role of ideology and the foreign-policy consequences of authoritarian domestic practices, and instead saw the Soviet Union behaving like a traditional Great Power within the international system, rather than trying to overthrow it.4
Yergin termed these tendencies of the revisionist framework the “Yalta axioms”.
The revisionist line was that the Cold War was not an inevitable development, but emerged as a consequence of the dynamics of Soviet–American relations after the Second World War. It is predicated on the thesis that while Roosevelt was prepared to divide the world up into spheres of influence, allowing the Soviet Union its own buffer zone in Eastern Europe as an essential aspect of its security, US foreign policy changed after his death. Truman was influenced by hardline anti-Soviet elements in the State Department and pursued a policy increasingly based on the Riga axioms. In this account the developing mistrust between the Soviet Union and the United States was partly caused by this shift in US policy, which eliminated all prospects for a more co-operative relationship and compelled the Soviet Union to consolidate its own sphere of influence. Others have gone even further to argue that the continued existence of a socialist command economy which resisted the influence of US capitalism was fundamentally inimical to Washington’s interests; the United States is thus seen as a driving force of the Cold War.5
The post-revisionist approach is a synthesis of the two earlier approaches. It accepts that the Soviet Union did not intend to invade Western Europe in the early post-war years, but at the same time concedes the perception of Soviet threat by Western policymakers.
The archival documents that have since become available on Soviet foreign policy in the aftermath of the Second World War shed considerable light on the thinking and motivations of Soviet policymakers.6 They confirm that two pivotal events which are central to the revisionist narrative, namely the death of Roosevelt and the use of the atomic bomb, had a profound effect on Stalin’s view of the international situation. Roosevelt’s death and Churchill’s electoral defeat removed the two statesmen who in Stalin’s view were essential to accomplishing the redistribution of spheres of influence. The atomic bomb made a dramatic impact on the Soviet leadership. Stalin had counted on the Soviet Union emerging as the most powerful country in Europe, with the United States retreating into isolation. Now the might of the Red Army was negated by the atomic bomb, to the extent that the Soviet Union itself faced the potential threat of atomic blackmail. With the atomic bomb, when the United States could decisively strike anywhere in the world without deploying large armies, a return to isolationism seemed less plausible. Stalin’s public response was to downplay the significance of atomic weapons. At the same time the Soviet project to develop the atomic bomb was put into high gear. The need to create a buffer zone in Central Europe acquired greater urgency, even though this could only hinder and not ultimately thwart an American attack on the Soviet homeland.7
Revisionists have noted that Stalin had only limited goals in Iran and Greece, where two of the early crises in East–West relations occurred. This does not mean that Stalin did not want to expand Soviet influence by supporting revolutions and the process of decolonisation which was sweeping the developing world in the aftermath of the war. But he acted with caution and restraint, as the Soviet Union needed a breathing space: the economy had to be rebuilt, the Red Army had to be strengthened and rearmed, and atomic weapons, modern jet planes and rockets had to be acquired.
The picture that emerges from documents now available confirms that the German question lay at the heart of East–West relations and the future of the European system of states. Stalin was convinced that within fifteen years Germany would have recovered from the war. His vision of Germany’s future was not one of a divided country, but a unified Germany that would be socialist and allied to the Soviet Union. By consolidating the Soviet hold over the eastern zone and undermining the British presence in Germany, he could achieve this vision if American forces withdrew from Europe. While initially developments in Germany moved in the direction Stalin favoured, as the Western powers, too, were keen not to cement the division of Germany, the status quo became increasingly untenable. Soviet policy towards Germany exhibited serious contradictions. The wave of German refugees from Silesia and Prussia (created essentially by Stalin’s policies), the dismantling of East German industry and the transfer of industrial assets to the Soviet Union, the transfer of highly skilled people to work in the Soviet Union and the general effects of Soviet administration—all these factors resulted in severe economic problems in East Germany, which was already ravaged by the war. For their part, the Allies decided to push ahead with the rebuilding of the western zones of Germany. Ultimately, the division of Germany would be the only way for the Soviet Union to maintain its position.
The Marshall Plan, announced in 1947, brought things to a head. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan finally convinced the Soviet leadership that its previous assumptions had been incorrect, that the United States was engaged in a major attempt to be the pre-eminent power in Europe and that the contradictions between the Allies, especially the United States and Britain, would not prevent that attempt. Moreover, the United States would promote the recovery of German military–industrial might against the Soviet Union. The Marshall Plan was perceived as a direct threat to the Soviet security zone in Central Europe. Stalin’s response was to consolidate Soviet influence there. The Berlin crisis was a last-ditch effort to prevent the creation of a West German state. The failure of Stalin’s tactics sealed the division of Germany and Europe.
The analysis of Soviet thinking as it emerges from the documents gives much credence to the revisionist account of the major turning points of the origins of the Cold War. However, the larger thesis of the revisionist approach is more difficult to sustain. It involves the notion that the Cold War had little or nothing to do with the threat of Soviet expansion, but rather arose from the American search for a dominant role in the international system. The driving force of the Cold War was not the Soviet threat, but rather the American vision of an open world economy. The spectre of the Soviet threat was promoted by the American political elite to legitimate its foreign policy and unify the West in a US-led alliance. This account relies heavily on the weakness of the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Second World War and the rather cautious policies pursued by Stalin, policies based on the analytical framework of the “Yalta axioms”. Essentially, the revisionist account denies that Stalin was motivated by the larger goals of an ideological drive towards world socialism, maintaining instead that he was the leader of a great power safeguarding its own interests. Soviet policy in Europe is to be explained by security concerns rather than a plan for expansion.
The archival evidence seems to demonstrate, paradoxically, that both the Yalta and Riga axioms are part of the explanation of Soviet foreign policy in the early post-war period. It is true that Stalin’s first priority was to ensure the security of the Soviet state in the emerging post-war international system and that the creation of a Central European buffer zone was a critical element of this policy. It is also true that Stalin was essentially a power politician, operating on the principles of Realpolitik. Nevertheless, the evidence also shows that he did have another perspective for the future. His principal objective was to restore a correlation of forces in which the Soviet Union would be the dominant power on the European continent. For this he needed a breathing space. At the same time he would encourage decolonisation and revolutions in the Third World. Here again Stalin would show restraint and not incur any risks. In the long term he saw a third world war from which socialism would emerge triumphant as inevitable, although this was more a general belief than the objective of policy.
Stalin’s foreign policy suffered from serious contradictions that resulted in significant failures and setbacks, creating a much more hostile international environment than he desired. The most important setback was that the Western governments deemed Stalin’s concept of spheres of influence unacceptable because it meant that the Soviet Union would impose its social system throughout its sphere. Indeed, the progressive implementation of this concept was considered by the West to be hostile and aggressive. New evidence does not contradict the view that this was the root cause of the antagonism between East and West. A social system in which human freedom and human rights were denied, in which arbitrary justice and judicial murder were practised on a large scale, was intolerable, especially in the light of what was learned about the Nazi regime.
Stalin’s German policy was unsustainable, as we have seen. Although revisionists have correctly explained these events and the archives corroborate those explanations, which hold that Stalin did not intend to invade Western Europe or start a war with the West, the Berlin crisis was nevertheless an important milestone in the emergence of the Cold War regime. Not only was Stalin’s blockade of Berlin interpreted as hostile and as a potential precursor of further aggression, but it also created the perception of a regime as having the moral character that would allow it to hold the civilian population of an entire city to ransom. As a consequence, Stalin’s foreign policy not only suffered a severe setback, but relations with the West deteriorated substantially.
Stalin’s policies towards regional crises and Third World countries were also inconsistent and flawed. In 1945–7, Stalin denied support to communist guerrillas in Greece and Vietnam, but his desire to use the revolutionary process to consolidate a communist bloc became more evident towards the end of the decade. Stalin’s decision to support Kim Il Sung in his attack on South Korea to unite the peninsula, an attack which resulted in the Korean War, negated all his previous efforts at restraint. A study of US and German threat perceptions in the period shows that the Korean War was a defining moment at which the view of the Soviet Union as aggressive, expansionist and posing a real and imminent threat to Western Europe was confirmed in the minds of leading policymakers.
The new evidence gathered by Cold War scholars since the availability of primary Soviet documentation from the period does corroborate the revisionist idea that Stalin sought a co-operative relationship with the West based on Realpolitik and the recognition of spheres of influence, at least from 1943 to 1946. But such a relationship was never a realistic prospect, for several reasons. First of all, Stalin’s ambitions for his sphere of influence exceeded what the West was willing to concede under any circumstances. The future of Germany was an insurmountable stumbling bloc. Second, Stalin’s desire to expand Soviet influence in the medium term was bound to create conflict in the longer term. It must also be considered that whatever modus vivendi Stalin might have created with the West, it could not have endured in the medium term. Stalin trusted no one, and as he was plotting to consolidate and expand Soviet power he was bound to suspect Western leaders of goals and activities inimical to the Soviet Union. Just before his death in 1953 he had decided to have the entire Soviet leadership beneath him executed and replaced, but he was unable to implement his decision. Permanent co-operation with anyone, especially Western leaders who in Soviet ideology were bound to be enemies of the Socialist camp and ultimately to seek to overthrow it, was simply inconceivable for Stalin. In this sense the Cold War was clearly unavoidable. The doctrine of the inevitability of war, which had already been expounded by Lenin, was affirmed by Stalin:
The fate of the world will ultimately be decided by the outcome of inevitable conflict between the worlds [of capitalism and socialism].8
Conflict with the West was also inevitable because the contradictions between the capitalist countries and the socialist camp would sharpen. From the perspective of the West, coexistence with the Soviet Union was problematic because the idea of a permanent Soviet sphere of influence in Europe, even though it had to be accepted under the shadow of nuclear weapons, was unacceptable.
We hereby arrive at our first thesis: The Soviet Union did initially envisage a post-war partnership with the United States and the other Western allies. However, the division into spheres of interests envisaged by the Soviet Union was inimical to Western interests and values. At the same time, the fundamental antagonism between the socialist camp and the West was only to be postponed, not overcome. The Soviet Union aimed to consolidate its control over Eastern and Central Europe and expand its influence by supporting revolutions in the developing world. Conflict with the West became inevitable, and revisionists are incorrect in blaming misguided Western diplomacy or identifying US global economic interests as the principal causative factor of the Cold War.
II. WHY DID THE COLD WAR LAST SO LONG?
If the sources of the Cold War lie in the nature of the Soviet regime and Stalin’s personality, how do we explain its endurance into the post-Stalin era?
It is tempting to explain the survival of the East–West conflict into the post-Stalin and nuclear era as resulting from the classic “security dilemma” postulated by realist international relations theory.
But this ignores the fact that the Soviet Union was not just another state, nor just another great power. The hostility towards the West was the consequence of a peculiar mixture of great power megalomania, inspired by a messianic ideology, and the specific requirements for the perpetuation of the Soviet power elite. The Communist Party was the political instrument for holding the Soviet Union together and legitimising the rule of the nomenklatura. The security services provided the means to quell any dissent.
The idea of an external threat played a crucial role in this configuration since the political identity of the Soviet Union as a state was defined in opposition to the “capitalist world”. The element of military confrontation was important because it provided a sense of objective reality to the conflict with capitalism.
The military element was important for two other reasons. One is that the armed forces were the ultimate instrument of power for the political elite. They were clearly essential in keeping the outer empire of the Eastern Bloc together. Although the military played a less important role in the political control of the Soviet Union itself, its mere existence was a source of enormous strength for Soviet political leaders. Second, the fact that the Soviet Union was one of the world’s two great military powers with a large strategic nuclear arsenal enabled Soviet leaders to conduct foreign policy as a global power.
None of this is to say that the Soviet Union was not under threat. But the threat was not a military threat per se, despite the enormous build-up of military power in the West. The threat consisted in the continuous challenge to the legitimacy of the Soviet power elite. This challenge came from the West, it came from domestic opposition in Eastern Europe and it came from inside the Soviet Union itself. It was a challenge to the political value-system that governed Soviet society and externalised itself in Soviet foreign policy behaviour.
The strategic nuclear stalemate which established itself at the end of the 1950s stabilised the Cold War regime and allowed it to endure. The West could not military challenge the Soviet sphere of influence and vice-versa. At the same time, the threat of nuclear conflict moderated the Soviet attitude to war as an instrument of policy. For this reason the Soviet Union, during the Khrushchev period, rescinded the doctrine of the inevitability of war and proclaimed peaceful co-existence as the general line of Soviet foreign policy. However, while settling down to a more stable relationship with the West, the Soviet Union continued to maintain its control—backed by military force—over Central Europe, and sought to expand its influence globally by supporting national liberation movements and insurgencies in the developing world. During the Brezhnev period, in which détente with the West briefly flourished, Soviet involvement in the Third World escalated, culminating in the military intervention in Afghanistan.
The history of arms control shows that the Soviet security dilemma could have been resolved easily had it simply been a matter of ensuring the external security of the Soviet state. Indeed, the possession of nuclear weapons did substantially resolve the problem of external security. If the “security dilemma” had been the source of East–West tension, then the Cold War should have ended with the acquisition of large nuclear arsenals. The reason why arms control largely failed in the end was because the perpetuation of the East–West conflict (albeit in a manner which did not allow it to get out of control) was necessary for the Soviet power elites in order to preserve their own legitimacy and existence. From the Western perspective as well, the military dimension was in many respects less important than the political dimension.
So, our second thesis states: The Cold War continued after Stalin’s death because the identity of the Soviet state and the legitimacy of its power elite were constructed around the “otherness” of the socialist camp and the conflict with the West. It endured for so long owing to the strategic nuclear stalemate.
III. A SOVIET DEFEAT?
It is almost universally believed that the Soviet Union and with it the entire communist bloc lost the Cold War. But in what sense exactly did the Soviet Union lose? It is a common belief that the failure of its command economy made it impossible for the Soviet Union to sustain its power struggle with the West. But this was not the case. It is true that the economy was experiencing a long-term decline which, if it continued, would undermine the basis for a global foreign policy in competition with the West. However, the economic collapse came after Gorbachev had begun to dismantle the command economy, without being able to put anything coherent in its place.
From a military perspective also, it is unclear how it can be argued that the Soviet Union lost the Cold War. True, the military superiority which the Warsaw Pact believed it enjoyed in Central Europe was largely negated by the emergence of sophisticated, high-technology weapons in Western arsenals. Indeed, by the late 1980s Soviet military planners came to believe that the principal factor which had underpinned the power of their conventional forces, namely the quantity and quality of battle tanks deployed in Central Europe, had been largely negated by NATO anti-tank capabilities. But this does not mean that in the event of war the Warsaw Pact would have faced inevitable defeat. The opposite was the case: the Warsaw Pact enjoyed a sufficient mix of conventional and nuclear weapons to ensure a stalemate at the very least and compel NATO forces to cease hostilities. The interpretation put on this situation by the Soviet military leadership was not that the competition with the West had to be abandoned, but rather that the Soviet economy had to become more efficient so that it could compete in the latest round of the technological arms race. But even if these efforts proved fruitless, the Soviet Union would still have had the ability to deter the West.
This analysis yields two important conclusions about the end of the Cold War. The first is that the collapse of Soviet power and the dissolution of the Soviet state itself fundamentally contradict neo-realist analysis, according to which the most fundamental objectives that states pursue are the perpetuation of their own existence and the maximisation of their power. Indeed, on the neo-realist analysis, and in continuity with the long-established parameters of Soviet foreign policy, a greater assertiveness abroad and a more sustained endeavour to improve the economy by a more determined use of the authoritarian instruments of government would have been expected. It is both the timing and peaceful nature of the end of the Soviet empire that defy explanation by the neo-realist or structural realist paradigms. The changes in the international system were not inevitable consequences of changes in the balance of power.
A Generational Shift
The second conclusion is that the Cold War ended because the Soviet leadership decided that it wanted to end it. This of course raises the question as to what caused it to pursue this objective. There is as yet no complete answer to this question. However, the analysis of primary documents and biographical literature suggests that a generational change occurred in the Soviet elite and that the new leaders were principally concerned to deal with Soviet economic decline, with the failure of the Soviet Union to become a modern industrialised country, with social disintegration and with the disillusionment among the intellectual elite. The transformation of relations with the West was an integral part of this process but not the primary objective.
The opportunity for the new generation to assert itself came as the older generation allowed the Soviet Union to fall into a state of complete political paralysis. The international environment undoubtedly played a part. The intensity of the hostility in East–West relations was perceived as extremely dangerous in the Soviet Union, but the previously established means of reducing tension proved wholly inadequate. A completely new departure, a wholesale revision of the intellectual framework that defined Soviet foreign relations, was required. The Gorbachev programme, even though it lacked precise objectives and was inconsistent in its implementation, had the far-reaching goal of totally redefining the values on which internal Soviet political systems, and consequently Soviet relations with the outside world, were based. Gorbachev, his foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze and many of the younger academics who acted as their advisers had come to recognise the absurdity of continuing relations with the West on the basis of an international class struggle.
In the first place, they recognised that the West had no interest in a military conflict with the Soviet Union and that the perception of an external military threat was in fact an illusion, perpetuated by powerful interest groups inside the Soviet Union. This explains how quickly the conviction that there was no real threat from the West was adopted by the military establishment once the Soviet positions in Eastern Europe had been given up and the Cold War was declared to be over. The real threat to Soviet security lay in the militarisation of the economy and the detrimental consequences of the arms race. In the second place, they believed that the West was, as Gorbachev’s adviser Alexei Arbatov put it, the place “where civilisation lies”. In other words, they believed that the Soviet Union needed to adopt many of the values on which Western political systems and societies were based, such as democratic freedoms and human rights, albeit tempered by socialist values. The full meaning of this programme did not become clear for some time. But between 1987 and 1989 it came to be recognised that arms control was only the first step and that one of the fundamental causes of the Cold War, namely Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, needed to be removed.
The first phase of the Soviet collapse must be understood fundamentally as the voluntary dismantling of Soviet military power. Once military force was no longer considered legitimate as a means of holding the Soviet empire together that empire had to fall apart, since it was held together by nothing else. The adoption of a new system of values that was to govern both domestic and foreign policy was incompatible with the preservation of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe or even the Soviet Union itself as a state.
The outright claim that the Cold War ended because the Soviet Union lost cannot be supported and has to be modified. Clearly, the Soviet Union did not win the Cold War, but neither had it lost its capability to project its power abroad. Rather, the Cold War ended because a crucial part of the Soviet elite decided that the Cold War was wrong, that it was not and never had been an acceptable way of conducting foreign policy, and that it was not and never had been in the true national interest of the Soviet Union. This development in the elite’s outlook is, of course, related to the deep contradictions between socialist ideals and the Soviet reality, and to the dramatic failure of the Soviet Union to deliver in those areas of life where it claimed moral superiority over the West, namely social and economic justice. But these contradictions were not a phenomenon that arose in the 1980s; they had always been part and parcel of Soviet reality. There are circumstances which help to explain why a new generation of the political elite wanted to reform the Soviet system radically. But this does not mean that they were forced to do so, or that the old elite could not have carried on for a long time as before had it remained in power. The third thesis therefore states: The Soviet Union did not lose the Cold War. It decided to end the Cold War.
Historians and political scientists are still too close to the Cold War era to write a definitive history of it, if there can ever be such a thing. However, the new evidence which has become available over the last ten years permits some preliminary conclusions about a number of controversial issues. The first is that some synthesis between the revisionist and traditional approaches to the study of the Cold War is possible. The revisionist account of early Cold War history remains plausible; Stalin did have a serious interest in continuing the wartime collaboration with the West. However, his vision of Europe’s future was completely irreconcilable with that of the West and he did foresee a conflict with the West after a breathing period to rebuild the Soviet Union and its economic and military capacities. Conflict with the West, which because of the emergence of strategic nuclear arsenals remained a cold war, became inevitable, and revisionists are incorrect to blame misguided Western diplomacy or define US global economic interests as the principal causative factors of the Cold War.
The new military technologies, missiles, jet aircraft and weapons of mass destruction globalised the Cold War and stabilised the Cold War regime, which was not susceptible to a military resolution. Stalin’s successors continued to construct a political system in Europe that would guarantee the security and political stability of the Soviet Union. At the same time, they promoted socialist revolutions in the Third World and expanded Soviet influence in the non-aligned world.
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet power was a complex and multi-faceted process that is not yet well understood. However, it cannot be explained simply by a change in the balance of power or by Soviet economic decline. It involved a shift in the values espoused by leading members of the Soviet political elite. From this perspective, a constructivist explanation promises to be more fruitful than neo-realist analysis.
The key implication of the foregoing account is that the end of the Cold War and the collapse of a nuclear superpower were not merely a change in the balance of power or in the distribution of capabilities; they constituted a fundamental change in the nature of the international system and international relations. The consequences of this transformation remain to be fully understood and apprehended.
2. Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 11.
3. Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, expanded and rev. ed. (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1985 [first published in 1965]).
4. Yergin, Shattered Peace, p. 11.
5. The most radical exposition of this thesis is given in Noam Chomsky et al., Superpowers in Collision: The New Cold War (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 26.
6. The best English-language sources for the research done on these documents are the Working Papers and the Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project in Washington, D.C.
7. See Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Krushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).
8. Cited in Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), p. 75.